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Abstract 
Major attempts to control the natural environment characterized government 
‘developmental’ activity in twentieth-century Sind.  This thesis argues that the 
construction of three barrage dams across the River Indus, along with a network of 
irrigation canals, enacted human control over nature as a political project.  The Raj 
and its successor state in Sind, Pakistan, thereby claimed legitimacy through their 
capacity to benefit humans by re-modelling the landscape.  These claims depended 
on an implied narrative of material progress, which irrigation development was 
expected to bring about, in a province considered technologically and socially 
backward.   
In allocating land that was newly made available for cultivation, government 
officials found an unprecedented opportunity to also re-shape agrarian society.  As 
well as providing the means by which ‘ideal types’ of cultivator could be encouraged 
to proliferate, the development of Sind’s irrigation system was based on concepts of 
modernization that promoted increasing state intervention in agrarian life to render 
a ‘disordered’ society more easily governable.  This trend was constrained, however, 
by successive administrations’ need to balance the lure of radical modernization 
against the powerful claims on new land of local magnates. 
The colonial belief in the agricultural, economic, and social benefits of large-
scale irrigation projects was transplanted into the post-colonial state.  The 
construction of irrigation works, the colonization of land, and their political 
implications before and after Independence are therefore analyzed, in order to 
demonstrate how and why the logic of large infrastructure schemes remained 
consistent.  At the same time, differences in how successive administrations framed 
and enacted barrage projects are shown to have depended on contemporary 
 4 
 
circumstances.  In the process, the thesis sheds new light on the tensions between 
and within the central and provincial governments, demonstrating the contested 
nature of concepts of Imperial governance, nation-building, and material progress. 
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A note on spelling and names 
Personal names, place-names, and words transliterated from Indian languages can 
all be rendered in a variety of spellings.  These spellings have also tended to change 
over time.    
Spellings in this thesis have been rendered without diacritical marks.  For place 
names, spellings contemporary with the source material have normally been 
preserved.  During the period covered by this thesis, the name of the province was 
spelled “Sind” (now “Sindh”).   For personal names, the most common Roman script 
spellings for individuals are used.  This means that the same name can have different 
spellings for different individuals, so “Mohammed Ali Jinnah” but “Ghulam 
Muhammad”.  Common words of indigenous origin, such as “zamindar” and “hari”, 
have been rendered in their usual modern forms.   
Where any of the above appear in direct quotations, the original spellings have been 
preserved.  Non-English words have been italicized in the text, except in direct 
quotations, where the source’s usage has been preserved. 
The names of the barrages themselves present more difficulties.  The first barrage 
was known during the planning phase as the Sukkur Barrage, then as the Lloyd 
Barrage (after the Governor of Bombay who authorized its construction), and 
eventually reverted to Sukkur Barrage.  Contemporary usage appears to have been 
subject as much to an author’s preference as to its formal name.  Because “Sukkur 
Barrage” was overall the most commonly-used name, it has been referred to as such 
here. 
The second barrage was initially known as the Kotri Barrage, and then renamed the 
Ghulam Muhammad Barrage after a Governor-General of Pakistan.  It has now 
reverted to Kotri Barrage.  However, because Ghulam Muhammad Barrage was 
almost exclusively used at the time, this is how the name appears in the thesis. 
The third barrage, the Gudu Barrage, has kept the same name but had a variety of 
spellings.  The form adopted here seems to be the most consistently used over time. 
Again, in direct quotations, the original names and spellings have been reproduced. 
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Map of Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from ‘Pakistan Political Map’, 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/pakistan/pakistan-political-map.html (retrieved 
07.01.2011). 
N.B. This map is intended to be indicative and not definitive. 
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Map of Sind’s river and barrages 
 
 
Adapted from N.a., Ferozsons Atlas for Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1986), pp.20-21. 
N.B. This map is intended to be indicative and not definitive. 
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Introduction 
 
I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river 
Is a strong brown god—sullen, untamed and intractable, 
Patient to some degree, at first recognised as a frontier; 
Useful, untrustworthy, as a conveyor of commerce; 
Then only a problem confronting the builder of bridges. 
The problem once solved, the brown god is almost forgotten 
By the dwellers in cities—ever, however, implacable. 
Keeping his seasons and rages, destroyer, reminder 
Of what men choose to forget. Unhonoured, unpropitiated 
By worshippers of the machine, but waiting, watching and waiting. 
-T.S. Eliot, ‘The Dry Salvages’ (1931)1 
 
From the closing decades of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, 
those who governed Sind, a province of British India until 1947 and thereafter of 
Pakistan, constructed major irrigation works that extended the supply of water for 
agriculture to barren land, and improved the reliability of the water supply to 
existing farmland.  The British-headed administration completed the Jamrao Canal in 
1899 and went on to build a large barrage at Sukkur in 1932, while after 
Independence the new government completed two more barrages, the Ghulam 
Muhammad Barrage in 1955 and the Gudu Barrage in 1962.  In 1885-1890 the area 
of irrigated agricultural land in Sind was 792,000 ha; irrigation development 
increased this to 5,604,000 ha by 1970-71,2 greatly strengthening the local economy, 
and helping to alter the socio-economic and political makeup of Sind.  But while 
successive administrations loudly proclaimed that irrigation projects were being 
undertaken for the good of Sind’s cultivators, and celebrated the transformation of 
Sind’s landscape that modern science and technology could effect, the extent of the 
rhetoric involved raises questions about whether these proclamations should be 
taken at face value.  This thesis, therefore, explores the political dimensions of 
                                                          
1
 T.S. Eliot, The Dry Salvages (London: Faber and Faber, 1931), part I, ll.1-14. 
2
 Jayantha Perera, Irrigation Development and Agrarian Change: A study in Sindh, Pakistan 
(Jaipur: Rawat, 2003), pp.61, 187. 
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irrigation development, and asks why – and to whose benefit – the projects in Sind 
were undertaken. 
The idea of harnessing and controlling nature on a grand scale, upon which 
Sind’s canal and barrage projects depended, has long been a particular concern of 
rulers and states, from the scientific management of royal forests in late 
seventeenth century Prussia and Saxony, to the electricity-generating Hoover Dam 
in Colorado in the early twentieth.  At the same time, environmental conditions 
always play a part in delineating the possibilities and limits of human activity, as 
works by Gadgil, Guha, and Madsen have suggested in the context of small-scale 
case studies.3  On a larger scale, Davis has established the effects of unstable 
geological conditions on human behaviour at the cultural, political and economic 
levels by integrating the ecological history of the El Niño climactic system into more 
conventional histories of European colonial expansion in Asia, Africa, and South 
America.4   In a related vein, Mitchell has underlined the complexity of political, 
economic and environmental circumstances in twentieth century Egypt, showing 
how human and non-human actors interacted to produce events.5   
The particular role of modern states in the relationship between humans 
and the environment has been crucial, as Scott has claimed in his examination of the 
philosophy and politics of schemes to ‘improve the human condition’.  These 
projects, in his view, were characterized by their reduction of complex natural and 
social environments to simplified pictures that allowed more apparently rational and 
efficient schemas to be put in their place.  Such reductionism gave those who 
                                                          
3
 Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This Fissured Land: An ecological history of India 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992); Stig Toft Madsen’s Introduction in his edited volume 
State, Society and the Environment in South Asia (Richmond: Curzon, 1999). 
4
 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts : El Nino famines and the making of the Third World 
(London; New York: Verso, 2001). 
5
 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts : Egypt, techno-politics, modernity (Berkeley; London: 
University of California Press, 2002), esp. ch. 1. 
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planned and executed the projects a false sense that they could control complex 
processes.6  Such processes were not only environmental, but also human, and 
attempts to control the environment and re-order nature have thus carried deep 
political implications.  Mitchell, for instance, argues that the 1942 malaria epidemic 
in Egypt provided a valuable opportunity for foreign agencies such as the 
Rockerfeller Foundation to present themselves as detached centres of rationality 
and intelligence as they brought new disease-control techniques to bear on the 
crisis.  After decolonization, the continued activities of foreign ‘advisors’ in Egypt, 
especially the United States Agency for International Development, perpetuated the 
relationship between the West and the non-West as one construed in terms of the 
latter’s lack of the former’s expertise, technology, and management skills.7  As Adas 
had previously asserted, the American ‘modernization paradigm’ displaced the 
colonial ‘civilizing mission’ as the main ideal of Western dominance outside Europe 
and North America after decolonization.8   
Mitchell is right to identify the possession of certain kinds of knowledge as 
crucial to power-relationships.  The link between knowledge and power in colonial 
contexts, particularly knowledge of native societies, is well established.9  Specifically 
regarding the kind of technical knowledge needed to assert control over the 
environment, scholars such as Headrick and Baber have demonstrated that 
knowledge of the ‘universal principles’ of post-Enlightenment science, and the 
ability to apply them, were extremely important in allowing Europeans to subjugate 
                                                          
6
 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How certain schemes to improve the human condition 
have failed (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1998). 
7
 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, pp.209-242. 
8
 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, technology, and ideologies of 
Western dominance (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 402-412. 
9
 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Partha 
Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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and rule Africans and Asians.10  As Adas suggests, this kind of knowledge was not 
only used by colonial governors to their own advantage, but the self-conscious 
possession of it played a significant part in formulating colonial ideas about Western 
dominance over the non-West.  As he would have it, colonialists felt that what they 
perceived as their own pre-eminence in inventiveness and superior understanding of 
the workings of the natural world justified their monopolization of leadership and 
managerial roles in colonized societies.  By the late nineteenth century, the degree 
to which a culture was able to control its environment determined its rank on the 
scale from savagery to civilization.11  Scientific and technical knowledge has been, 
therefore, crucial both in the extension of empires and imperial states, and in the 
self-perception of colonial rulers.   
The notion of the ‘state’, however, cannot be taken for granted in the 
context of river politics.  Indeed, the way in which we understand states has much to 
gain from examining their participation in large-scale attempts to re-order the 
natural environment.  Gellner, among others, has rejected Weber’s definition of the 
state “as that agency within society which posses the monopoly of legitimate 
violence,”12 as too simplistic.  For him, “the ‘state’ is that institution or set of 
institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order”, where a political 
division of labour has allowed such specialisation.13  Schulze notes that Machiavelli 
first used the term ‘lo stato’ to refer to “the organization of political power”.14  This 
                                                          
10
 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European imperialism in the 
nineteenth century (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), part 3; Zaheer Baber, 
The science of empire: scientific knowledge, civilization, and colonial rule in India (Delhi; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.9. 
11
 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, pp.205-215. 
12
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
p.3.  
13
 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.4. 
14
 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the present, 
trans. William E. Yuill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p.30.  On the relationship between 
postcolonial nation-formation and colonialist epistemology, see: Partha Chatterjee, 
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definition is arguably too broad to be useful in a context where large, well-organized 
government agencies engage in complex tasks such as infrastructure development, 
which is a common feature of attempts to control the environment.   Alavi’s 
emphasis on military-bureaucratic ‘oligarchies’, which he identifies as common in 
post-colonial states, and their relationship with ‘exploiting classes’ within and 
outside former colonies, might be a more helpful way to view the often centralized, 
‘top-down’ approach to governance in countries where river-development proved to 
be most intensive in the twentieth century, such as Egypt, India, and Pakistan.15  
Adas, Scott and Mitchell certainly suggest that this is true, highlighting as they do 
the imposition of such schemes by the governors on the governed.   
A helpful element present within this last approach to the state is its 
emphasis on what states do, as well as how they are composed.  Other 
understandings prioritize the way that ‘the state’ is perceived and experienced by 
ordinary people.  Recently, this has opened up a field of enquiry that questions the 
‘meaning’ of the state from a variety of viewpoints, including its relationship with 
gender, ethnicity and religious identity.16  This work has often been based on oral 
history, and has been significantly influenced by sociology and anthropology, both in 
terms of research methods and analytical frameworks.  A collection edited by Fuller 
and Benei, for example, is chiefly concerned with anthropological approaches to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A derivative discourse? (London: Zed Books, 
1986). 
15
 See Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', in Kathleen 
Gough and Hari P. Sharma (ed.s), Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (London; New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1973). 
16
 In South Asian historiography, this trail was blazed by influential studies of the 1947 
Partition of India.  See, for example, Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from 
the partition of India (New Delhi; London: Penguin, 1998); Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, 
Borders & Boundaries: Women in India's partition (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1998).  Important later works in this line include Veena Das, Life and Words: Violence and the 
descent into the ordinary (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2007); Vazira 
Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: 
Refugees, boundaries, histories (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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what they term the ‘everyday state’ in modern India.17  Likewise, an edited volume 
by Hansen and Stepputat has questioned the link conventionally drawn between 
states, territory, and sovereignty.18  By exploring river politics, this thesis will test 
notions of what the state meant in colonial and post-colonial contexts.  It will use 
irrigation development to examine the relationship between different branches of 
government, and between the administration and the people.  It will also consider 
the relationship between the state, the environment, and science and technology. 
Water in South Asia 
One technology crucial to human attempts to control nature is irrigation.  Managing 
water – its supply, storage, and distribution – has long been a lynchpin of civilization 
in much of the world.  Wittfogel identified irrigation works with state power in 
ancient Asian and Middle Eastern civilizations, arguing that ‘hydraulic societies’, 
whose agriculture and economies depended on artificial irrigation, tended to be 
regulated by strong, centralized states.  Only well-organized bureaucracies, with the 
state’s relatively immense resources at their disposal, could carry out the necessary 
work of diverting river-flows and managing the distribution of water on a large 
scale.19  Wittfogel’s conclusions have been challenged by more recent scholars such 
as Dolatyar and Gray,20 but his notions of the influence of climatic and hydrological 
conditions on societies, and the important role of states in such societies, have 
informed subsequent thinking about irrigational civilizations.   
                                                          
17
 C. J. Fuller and Veronique Benei, The Everyday State and Society in Modern India (London: 
Hurst, 2001). 
18
 See the Introduction to Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Steputat (ed.s), Sovereign Bodies: 
Citizens, migrants and states in the postcolonial world (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005). 
19
 Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A comparative study of total power (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 22, 161. 
20
 Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A context for conflict 
or co-operation? (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.3-6. 
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In the modern era, colonial and post-colonial states have played a 
determining role in river-control and irrigation-development in, for example, the 
Nile Basin (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Rwanda), Palestine, and South Asia.  
Important debates have included strategies for reducing conflict and increasing co-
operation where river basins are shared by two or more nation-states and the 
impact of colonial rule on irrigated areas.21  At the same time, the international 
development community has, since decolonization after the Second World War, 
been concerned with schemes to improve water provision in developing countries.22   
South Asia features prominently among the world’s centres of man-made 
irrigation.  Much of the subcontinent is dry, and requires artificial water supplies to 
supplement natural rainfall.  In South India, water is stored in and distributed from 
artificial reservoirs or ‘tanks’,23 while North Indian irrigation is dominated by river 
basins, which today host large networks of canals.  India and Pakistan share the 
Indus Basin, while the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin, which is formed around 
the confluence of those three rivers, stretches through India and Bangladesh, as well 
as China and Nepal.   
In the subcontinent’s arid northwest, irrigation works that divert water from 
the River Indus into canals are essential to sustain agricultural and municipal 
societies.  In this region, an irrigation canal can help turn barren wastes into 
productive farmland.  Scholarly work on the colonial irrigation system has uncovered 
a great deal about the politics and economics of canal irrigation elsewhere in British 
                                                          
21
 Terje Tvedt, The River Nile in the Age of the British: Political ecology and the quest for 
economic power (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004); K. Gaarde, 'British Colonial Water 
Legislation in Mandatory Palestine', in R. Coopey and T. Tvedt (ed.s), A History of Water, 
Volume 2: The political economy of water (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). 
22
 World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A new framework for decision-
making (London: Earthscan, 2000). 
23
 See David Mosse, 'Colonial and Contemporary Ideologies of 'Community Management': 
The case of tank irrigation development in South India', Modern Asian Studies, 33:2 (1999): 
303-338. 
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India, and its social impacts.  Some debate exists about whether canals benefited 
Indian peasants, with Stone’s examination of canals in the mid-nineteenth century 
North-West Province answering in the affirmative,24 while Whitcombe notes the 
deterioration of agricultural land through over-watering and poor drainage, and the 
malarial conditions created by the pools of stagnant water that lay on poorly-
drained land.25  Both authors focus on the finances of canal irrigation, showing how 
the state and farmers gained, to varying degrees, from capital outlays on irrigation 
systems.  Islam’s work on canal colonies in the Punjab also privileges irrigation’s 
financial aspects.26   
Other studies of the Punjab’s canal colonies, by Ali and Gilmartin, do more 
to illuminate the social and political implications of canal irrigation.  Ali claims that 
agricultural colonization had a profound impact on the position of the state vis à vis 
the people in the Punjab, where the state controlled not only canal water but also 
the manner in which land was disposed of, to whom it was allotted, and the types of 
tenurial rights that were to prevail.  “The greater strength of the state,” he argues, 
echoing Wittfogel, “its ‘entrenchment’ in society, arose out of its pivotal role in this 
region of hydrological agriculture.”27  Making a similar point, Gilmartin asserts that 
the “control of irrigation was a hinge between the power of the local ‘community’ 
and that of the state.”28  Gilmartin’s analysis goes further than Ali’s in recognizing 
the importance of canal development in officials’ perceptions of themselves and the 
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state’s role.  He discusses the increasing influence over irrigation policy of technical 
knowledge, residing chiefly in the Public Works Department, at the expense of 
revenue officers’ intimate knowledge of local customs.29  Controlling water, then, 
became one of the key responsibilities of the colonial state in India, and at the same 
time one of the most important ways in which it could influence, and maintain 
control over, Indian communities.   
Gilmartin and Ali portray the relationship between irrigation, officials, and 
cultivators on a relatively small scale.  Studies of irrigation in South Asia could 
benefit, however, from an interrogation of the relationship between the state and 
the environment in a broader sense, including the role of discourses of material 
progress and the notion of controlling the environment.  This thesis will therefore 
seek to illuminate how important a place irrigation development held in the 
establishment of ideas about the colonial and post-colonial state’s legitimacy.  In 
other words, it will ask whether schemes to harness rivers were significant as 
markers of human endeavour.  In light of the importance of technical ability in 
irrigation development, the thesis will also consider the role of scientific knowledge 
in large-scale projects, especially the question of how far engineering expertise was 
self-consciously deployed in the cause of consolidating state authority. 
Introducing Sind 
Within South Asia, river-control and the state’s role in it is particularly important in 
Sind, which depends almost wholly on the River Indus for fresh water.  The Indus, 
which is joined by the last of its tributaries shortly before entering the province, 
bisects Sind and meets the sea at the southern coast.  Over thousands of years, the 
river has deposited silt on Sind’s soil as it changed its course, making the country 
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highly fertile.  Before twentieth-century irrigation led to soil fertility becoming 
exhausted in many areas, almost all the land in Sind could be farmed if water were 
brought to it.   
Accordingly, Sindhi agriculture has been dependent on the Indus to water 
crop-fields.  This was true of the Indus Valley Civilization, the remains of which, 
dating back to 3000 BCE, have been found at Mohenjo-Daro in Sind and Harappa in 
the Punjab.  These settlements appear to have depended on the river almost wholly 
for their sustenance.  When Muhammad bin Qasim invaded India in 711, Sind 
already possessed a canal system, and this was the backbone of the regional 
economy when the East India Company conquered Sind in 1843.  Cheesman and 
Khuhro have recognized the importance of the subsequent development of this 
canal system under the Raj, but have not extensively considered its relationship with 
concepts of state legitimacy as part of the colonial ‘civilizing mission’.30  Given the 
vital importance of river-control to the sustenance of life in Sind, irrigation deserves 
greater attention.   
The building of Sind’s barrages, and the Jamrao Canal, were certainly major 
events.  Perera has understood the state-sponsored development of Sind’s irrigation 
system, by both the colonial and Pakistani governments, as the trigger of major 
agrarian changes, but indicates that very little has changed in the relationship 
between cultivators, landlords, and the state.31  If the building of barrages and 
canals has done little to alter the way that farm labour is organized, it has had other 
kinds of effects on the province – negative as well as positive.  In the words of Alam, 
Sahota and Jeffry, “Many of today’s water problems in the Indus basin have their 
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roots in the colonial period – salinity, drainage, inadequate water pricing, poor 
maintenance, provincial conflict, and ineffective bureaucratic organization.”32  In this 
portrayal, the state apparatus cannot combat the physical and mechanical 
challenges posed by the landscape, or to regulate itself properly; nor can the 
national state regulate its constituent provinces’ rivalries.  Bengali and Shah have 
made the point the Pakistani state’s “fetish” for capital- and technology-intensive, 
foreign-debt-funded, environmentally-degrading approaches towards irrigation 
seeks technological fixes for social and political problems, which tend only to 
displace such problems and remove them elsewhere.33   
General agreement exists, then, that the state has been crucial in projects to 
tame the Indus and make it available for agricultural uses.  Unanswered questions 
remain, however, about how river-control has been understood by those who built 
and operated irrigation systems, what kind of knowledge they deployed, and why 
this might have been important.  What kind of social and political effects did they 
expect such schemes to produce?  This thesis seeks to draw out the philosophy 
shared by Sind’s rulers – on both the provincial and national (British Indian or 
Pakistani) scales – which helped to determine how the economic and social 
development of the province was actively promoted.  At the same time, it explores 
the political and social implications of the kind of large-scale, technology-intensive 
development projects that the barrages and canals epitomized. 
Sind’s history is crucial to understanding the political importance of barrages 
and canals, but is not comprehensively covered by existing scholarship.  Sind holds a 
peripheral place in English-language studies of colonial India, and a more integral, 
though by no means dominant, position in studies of Pakistan.  Only a handful of 
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substantial works cover Sind’s history after its annexation by the British in 1843.  
There are several reasons why this may be the case.  Sind was located on the north-
western fringe of British India, geographically remote from the Imperial capitals in 
Calcutta and subsequently New Delhi.  While administered as part of the Bombay 
Presidency between 1847 and 1936, it was barely contiguous with the Presidency 
proper and accessible only from the sea.  In north-western India, Sind was eclipsed 
in fame and political importance by its northern neighbour, the Punjab, which had a 
bigger population and economy, and a privileged position in colonial official 
imaginations.   
With the advent of Pakistani independence in 1947, Sind’s national world 
shrank and it suddenly formed a much greater proportion of the sovereign unit of 
which it formed a part, but its subordination to the Punjab continued.  The brief 
tenure of Karachi, Sind’s major city, as the federal capital of Pakistan did little to 
enhance the status of the province itself, as the city was administratively separated 
from the province after 1948.  In 1955, Sind lost its political-administrative 
personality when it was amalgamated into the new West Pakistan Province, where 
again it fell under the Punjab.  At the same time Sindhi politics were typically inward-
looking and factional, meaning that the province was often disconnected from 
mainstream political events elsewhere in the subcontinent.34  After Independence, 
the ‘national’ political scene revolved around the politics of the Punjab and East 
Bengal.  Input from Pathans and Urdu-speaking refugees located in Karachi and 
other urban centres also took precedence over that of Sindhis.35 
Yet despite its geographical and political marginality, Ansari and Cheesman 
have both identified the region’s very peripheral nature as a reason to examine it 
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during the colonial period precisely because this affords an opportunity to examine 
the workings of imperialism away from the more celebrated centres of power.  In 
Cheesman’s words, “the British Empire was won and lost in the apparent backwaters 
like Sind,” where the constant day-to-day negotiations of collaborative rule were 
played out in relative peace.36  Ansari has explored the province as a case study of 
the relationship between Muslim religious elites and a colonial state, again stressing 
its isolation from Imperial centres, and argued that this can offer thoughts on the 
wider questions surrounding Muslim responses to colonial rule across the European 
empires.37  In a similar vein, Khuhro has asserted that nineteenth-century British 
Sind provides valuable insights on how the ‘European [colonial] mind’ was 
exercized.38   Ansari has also applied a similar logic to a study of responses by Sindhis 
and refugees to their newfound sharing of Karachi after Partition, making a case 
both for Karachi’s importance within Pakistan, and Sind’s value as a case study for 
the larger historical question of community and identity as contested issues.39  
This handful of works necessarily leaves many historical stones unturned.  As 
well as assessing the relationship between the state and the environment, this 
thesis’ investigation of the politics of river-development will address some of the 
gaps in existing literature.  Because extending and managing the irrigation system 
was a major part of the state’s activities, and was of interest to higher levels of 
government outside the province, the thesis will examine the relationship between 
the administration in Sind, and its suzerains in Bombay, Delhi, and London – and, 
later, Karachi or Islamabad.  Because water was used to irrigate farmland, the 
politics of land use, ownership and tenancy are essential to understanding the 
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implications of irrigation development: this, too, is a concern of the thesis.  Land 
politics have received only passing mention in studies of Pakistan.40  This thesis 
offers a new interpretation of Ayub Khan’s 1958 land reforms programme, as well as 
land issues more generally, where they have connected with the politics of irrigation 
development. 
Methodology and sources 
The thesis examines a variety of documentary evidence connected with government 
involvement in irrigation in Sind, of different types and from different periods.  For 
the colonial period, the staple sources are correspondence between officials in the 
Governments of Sind, Bombay and India, with additional reference to 
communications between the Government of India and the British Government in 
London, as represented by the Secretary of State for India.  Non-official sources, 
especially contemporary newspapers, are also used to demonstrate the currency of 
the progress ideal outside officialdom.   
The types of sources that predominate vary according to topic and chapter.  
Public Works and Revenue files form the basis of the documentation used in 
Chapters 1 and 2, and have been drawn from a number of sources.  The British 
Library’s holdings of official correspondence emanating from India are 
complemented by the private papers of officials working in the subcontinent.  These 
often contain duplicates of documents that can also be found in the official 
correspondence registers, and are especially useful for copies of those that were not 
sent to London for the India Office’s records.  Much of the analysis of land 
                                                          
40
 See Talbot, Pakistan: A modern history, pp.165-166, 230-232; Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and 
Authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and historical perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.145-146.  
 27 
 
colonization policy relating to the Sukkur Barrage in Chapter 2, for instance, is based 
on the Dow Papers. 
Documents that were not sent to London can also sometimes be found in 
collections outside the U.K.  Much of the correspondence quoted in Chapter 1 was 
found in the Sindh Government Archives, Karachi, and the Maharashtra State 
Archives, Mumbai.  As Sind was part of the Bombay Presidency until 1936, many 
records pertaining to the province were sent to Bombay and are still held there.  
Other documents were retained by the Commissioner-in-Sind’s office, and form the 
basis for the Sindh Government Archives.  Both collections, however, suffer from 
inconvenient cut-off points, due to changes in conventions for archiving official 
correspondence in the 1920s. 
Combining records from London, Karachi, and Mumbai allows a picture to 
be constructed of officials’ views and actions relating to irrigation development.  
However, once colonization was well-established, official interest in the projects at 
the levels from which records have been preserved seems to have dried up, and the 
intriguing topic of the changing social and political relationships in the Sind canal 
colonies needs to be approached obliquely, through references in later sources.  In 
this respect, the decennial Censuses of India and Pakistan have been helpful in 
outlining some of the demographic changes resulting from canal irrigation, and 
include some information on the growth of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
populations during the period under study.   
With the administrative separation of Sind from Bombay in 1936 came a 
new type of politics: that of the Provincial Assembly, made up largely of Sindhis and 
operating under the 1935 Government of India Act, which provided for elected 
representatives exercising much greater political control over the provincial 
administrations.  Because most of the Sind Assembly’s members were influential 
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landlords, its Proceedings provide an invaluable source for the study of how Sindhi 
zamindars (landlords) 41 adjusted to the new Sukkur Barrage system in Chapter 3.  In 
conjunction with documents relating to the movements for and against the 
separation, they have been especially helpful in tracking the changing role of the 
Sukkur Barrage in Sindhi politics during the 1920s and 1930s.  For the later 1930s 
and 1940s, they have also been considered in combination with correspondence 
between Governors of Sind and Viceroys (contained in both official registers and 
private papers).  These form the most direct window onto the matters that were 
preoccupying the higher levels of the administration, and it is instructive that 
agricultural and irrigational matters continued to feature with regularity throughout 
the 1930s and the Second World War, despite the great weight of constitutional and 
political questions that arose from the Provincial Governors’ new role as managers 
of provincial legislatures.   
For the post-independence era, the majority of sources used in this study 
have been obtained from the consular records of the United States and United 
Kingdom.  Both countries, and especially the U.S., kept extensive records on issues 
such as political upheavals, Pakistan’s economy, and the development projects to 
which their governments were contributing.  While consular report-writers often 
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depended on intelligence provided by locals, who had their own agendas to push, 
these records provide a wealth of specific and contextual detail about Sind’s barrage 
projects.  The National Documentation Centre, Islamabad, has furnished additional 
information regarding the attitudes and actions of the central government, and 
many Pakistani official publications are available in the British Library.  Matters of 
special interest to politicians and the public, such as the settling of East Pakistanis on 
Ghulam Muhammad Barrage land in the 1960s, were well-recorded in high-level 
government documents, and garnered much attention from contemporary 
newspapers. These kinds of special land allocation provide a window into the 
specific politics of the barrage lands. 
Indeed, the last two chapters also make more use of contemporary 
newspapers than the first parts of the thesis.  Several major English-language dailies 
had large circulations, such as the Karachi Dawn and Lahore’s The Pakistan Times.  
Newspapers are not the most reliable historical source: in Pakistan their reports 
were sometimes mutually contradictory, and the press was not always free.  Ayub 
Khan’s regime (1958-1969), for example, kept the press on a tight leash.  
Newspapers also often had particular affiliations: Dawn generally took a pro-refugee 
stance, while The Pakistan Times often opposed the government during the 1950s.  
Newspaper reports should therefore be treated with caution.  However, they often 
provide rare insights into the way that development projects were perceived by the 
Pakistani public, and conversely they could operate as a mouthpiece for 
administrations trying to promote their development work.  Either way, they can 
inform us about the political ‘meanings’ of the barrages, and reactions to them.  
Moreover, newspapers are often virtually the only source of detailed information 
about contemporary everyday events, and so, despite their imperfections, they are 
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valuable in this study, when treated with caution.  Efforts have been made to check 
consular and newspaper sources against each other wherever possible. 
Chapter outline 
Chapter 1 is concerned primarily with the construction and colonization of the 
Jamrao Canal in southern Sind during the 1890s and 1900s.  It explores the extent to 
which this early project was innovative in terms of mixing the political benefits that 
accrued from ‘settling’ Sindhis onto agricultural land alongside those associated with 
the introduction of the ‘modern’ cultivation methods and social structures 
developed in the neighbouring Punjab province since the 1880s.  The tensions 
between the different goals of the local administration - and how far it was able in 
practice to resolve them - reveal much about the state’s role in Sind in the late 
nineteenth century.  Chapter 2 then turns its attention to the much larger Sukkur 
Barrage, located in upper Sind, which came into operation in 1932 after years of 
planning and construction.  The barrage project promised to draw Sind into an even 
more closely regulated framework of governance, and yet ultimately the 
‘revolutionary’ effect that it was expected to have on Sind’s agro-economy did not 
extend into the framework of governance that existed in India.  However, the 
project acquired considerable symbolic value as a visible demonstration of the 
colonial state as a force for ‘progress’ in India.    
The concept of ‘material progress’, which dominated official understandings 
of the Sukkur Barrage, played an important part in provincial politics from the 1920s 
onward, and was ultimately translated into rhetoric surrounding ‘nation-building’ 
after Independence.  Following discussion about the Sukkur Barrage’s wider 
significance, Chapter 3 considers how the politics of irrigation connected with 
broader political developments in the period between the Sukkur Barrage’s 
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completion, and Sind’s first years as part of independent Pakistan.  Debates about 
the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency in the interwar years 
demonstrated that the most vocal class of Sindhis – or, at least, those to whom the 
administration was most likely to listen – shared the view of British officials that the 
barrage system was a force for both moral and material good, and from the late 
1930s, Sind’s burgeoning political class entered into lively debates about the way in 
which the administration managed the new barrage.   Irrigation remained equally 
important during the Second World War, when the barrage’s transformative 
potential was realized and local wartime food surpluses allowed Sind to sell large 
quantities of grains to deficit provinces.  Against the backdrop of wartime 
uncertainty about the long term future of the British administration in India, the 
Government of Sind produced plans for the post-war development of the province, 
and, as this chapter argues, immediately after Pakistani Independence in 1947 the 
idea of ‘material progress’ embodied in the Sukkur Barrage was recast by the new 
government in a nationalist framework as ‘nation-building’. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, which explore post-independence developments, the 
chronological approach of the preceding chapters is replaced by a thematic analysis.  
Chapter 4 considers the symbolic and political aspects of the construction of new 
Sind Barrages at Kotri and Gudu.  It asks why these projects were undertaken, and 
how far the new barrages were perceived by Pakistani officials, in keeping with the 
views of their colonial predecessors, as the solution to the problem of raising 
agricultural productivity in Sind.  Yet the location of the barrages at the heart of the 
new administration’s search for legitimacy also points to the extent to which their 
symbolic value may have transcended the immediate demand for food production.  
By examining their construction and opening ceremonies, the chapter will evaluate 
how far there was continuity with the discourses of earlier colonial ceremonies, 
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albeit reconfigured as a marker of Pakistan’s national progress rather than of 
Imperial superiority.   However, the rhetoric of the 1950s and 1960s was not 
matched by government achievements when it came to the practical development 
of the barrage areas, and problems of severe drainage and waterlogging problems 
served to undermine the ideal of development and good governance associated 
with these schemes.  
Chapter 5 addresses the theme of land politics, again after Independence.  
While the high-flown rhetoric and technicist discourses examined in Chapter 4 
provide insights into the barrages’ impact locally and nationally, much of their 
importance lay in the administration’s disposal of the land that they irrigated.  The 
allocation of barrage land had to contend with the day-to-day politics of the districts 
in which the land was situated, as well as with the politics of the Sind Legislative 
Assembly (and, after 1955, the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly), which meant 
that the process was slow and difficult.  Despite all the talk of modernization and 
rationalization that underpinned the ways in which the barrages were publicly 
presented, the considerable power of zamindars and other agrarian interest groups 
in Sind endured, affecting how far the expectation established during British times  - 
that barrage irrigation would significantly reform the structure of the agrarian 
economy and encourage a ‘progressive’ attitude among Sindhis - was actually met.  
This thesis, then, examines ways in which the control and use of water for 
agriculture, a vital natural resource, affected the nature of the state in Sind between 
c. 1898-1969.  It asks how the construction of these projects, the management of 
the water that they made available, and the distribution of irrigated land formed a 
central part of the loose concept of ‘progress’ by which pre- and post-Independence 
governments claimed legitimacy for their rule.  It tests the hypothesis that this 
concept prompted action to increase Sind’s production and consumption capacities, 
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with the belief that improving the material condition of agricultural producers would 
have huge social, political, economic, and moral benefits.
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Chapter 1: The Jamrao Canal and the beginning of scientific 
irrigation in Sind 
 
In Sind, human intervention could transform the environment.  This 
made it an ideal laboratory for optimistic Victorians to live out their 
dream of setting the world to rights through perseverance, science and 
public works. 
-Cheesman (1997)1 
 
The link between irrigation canals and state authority in Sind preceded British rule 
by more than a millennium, but from the late nineteenth century the British 
administration introduced a new kind of irrigation project: in which water 
distribution was more closely controlled by engineers, and the social makeup of 
colonizers was more closely controlled by revenue officers.  The first of these 
projects, the Jamrao Canal, heralded a more comprehensive system of bureaucratic 
control over both people and the natural environment than had ever been seen 
before in Sind.  Moreover, it set a precedent for later, larger-scale projects, 
particularly the Sukkur, Ghulam Muhammad, and Gudu Barrages.  During the 
construction and colonization of the Jamrao Canal, officials developed the attitudes 
that also governed these later projects.  The Canal was an important innovative 
feature in the development of the state’s relationship with the province, and it is the 
aim of this chapter to assess how and why the Jamrao Canal was a focal point for 
change.  This took the form, it is argued, of a discourse of scientific irrigation 
management. 
This chapter also demonstrates the strong continuity that the Canal had 
with earlier British irrigation projects.  It argues that, despite many innovative 
features, the project was rooted in the political and economic concerns that 
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governed all colonial activity in the province, some of which originated in the pre-
British period.  While these concerns were common across British India in the 
nineteenth century, the specific conditions of power in Sind had a large impact on 
the political meanings of the project – in other words, its implication for the 
relationship between branches of the government, influential Indian groups, or 
individuals such as Sindhi zamindars (landholders) ‘indigenous’ to the Jamrao tract, 
and immigrant Punjabi cultivators.  The chief example of the tension between the 
Canal’s modernizing potential and the political realities of governance in Sind was 
the attempted settlement of the province’s former rulers, the Talpur Mirs, on the 
Canal tract.  This move demonstrated the delicate balancing act that officials 
performed to prevent one of the Jamrao project’s novel aspects (i.e. a systematic 
colonization scheme) from upsetting Sind’s existing conditions.  Similar concerns can 
be seen in the importation of Punjabis to colonize Canal land.  Moreover, the Jamrao 
Canal was not the only canal to be constructed in Sind during the late nineteenth 
century.  An earlier project, the Laikpur Canal, provided a crucial opportunity for 
officials in the Sind administration and in the Presidency headquarters at Bombay to 
debate the merits of different approaches to the allocation of land irrigated by 
government canals.  The extent to which Jamrao Canal policies adhered to and 
differed from these approaches again demonstrates the mix of continuity and 
change that the project heralded. 
Until now, most scholarship on canal-building and colonization in this period 
has been directed towards the Punjab, Sind’s neighbour to the north.  At the time, 
too, the Punjab’s canal colonies, constructed from 1885, were often taken to be the 
archetype of ‘meaningful’ canal irrigation development.    The development of Canal 
Colonies in the western part of the province is one of the most heavily researched 
aspects of irrigation in colonial India, having received significant critical attention 
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from Ali, Islam, and Gilmartin.  It was, too, the subject of books published while the 
Raj was still in place, most notably Malcolm Darling’s The Punjab Peasant in 
Prosperity and Debt (1925), which was sufficiently influential to be cited in the 
Indian Central Cotton Committee’s 1929 report.2  Sind’s own officials sought to 
distinguish the features that had made these Colonies successful, in order to 
reproduce certain elements in Sind’s own irrigation development.  These officials 
were not, however, under the illusion that techniques and structures that had found 
favour in the Punjab were necessarily translatable into the Sindhi context.  The 
Punjab-centrism of existing scholarship has skewed our understanding of what 
canal-digging meant in social and political terms, and so one of this chapter’s 
functions is to establish the distinctiveness of Sind’s irrigation experience, while 
keeping in mind the important influence its northern neighbour exerted.  
Sind before and after British Annexation 
The centrality of the River Indus to Sind’s agricultural, economic, and demographic 
character long pre-dated the British colonial regime, implying that Sind’s 
environment had a bearing on governance there that survived regime changes.  
Governors under the Mughal Emperor Akbar (reigned 1556-1605) were unfamiliar 
with irrigated agriculture, and mismanaged the canals, but the system was still 
operational at the end of the eighteenth century.  Panhwar for one credits the 
Kalhoras (1700-1783) with good irrigation management – improving the canals, 
settling ‘wild’ tribes to agrarian life, and greatly increasing the area under 
cultivation.3  Under their successors, the Talpur Mirs (1783-1847), local zamindars 
                                                          
2
 Indian Central Cotton Committee, General Report on Eight Investigations into the Finance 
and Marketing of Cultivators' Cotton (Bombay: C.V. Thomas, 1929), p.13. 
3
 M.H. Panhwar, History of Sindh Irrigation: 3500 B.C. - present (Islamabad: Government of 
Pakistan, Ministry of Science and Technology, Pakistan Council of Research in Water 
Resources, 1991), p.66. 
 37 
 
looked after the small branch canals and watercourses on their own land, while the 
government was responsible for clearing the larger feeder canals.  For this service a 
charge, ‘hukaba’, was levied from zamindars, and a system of statutory labour was 
also practised in some areas.4  
In 1843, Sind and its canal system acquired a new overlord when the 
territory was conquered by Sir Charles Napier, a British general who had been 
tasked with providing support to the British expeditionary force that was attacking 
Afghanistan.  The Talpur Mirs, a clan with origins in Baluchistan but which by then 
ruled Sind, were nominally allies of the East India Company, but once the ill-fated 
Afghan expedition had run its calamitous course, Napier accused them of treachery 
and annexed their territory after a swift military campaign.5  The annexation was not 
welcomed in London, but the Company accepted a fait accompli and did not restore 
the Mirs to power.  Sind instead became a province of British India, and Napier its 
first – and, for almost a century, last – Governor.  His time in charge was 
controversial, drawing stinging attacks from contemporaries such as Colonel James 
Outram, the Company’s Political Agent in Sind before annexation.6  The published 
diaries of Keith Young, Napier’s senior legal officer, portrayed Napier as a capricious 
tyrant.7  After his retirement, Sind was incorporated into the Presidency of Bombay 
and administered by a Commissioner-in-Sind, who was answerable to the Governor 
of Bombay.  Napier’s style of government in Sind was not allowed to develop into a 
tradition of frontier Governors.  Khuhro has, however, credited him with realising 
that the success of any Sind government’s revenue policies depended on its 
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effectiveness in keeping the canals in working order, whereas his immediate 
successors did not.8  His recognition of irrigation’s importance was matched by Lord 
Ellenborough, Governor-General at the time, who wrote of their mutual desire to 
improve the canals in order to “give proof to the people of Scinde [sic] of the 
advantage they will derive from being placed under an enlightened and beneficent 
government”.9 
The canal system inherited by the British was wide-ranging and 
sophisticated, and many of its technical and administrative features survived almost 
unchanged during the early British period.  The revenue distinction between public 
canals and private wells, which had predated the Arab conquest, was maintained.  
For most cultivated land, water had to be lifted from the canal to the fields (on 
average, 12-14ft).  This meant that irrigating agriculture was usually arduous and 
time-consuming.  Much less commonly, if the canal were raised sufficiently, water 
could be allowed to flow onto the field.10  In addition the system provided for 
extensive kharif (summer) irrigation but only very limited rabi (winter) cultivation.  
Most agricultural land was unproductive for half the year, yielding no benefit to 
cultivators or to the state.  Perennial irrigation, i.e. the provision of water during 
both summer and winter, was the ideal goal of British officers in Sind throughout the 
second half of the nineteenth century, but little was done to bring it about.  The 
annual irrigation of lands by water obtained during the Indus’s inundation therefore 
remained fundamental to the practice of agriculture across nearly the whole of the 
province, which made kharif by far the more important cultivation season. 
Continuity with the past was not, however, necessarily welcome.  It was a 
truism among early British officers in Sind that the Talpur Mirs had ruined the canal 
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system by neglecting their annual duty to clear silt and sediments from the channels, 
thus allowing the water’s flow to become impeded.11   Furthermore, Colonel Richard 
Strachey, the Inspector-General of Irrigation in India, wrote in 1867 that many 
difficulties “arise from the rude manner in which the irrigation channels have been 
formed in the first instance”.12  These included unstable heads (i.e. the point at 
which a canal connected with the Indus was liable to shift, breaking the link between 
the canal and its water supply), silt build-ups caused by mis-aligned inclination, and 
badly constructed channels.  Strachey also criticized the canal administration, 
lamenting the fact that British canal engineers were little more than “superior 
Overseers of the annual canal clearances, under the direction of the Revenue 
District Officers”.13  
Sind’s canals were in physical and administrative disarray, but such criticisms 
did not lead to any fundamental renovation of Sind irrigation.  Napier’s short-lived 
and ineffectual Canal Department was closed when he left the province.  Instead, 
British resources focussed on subjugating the country, and the canal system was 
given only the bare minimum of maintenance.  As Strachey’s lament suggested, 
good engineering was subordinated to revenue and political considerations, and 
plans prepared by individual engineers and administrators were shelved by higher 
authorities.  Most notably, Lieutenant J.G. Fife’s 1855 proposal to remodel the 
whole Sind canal system was (in the words of the 1907 Gazetteer of the Province of 
Sind) “of alarming magnitude and was not adopted”, neither at the time, nor when it 
was again urged by the Executive Engineer of Hyderabad Canals in 1891.  Fife also 
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proposed a second project, the Sukkur Canal, which was sanctioned by Government 
in a very reduced and modified form in 1861.14 
Yet despite the limit to technical advances in pre-Sukkur Barrage British 
irrigation, a number of important administrative changes occurred.  The cherr 
system of forced labour was abolished (at least in principle) by the Government of 
Bombay in the late nineteenth century.15  This meant that the prevailing 
arrangement for canal clearance in Sind – in which zamindars had a duty to provide 
the labour force – was replaced by a cash-paid, hired workforce.  The Government 
began to take land revenue payments in cash rather than in kind, whereas the latter 
had predominated under the Talpurs.16  Thus monetary payments were established 
as an increasingly important mechanism for the transaction of public business, and 
the latter innovation placed cultivators more directly in the market system of 
agriculture.  A parallel codifying trend could be seen in the Government’s acquisition 
of as many branch canals as possible,17 and its taking on of more direct responsibility 
for canal clearance.  Previously this task had been performed by zamindars at the 
local level; now it had become an official matter, and Sindhi irrigation provision was 
further ensnared in the British administration’s web of institutionalisation and 
codification.  Beginning in 1887, an ‘Irrigational Settlement’ was introduced into the 
country piecemeal, which determined land revenue according to the type of 
irrigation practised upon it.18 
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These changes, however, were fragmented and haphazard.  Although water 
was integral to both agriculture and governance in Sind, no coherent plan for 
genuinely renovating Sindhi irrigation and agriculture – technically or 
administratively – was acted upon.  In this respect, Sind was both typical and 
atypical of north-western India.  Sind’s dependence on canal irrigation was reflected 
in parts of the Punjab and the North-Western Province (N.W.P.), which were 
similarly arid.  Parallels were also drawn between Sind and other parts of the British 
Empire, such as Egypt and the Sudan.19  Fife was even sent to Egypt in 1856 to 
determine whether Egyptian irrigation techniques should be imported into Sind, 
although he reported that Sind’s engineers had little to learn there and should 
instead look to north-western India for inspiration.20  The Superintendent of Canals 
in the N.W.P., who had also spent time in Egypt, confirmed the validity of Fife’s 
findings.21  India in the nineteenth century was, then, the laboratory in which 
colonial irrigation techniques were developed.22  However, Sind lagged far behind its 
neighbours in irrigation development under British rule.  In the N.W.P., East India 
Company engineers had begun renovating the Western and Eastern Jumna Canals as 
early as the 1820s; in 1840, work had started on the expensive Ganges Canal at 
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Haridwar, intended to irrigate the whole of the Upper Doab.23  In much of northern 
India, administrative power and water provision were intimately connected, and the 
government invested a great deal of capital in strengthening this relationship.  In 
Sind, however, the physical infrastructure that facilitated it remained virtually 
unchanged. 
The Laikpur Canal 
Irrigation remained, however, an essential part of the government’s activities in 
Sind.  Operating canals required a constant process of negotiation in which officials 
put forward overlapping and competing definitions of the state’s responsibilities, 
privileges, and objectives.  This was seen particularly during the 1880s, when 
irrigation work in Sind began to intensify.  After the relative stagnation of the mid-
1800s, canals such as the Desert, Unharwah and Begari Canals in Upper Sind, and 
the Eastern Nara works in Thar Parkar district, were constructed during the century’s 
later decades.  As the 1890s commenced, several important new schemes were in 
progress: a new feeder to the Western Nara Canal, expected to irrigate 55,000 acres 
on the right bank of the Indus in Shikarpur and the northern portion of the Karachi 
Collectorates; the improvement of the Renwah Canal, designed to increase the 
supply of water to land already cultivated, and to extend irrigation to 28,000 acres in 
Sakrand Taluka of Hyderabad district; as well as improvements to the Fuleli Canal 
and the extension of the Eastern Nara system.24   
These irrigation projects were by no means the biggest known to colonial 
India, but their importance in Sind’s development lay in the debates that they 
encouraged among officials about the value of such schemes, and the state’s place 
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in them.  Attention was drawn firstly to the fact that the piecemeal historical 
development of canal irrigation in the province had not been conducive to the 
formulation of a standard code for getting their commands (i.e. the area of land that 
they irrigated) settled and cultivated.   In 1896 the Commissioner-in-Sind, Sir Evan 
James, pointed out that "new Canals have seldom been made in Sind, and there are 
no general rules for giving out the land upon them.”  In the past, canals in Sind had 
been used as much to pacify the wilder tribes of the interior as to significantly 
increase cultivation, and so their colonization had been carried out piecemeal 
according to contemporary political needs.   On the three frontier canals – the 
Begari, Unarwah, and Desert systems – the Deputy Commissioner for the Upper Sind 
Frontier had distributed the lands himself, granting them gratis to the Baloch Sirdars 
and tribes, "the object being to reclaim them from rapine and plunder and induce 
them to take to peaceful pursuits.”25   
The situation was similar in the Punjab, also a new territory, where the 
British regime needed to provide employment for the disbanded Sikh army after the 
annexation of the Punjab in 1849.  Digging canals provided short-term work, and the 
infrastructure for settling the ex-fighters into agriculture.26  As one officer wrote of 
Multan in that year, “the people [...] are predatory herdsmen, little engaged in 
agriculture, and without extensive means of irrigation [...]  To give them the means 
of cultivating would be the most efficient aid to the Magistrate”.27  The British began 
                                                          
25
 Commissioner-in-Sind James to Secretary to Government of Bombay R.D., 08.10.1896, R.D. 
vol. 147 of 1897, compilation 1486, M.S.A. 
26
 Chapman, The Geopolitics of South Asia, p.126. 
27
 Lieutenant Hugh James, ‘Canals of the Mooltan District’ (November 29, 1849), Selections 
from the Records of the Punjab Administration, Old Series, No. 1, I.O.R.; cited in David 
Gilmartin, 'Scientific Empire and Imperial Science: Colonialism and irrigation technology in 
the Indus Basin', The Journal of Asian Studies 53.4 (1994): 1127-1149, p.1132. 
 44 
 
to consider proposals for extending irrigation into the thinly-populated western 
frontier districts as early as the 1860s.28   
Yet whereas the Punjab administration took a systematic approach to canal 
construction and colonization from the 1880s onwards, which gave greater weight 
to demographic and economic questions, Sind’s irrigation development remained 
less systematic.  Lord Sandhurst, the Governor of Bombay, felt that irrigation 
practices should be regulated, arguing that it would be unwise to put too much 
implicit trust in the local officers of a province with Sind’s irregular frontier history.  
“old fashions and ancient practices which are survivals of the former paternal 
system of administration”, the Governor wrote, were no longer suitable, but would 
“die hard” as long as the old administrative order remained active in the province.  It 
was, he concluded, time for general rules for land distribution and colonization in 
Sind to be framed.29  Commissioner James, on the other hand, emphasized the vital 
importance of local political conditions, which could only be assessed by officers 
within Sind, and asserted that the relationship between the government and its rural 
allies must be respected: "It may be well to remind Government that when 
distributing land in Sind, every consideration has to be given to the claims of local 
Zamindars on the spot."  Moreover, he quoted the authority of his predecessor 
Bartle Frere30 to remind his superiors in Bombay that almost any land in Sind was 
subject to some kind of ownership, which was bound to be asserted once water had 
been brought to the land, however long it had lain dormant.   
James’s caution in this matter may be attributed to his keen sense that the 
British regime in Sind rested on fragile political foundations.  Expectations of 
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bolstered crop outturns and higher revenue receipts had to be set against the risk of 
alienating the administration’s traditional support base, namely the jagirdars and 
zamindars, and the difficulties that the administration inevitably encountered when 
trying to navigate the maze of customary rights and agreements that governed 
agrarian society.  Sounding aggrieved, James asserted an ambition to good 
governance that looked beyond the accountant’s ledgers.  An irrigation officer, he 
wrote, may be excused for  
looking on a new canal as a mere machine made by Government, solely as an 
investment, and for extracting as much hard coin [as possible] at the start 
from the people who will depend on it for their living.  But the Commissioner 
and the Government have higher views of their duty towards subject-races, 
and so long as just & moderate assessments are imposed, (and in Sind the 
assessments remunerate Government amply for their outlay) it is desired that 
the people as well as the Treasury should profit by the new canal.31   
James’s indignation expressed a concern about pressures on his administration from 
above (from London and from the upper echelons of governments in India) as 
relentless as those from below (from the collaborators whom local officers were 
both unwilling and unable to circumvent).  His invocation of a “duty towards subject-
races” spoke to a paternalist conception of colonial governance.  This duty operated 
primarily in terms of the relationship between local power-holders and the 
administration, and tended to encourage the regime’s role in India to be viewed 
through an aristocratic prism.  This was the principle by which the post-annexation 
rule of Sind had been established, and according to which it had been maintained 
during the following decades.  It had little to do with the demands of scientific 
irrigation and engineering, nor with systematic attempts to alter the society being 
governed.   
                                                          
31
 Commissioner-in-Sind James to Secretary to Government, R.D., Bombay, 08.10.1896, pr.1-
3, R.D. vol. 147 of 1897, compilation 1486, M.S.A. 
 46 
 
Now, there was change in the air, however limited and piecemeal.  As in the 
Punjab, officials in Sind hoped to tease out a new class of agrarian collaborators, 
whose power would be more diffuse because they were more numerous and were 
not traditional, aristocratic magnates.  A member of the Bombay secretariat, writing 
about the Laikpur Canal scheme in Hyderabad District, noted that there were no 
projects in Sind “so large as to call for colonisation schemes such as exist in the 
Punjab”; but that did not mean that Sind should not take a leaf out of the Punjab’s 
book, especially where the increasingly systematic nature of colonization was 
facilitated by closer official supervision of day-to-day cultivation.  “these schemes 
are highly successful,” he wrote of the Punjab colonization projects.  “Cultivation has 
been brought from congested districts [...] and [these cultivators] have developed 
prosperous villages.  The schemes have been considered important enough to 
require the superintendence of special settlement officers", picked from the best 
I.C.S. men, rather than leaving the work to regular revenue officials, as was done in 
Sind.  Government should not aim to interfere with the established discretionary 
powers of local officers, he argued, but "it would be a doubtful policy to allow the 
lands of Sind, made valuable by new canals, to be developed in haphazard fashion.  
Government [...] ought to obtain full assurance that uniformity, method, and 
judgement are observed in so important a branch of administration."32  In other 
words, although irrigation construction was proceeding at a more sedate pace than 
in the Punjab, the local government must take a more systematic and rational 
approach than had hitherto been its practice. 
The Laikpur Canal debate resulted in a Government of Bombay resolution, in 
which the Governor-in-Council ordered that customary rights and “the expediency 
of reclaiming from predatory habits the wilder tribes by the grant of land” should be 
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respected, but that public auction should be the chief means of allocating 
government land.33  This decision represented acceptance that speculation on 
landed property was an inevitable evil born of the market system which the British 
were encouraging in rural India.  Sindhi agriculture, or rather the British regime’s 
relationships with Sindhi agriculturalists, had long been considered to be under 
threat from the indebtedness of Muslim landowners, and the attendant prospect of 
their land falling into the hands of Hindu moneylenders who were often presumed 
to lack sufficient local standing to maintain order in the countryside.  In a similar 
manner, the administration had mixed feelings about allowing land to be sold to 
outsiders who might only be buying up agricultural land for financial speculation.  
Nevertheless, Bombay’s Governor-in-Council demonstrated the irrepressibly 
pragmatic financial instinct that underpinned his government’s operations by 
concluding that it would be better for the government to receive the money of such 
speculators at auction, than for the land to be given away on easy terms to 
zamindars who might sell it on anyway.34  At this stage, Bombay was not yet willing 
to resort to granting the land on condition that it could not be sold on for a set 
number of years.  Officials’ influence over zamindars and cultivators was not to 
become significantly stronger until the rules governing colonization and agriculture 
on the Jamrao Canal came into effect at the turn of the century. 
The Jamrao Canal  
In the context of such a haphazard approach to building and operating new canals in 
Sind, the Jamrao Canal in the southeast of the province heralded an important shift.  
It inaugurated a new phase of irrigation development in Sind that was more 
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intensive and systematic.  As such, it laid the roots for the twentieth century’s huge 
barrage irrigation schemes that occupy the attention of later chapters in this thesis.  
Constructed in 1898-1899, the Jamrao Canal project relied on migrant labourers 
from outside the province, especially Punjabis and Baluchis.35  This was due to the 
sparseness of Sind’s population, which the local administration was always keen to 
point out as a limiting factor in any development project, because it forced up 
labour costs36 and suggested the danger that Sindhi haris would desert the 
zamindars who employed them in order to take up other work elsewhere.37  The 
canal was an extension to, and significant renovation of, the existing Eastern Nara 
canal system, and provided irrigation water to 934,300 acres, although only a third 
was cultivated each year because limited water supplies were rationed.  
Importantly, the canal was designed to provide water for both kharif and rabi 
cultivation, which would enable more crops to be produced during a year, whereas 
existing Sind canals provided almost exclusively for kharif irrigation.  The Jamrao 
was, like all main canals constructed in Sind since annexation, a government project.  
The administration in Sind recognized that irrigation development would have to be 
state-driven and could not rely on a proactive public reception, unlike in the Punjab 
where the greater enthusiasm of rural magnates for building and maintaining their 
own canals led to a higher incidence of private canal construction and ownership. 
In fact, the state’s precise role in Sindhi irrigation was a product of constant 
negotiation between government departments and officials.  Canals were important 
enough in Sind that the negotiations that accompanied their development – and 
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even their day-to-day maintenance – were significant in defining the state’s powers 
and responsibilities towards its subjects.  In order to regulate and control the act of 
getting water from the Indus to the fields, the colonial administration became 
engaged in a complex set of relationships, which continually evolved.  This process 
was often organic, and the picture was built up gradually on a case-by-case basis as 
the interpretation of irrigation rules was adapted to a variety of situations on the 
ground.  While the Sind administration was alert to the lessons to be learned from 
similar projects in the Punjab, the latter could not be translated directly into a Sindhi 
context because of the complexity of existing rights to land in Sind.  With the 
construction and colonization of the Jamrao Canal, this same process continued, but 
it was an accelerated one with the scope for significant change.   
The difference was, in some respects, due to the size and expense of the 
Jamrao project.  Excavation of the main Jamrao Canal began in 1898, and was 
completed the following March; most of the system was brought into operation by 
May 1900, utilizing existing canals and karias wherever possible.  Unusually, the 
project was completed a year ahead of schedule, and the canal was therefore 
considered to be Rs. 175,000 in credit before water even began to flow.  From the 
outset, therefore, the canal seemed to promise resounding success.   But it was also 
a more complex and ambitious project than Sind had previously seen.  The hydraulic 
technology that underpinned it, and which allowed water to be brought to the fields 
twice per year rather than once, meant that more intensive cultivation would be 
possible.  Moreover, the colonization of the canal was to be undertaken on more 
rationalized, modernist lines than previous canals, with a strong interregional 
component. In this sense it had much in common with the contemporary Punjab 
colonies.  The construction project itself shared some of the Punjab colonies’ 
frontier romance: the work was tough, and several engineers who were assigned to 
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the project ‘broke down’ after a few months in the desolate, burning hot 
landscape.38   As Gilmartin has argued, the Punjab colonies were important in the 
development of British officialdom’s self-image.  They allowed the administration to 
re-shape a hostile landscape and demonstrate the worth of European science, 
technology, and human endeavour, in what the Punjab Irrigation Manual described 
as a “bold and magnificent conception”.39  The same analysis could be applied to the 
Jamrao Canal, which was also was conceived as a self-consciously scientific project in 
contrast with the haphazardly constructed and settled canals of Sind’s past. 
Why, then, was such an arduous task undertaken?  The state, as the 
project’s instigator, naturally expected to gain something from the work.  The earlier 
Laikpur Canal debates had demonstrated the range of economic and political 
motives that the administration had for canal construction, but in order to 
understand the particular relationship between irrigation and governance in which 
the Jamrao Canal was located, it is necessary to ask briefly how such projects were 
financed.  Irrigation works in British India fell, by this time, into two categories: 
‘productive’ and ‘protective’ works.  This distinction had been drawn within a few 
months of the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown, 
following the Mutiny in 1857, when a committee had been set up under Richard 
Strachey in order to classify public works expenditure.  The committee divided the 
latter into two categories, the first of which was ‘State Works’.  Essentially non-
remunerative projects, these were constructed to fulfil the state’s duties towards 
the public, and included barracks, law courts, and schools.  The second category, 
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‘Works of Internal Development’, were essentially commercial projects.  These were 
expected to profit both government and community; they included all municipal and 
marine improvements, and all engineering operations focused on agriculture, 
especially irrigation works.40  The first category was to be financed purely by current 
provincial revenue surpluses, the second by money borrowed in London.  
Irrigation works retained an ambiguous dual status because they could turn 
a profit, while also  being recognized as important for the ‘public good’.  Successive 
governments in India, influenced by different political and social ideas from Britain, 
took differing views on the value of state intervention into matters of public good, 
rather than cleaving to its traditional focus on security and revenue-collection.  
Under Marquess Ripon’s Governor-Generalship (1880-1884), for example, the 
Government of India accepted the need for broader state intervention in areas such 
as local self-government and education, and especially in relation to agrarian issues 
such as land reform, agricultural experimentation and outreach programmes.  
Paradoxically these new initiatives, which included elements of social engineering 
and conscious policies for economic development, accompanied a growing 
pessimism among British officials in India about their capacity for ‘improving’ the 
country.41 
Sind’s agriculture relied on the Indus rather than the failure-prone annual 
monsoon common to most of the subcontinent, and the province was thought to be 
largely safe from famine.42 Irrigation development was therefore undertaken with 
an eye to profit, rather to protect against food scarcity.  The good financial sense of 
this approach appeared to have been borne out by experience.  Sind possessed a 
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good record on productive irrigation works: in the early 1890s, Sind and Madras 
were the most successful on this front, with the canal-irrigated agricultural 
‘heartlands’ of northern India, the N.W.P. and the Punjab, lagging behind.43  
According to estimates made in 1897, before the Canal was constructed, the 
revenue receipts from Jamrao Canal land were expected to more than cover interest 
charges on the project within the fifth year after the completion of the works, and 
the Canal was expected ultimately to return a 6.77% profit per year on the total 
outlay.44  In 1903, when the Canal had been in operation for three years, it was 
predicted that within ten years the revenue gained from the Canal would exceed 
interest charges by a comfortable Rs. 1,924,744, and that the total capital outlay 
plus interest charges would be covered by 1931.45    
When considering irrigation development, the Sind administration could 
look not only to its own experience of profitable canal construction, but also that in 
the Punjab, which at the time was the site of the biggest and most intensive 
development of canal irrigation in India.  These huge canal colony projects began in 
1885, opening up virgin land for colonization and cultivation in the western part of 
the province.  Despite the greater vulnerability of the Punjab to famine, these works 
were, like Sind’s canals, considered productive rather than protective, and were 
expected to return a profit on government capital outlay, as well as provide 
economic benefits to the population at large.  In this the colonies were remarkably 
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successful, and the huge extension of cultivated acreage swelled the provincial 
coffers.  The gross revenue earned by Punjab canals classed as Productive Works 
would increase from Rs. 14.6 lakhs per year during 1860-1869 to Rs. 800 lakhs 
during 1937-1946, and by the year 1945-46 the net profit exceeded the total capital 
expenditure by more than 200%.  These spectacular profits were not gained 
instantaneously, and appeared only once the Colonies had been working for 
decades; hence, during the period under consideration in this chapter, profits were 
more modest, standing at 7.5% of capital outlay during 1897-1905.46  Indeed, Ali has 
convincingly argued that the Colonies’ financial (and agri-developmental) potential 
was consistently neglected in favour of political and military expediencies.47  This 
should not, however, be allowed to obscure the fact that financial gain – or at least 
financial viability – was the bottom line for these projects, as it usually was for all 
levels of government in India.  Similarly, the Jamrao Canal is best understood as a 
project designed to further a mixture of economic, social, and political aims, while 
being constrained by a similar variety of factors.   
Colonization of the Jamrao project 
Building the Jamrao Canal was one endeavour, but arranging for colonists to put the 
land it watered under the plough was quite another.  This had traditionally been a 
matter for revenue officers on the spot, but in this case external authorities took a 
stronger interest.  Jamrao tract colonization attracted the attention not only of the 
Governments of Bombay and India, but even the Secretary of State for India in 
London, who sanctioned a five-year colonization scheme for the Canal in 1899.  
Colonization crystallized the tension between local officers’ discretion and higher 
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levels of authority that had characterized debates about Laikpur Canal land only a 
decade earlier.  For the Jamrao Canal to meet its purpose, colonists had to be 
tempted onto the land, those who would make for the most ‘suitable’ grantees had 
to be selected, and then it had to be ensured that they actually grew the necessary 
crops.  This process was captured in a great deal of colonial correspondence, as 
officials debated both the principles and finer points at stake.  The arguments 
deployed therein and the action that the administration actually took revealed two 
overlapping but competing priorities: firstly, the need to maintain the political 
stability of the colonial administration’s rule in Sind, and secondly, the lure of 
encouraging or imposing ‘scientific’, financially productive cultivation.  Both 
concerns were underpinned by officials’ keen awareness that their actions had 
ultimately to result in the revenues raised through land sales and agricultural taxes 
at least covering the cost of the project’s construction, and preferably turn a profit 
for the government.  The tension between granting land to ‘scientific’ Punjabi 
peasants and yeomen, and politically important but unproductive Sindhi aristocrats, 
exemplified this. 
The influence of the first of these concerns will be addressed here through a 
study of the administration’s policies to determine to whom land should be 
allocated.  As it transpired, Jamrao land was chiefly used as a resource for settling 
problems and exploiting opportunities that presented themselves in Sind and its 
neighbouring areas.  The second concern is shown to have influenced village layout 
and cultivation rules; moreover the canal’s ‘scientific’ construction and regulation 
was also to be accompanied in many places by colonists who would cultivate the 
land according to scientific principles.  Not coincidentally, these cultivators were also 
expected to be easier to govern.  It is argued that the financial, social-political, and 
‘moral’ aspects of the project were not as distant from one another as might be 
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assumed.  Rather, officers sought an ideal type of cultivator who would be both loyal 
and productive.   The fact that no complete separation is possible between the 
‘scientific’ and ‘political’ aspects of the colonization work indicates colonization’s 
multivalency.  
The colonization of the canal demonstrated first and foremost the concern 
for stability that so preoccupied the British in India.  85% of available land was given 
to zamindars whose estates were in or adjacent to Jamrao tract: they automatically 
had first refusal on new squares adjoining their existing estates.  This policy was 
expressed in terms of concern for the pre-existing legal rights held by these 
zamindars over the land,48 but this barely masked the unease that the 
administration felt about upsetting the status quo, and its need to maintain the 
stability of local agrarian society in areas bordering the Jamrao tract.  By contrast, 
only 12% of land was allocated to settlers from outside Sind, mainly peasants from 
overcrowded regions of the Punjab.  2% was granted to zamindars from other parts 
of Sind, who were carefully selected as loyal and reliable people who would run 
their farms efficiently. These men had to settle on the Jamrao tract itself and were 
not permitted to bring any haris with them who were already cultivating lands 
irrigated from government canals in Sind: they had to recruit locally or import 
foreigners.  This condition underlined official worries about the destabilization of 
Sind’s demographic makeup, as had the use of Punjabis and Baluchis for 
construction work.  The remaining 1% of land was given on the same terms to 
military pensioners, capitalists (grantees in this class were expected to farm large 
areas, explicitly for profit) and to a few men of political significance.49  Ironically, the 
recipients of the bulk of these grants – the ‘indigenous zamindars’ – were the 
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subjects of the least discussion during the formulation and execution of colonization 
policy.  Determining who was eligible to buy land was a relatively simple matter for 
the local officers on the spot, under the Colonization Officer’s charge.  By contrast, 
the settlement of other groups attracted far more attention in surviving, available 
documents.  The lack of extant information on grants to indigenous zamindars 
suggests that these were perceived as a fundamentally local matter for local officers, 
and so accepted as an extension of normality in Sind and left outside the immediate 
control of higher authorities.   
The way in which the administration dealt with the project, and the effect 
that this had on the populace, was intimately tied to notions of the colonial regime’s 
moral right to govern, as the Commissioner-in-Sind’s earlier correspondence on the 
Laikpur Canal had suggested.  The Talpur Mirs, relatively small in number but great 
in political consequence, were one special group that exemplified the problems 
connected with this mindset.  The questionable morality of British rule in Sind had 
been a thorn in the side of Napier’s administration, and the rejuvenated Sind that he 
had promised had not materialized despite fifty years of Imperial rule.  As the 
descendents of the ruling families of Sind at the time of the annexation, who had 
reached accommodations with Napier’s government, the Talpurs had an important 
place in the social fabric over which the British maintained their rule: their utility as 
local aristocratic collaborators had been an integral part of the British system of 
control over rural Sind ever since Napier’s ‘reconfirmation’ of their jagirs (areas of 
land on which the grantee, known as a jagirdar, was allowed to keep part or all of 
the land revenue rather than returning it to the state).  However, the relationship 
between the Mirs and the British had always remained uneasy, and by the time the 
Jamrao Canal was built, the administration had begun to perceive them as an 
embarrassing remnant of a deeply corrupt and lethargic system.  Moreover, most 
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Talpurs relied on Government pensions and grants in order to maintain themselves 
and their families in a style appropriate to their royal heritage.   
The Government of Bombay had recently decided that the practice of 
supporting the Talpurs had outlived its usefulness and was now merely a financial 
burden, and so their pensions should be cancelled.  Sind’s administration, however, 
had no desire to see disaffected Talpurs stir up trouble, especially as a recent anti-
British uprising among the Hurs – a group who proclaimed devotion to the Pir 
Pagaro, an influential hereditary saint, and claimed to act in his name when violently 
attacking those who they thought had done wrong to the Pir – had demonstrated 
the danger that Sind's normally placid aristocracy could pose.  In light of this Evan 
James, the Commissioner-in-Sind, took pains to emphasize to the Jamrao Canal 
Colonization Officer "very strongly that it is more important to get a Talpur settled 
than a Panjabi Colonist,” even though the latter could be expected to cultivate more 
crops.50  The Talpurs’ favoured status was, he went on, due to their earlier 
dispossession at the hands of the early British regime.  The Commissioner was 
keenly aware that the material rewards that played an important part in 
underpinning the loyalty of landlords under the Imperial system could not be 
completely removed without political consequences.  “if the Talpurs are not 
provided for,” he wrote, “they will remain a very persistent thorn in the side of the 
Govt [sic], so do your very best to help Govt to get rid of them and let them be 
swallowed up in the ranks of the zamindars.  There will never be so good an 
opportunity again.”51  James was incorrect: the resettlement opportunities afforded 
by the Sukkur Barrage would later provide an ample opportunity of the same kind.  
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His comment, however, pointed to the relative novelty of the Jamrao scheme in 
Sind, and the immediate political uses to which large new tracts of government-
owned lands could be put.   
The resettlement of the Talpurs was a wide, somewhat vague endeavour, 
and not very systematic, but the political gains were potentially great.  For officials, 
removing the Mirs from their ancestral lands and re-settling them in a new area 
represented an opportunity to break their power and modernize Sindhi agrarian 
society, and forge new relationships between the Crown and its subjects.  There is 
no doubt that James had deliberate ambitions to reduce the power and prestige of 
the Talpurs, whom he considered a remnant of the pre-annexation regime and an 
unwelcome drain on Government resources.  "It is of great importance”, he had 
written in 1899, “to get this troublesome and at present useless and discontented 
class merged amongst the zamindars and their pensions from the state absorbed."52  
James’s “higher view” of the government’s duty towards subject-races evidently 
allowed room for the disposal of subjected elements which the government – as 
personified by himself, the Commissioner-in-Sind – found distasteful and of little 
use.  Political benefits of this kind, however, could only come at an economic cost.  
Large sums of money were set aside to provide grants and loans to Talpurs who 
were willing to take up Jamrao land, and the grants were usually rent-free for one 
lifetime.  Stopping pensions would not, therefore, save money in the short- or even 
medium-term.53  Instead, the long-term financial benefits of stopping Talpur 
pensions combined with the more immediate benefits of breaking their power to 
make the Talpurs a worthy target for settlement on the Jamrao tract.   
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Other officers took a friendlier view of the Mirs.  Once Jamrao colonization 
was well underway, the Colonization Officer noted that under the colonization rules 
for the Talpurs “the intention has apparently been to make them settle on the lands 
in order that they may be merged into the population."54  However, up to that point 
only six Talpurs had been willing to take up Jamrao grants.  As a result, the 
Colonization Officer felt that the administration should encourage them to take up 
good land on easy terms, and then persuade them over the long-term to move their 
households onto the lands once they saw that the land could provide for their 
families.55  Similarly, the Collector of Sukkur – the officer in charge of the country in 
which many of the Talpurs resided – was sympathetic to their condition, and 
suggested that their noble lineage threw responsibility for maintaining their dignity 
onto the government.  "The condition of these Talpurs,” he wrote in 1902,  
gentlemen of high birth with the traditions of hereditary rule to look back 
upon and now often - literally - hard put to it for their daily bread, has long 
been well known [...] and this opportunity that has now been given to them to 
make a decent livelihood for themselves and their descendents is one which I 
consider should not be hampered by want to liberality. 
Like James, the Collector and the Colonization Officer saw agriculture as the Mirs’ 
saviour, as something that would lift them out of their degradation and set them on 
a productive and useful track (to Government and to themselves).  The Collector 
argued that the alienations of revenue concurrent with granting land to the Mirs 
was "a mere trifle compared to the result obtained if we succeed in removing the 
long standing reproach which the presence of this indigent nobility in our midst I 
think undoubtedly throws on us."56  In the end, James’s successor as Commissioner-
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in-Sind, H.C. Mules, took a softer line with the Talpurs, recognising that it would not 
be practical to require them to live on their land permanently, nor to disperse into 
the general populace and lose their sense of self.57  Under these conditions, 
colonization by the Mirs continued apace, and 49 Talpur grants were made by mid-
March 1902.58    
In one sense, the treatment of the Talpurs fitted in with the wider aims of 
the Jamrao project, because the Mirs were expected to be part of the movement 
towards a rationalized process of irrigation and agricultural production.  To officials 
who often saw the Talpurs as remnants of a passed time, maintained in an artificially 
privileged position by the government’s generosity without giving sufficient 
reciprocal benefit to the state, what could be more attractive than dissolving this 
stubbornly old-fashioned, unenterprising class into the new, regulated, productive 
agrarian society that the Canal was expected to sustain?  Therefore the attempt to 
settle the Talpurs on the Canal could be seen as part of the wider trend in north-
western India to purposely shape the kind of society that would go hand-in-hand 
with modern irrigation systems.  On another level, however, the treatment of the 
Talpurs manifested the established pattern of political uses of irrigated land in Sind, 
arrived at through an equally hoary process of compromize and negotiation 
between officials and Indian subjects.  What distinguished the Talpurs from other 
‘tribes’ that the British had shunted around Sind onto canal tracts was their prestige 
as Sind’s former rulers, and their consequent legally-encoded right to claim financial 
support from the government.  Indeed, the case of the Talpurs rather demonstrated 
the limits of the government’s ability to put rationalizing schemes of social, as 
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opposed to technical, engineering into place.  Compromize had to be made, 
therefore, over residency criteria and dispersal amongst other colonists.      
Another overtly political use to which Jamrao land was put was in 
‘rehabilitating’ a group that had rebelled against British authority, following the Hur 
rebellion in south-eastern Sind between 1894-1896.  The Hurs had, by the 1890s, 
earned a reputation for lawlessness, especially after the formation of an active 
outlaw band in the late 1880s.  After a brief quiet period, this band re-emerged in 
1894 and carried out increasingly violent attacks on people associated with the 
government, and more generally on people who opposed them.  The band found a 
great deal of support among Hur communities, and the police employed coercive 
tactics against these communities as well as against the outlaws themselves.59  Evan 
James, then still Commissioner-in-Sind, wrote to the Governor of Bombay about the 
long and difficult suppression of this rebellion.  Arguing that the Criminal Tribes Act, 
under which groups of people classed as ‘criminal’ by heredity and habit could be 
controlled and forced into agricultural life,60  could not practically be extended to 
Sind, James concluded that he would pin his hopes for settling the Hurs into “a 
better mode of life” on punitive police measures and “The importation, too, into 
their neighbourhood of Baluchis, Cabulis and Panjabis, which I shall try and effect 
when the Jamrao Canal is opened”.61   
This ‘better mode of life’ was, of course, peaceable agriculture along 
government-approved lines.  A few years earlier, while Deputy Collector of Sehwan 
in 1893, James had written:   
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A district with canals in order, means a district where there is a certainty of 
cultivation, and every incentive to extend it – a district where the cultivators 
must be, if they wish it, happy and prosperous.  If the canals are out of order 
and not looked after as they ought to be, the reverse will surely be the case.62   
This observation was indeed made the basis of one of the government’s moves to 
permanently break the Hurs’ power.  After their defeat, the completion of the 
Jamrao Canal meant that Mari families from Johi on the Indus’s right bank, and tribal 
Khosas from the desert tracts, were joined by Baluchis and Pathans in their 
thousands.  Most of the latter were military pensioners whose loyalty to the 
government was proven.  In addition, the administration used Jamrao land to 
reward leading individuals for help during the crisis: for example Nawab Shahbaz 
Khan, the chief of the Bugti tribe, was given 4,000 acres land near Sanghar in return 
for their chief’s offer of 200 men to assist in controlling the Hurs.63  Thus, the Jamrao 
project took on a further immediate political importance, and played a significant 
part in the regime’s attempt to keep Sind pacific.   
The two colonization cases considered so far were geared towards particular 
situations within Sind, but the administration saw no reason why colonists should 
not be drawn from outside the province.  Indeed, Sind had always been a 
destination for immigrants, and populations were often mixed in the areas 
bordering Baluchistan, the Punjab, and Rajputana.  Sind’s historic links with 
Baluchistan meant that, apart from the large number of ‘Sindhis’ who could trace 
their recent lineage to Baluch families, Baluchis living in Baluchistan and along the 
Sind-Baluchistan borderland – especially on the Upper Sind Frontier – were often 
drawn towards the prospect of acquiring new agricultural land in Sind.  The Bugtis 
were one example of a Baluch tribe receiving Jamrao land.  The Native States that 
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lay nearby Sind, especially Rajputana, provided another potential source of 
colonists.  In addition, Sind’s administrative links with the Bombay Presidency made 
it more likely that colonists could be brought in from western India – although in 
practice, it was only personnel from the Bombay army regiments who would come 
from the ‘Presidency proper’. 
The idea of settling grantees from outside Sind onto Jamrao Canal land was 
not, then, radical in terms of Sind’s demographic history.  However, the Deputy 
Commissioner of Thar Parkar, who was responsible for allocations of Jamrao land 
before the Colonization Officer’s appointment, was strongly opposed to selling land 
to buyers from Native States.  "Unless the Jhamrao [sic] is to be worked as a 
financial speculation pure and simple”, he wrote to the Commissioner-in-Sind in 
1898, “I am strongly of opinion that except in special cases no hopes of receiving 
land thereon should be held out to subjects of foreign states".64  Soon afterwards, 
he reiterated that officials and jagirdars of Native States should not be allowed 
Jamrao land, and predicted that “the difficulty for the Colonization officer will be – 
not to obtain sufficient colonists, but to select from the immense number of 
applications, those of men who may be trusted to prove good landlords and loyal 
subjects of Government".65  Perhaps it was the allegiance that officers and 
aristocrats from the Native States were expected to have to their own Princes which 
made them seem unsuitable colonists: their loyalty to the British Government was 
questionable, because they were not used to being directly ruled by the same.   
Instead, and in keeping with the Sind administration’s having sought 
inspiration in the Punjab Canal Colonies, the majority of foreign grantees were 
drawn from the Punjab.  The figure of the Punjabi peasant was much favoured in 
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colonial imaginations, and had formed the backbone of the colonization of new 
lands in their home province.  Whereas the administration in contemporary Sind 
maintained its power through collaboration with big landholders, jagirdars, and 
‘loyalist’ Baluchi tribal leaders, the government in the Punjab sought a more diffuse 
structure of rule by prioritizing peasant and yeoman grants on its canal colonies.  
There was a direct economic motive for this: it was not in the government’s 
interests to allow large rent-receiving grantees to claim a portion of the agricultural 
produce, which could be more rationally distributed between the producers 
themselves and the state.66  Politically, after the 1857 Mutiny, a stable peasantry 
came to be defined as one of the bedrocks of British rule in the Punjab,67 and with 
the Canal Colonies the administration was able to consolidate this class's already 
dominant position in the province by favouring it with liberal land grants.  The 
colonization rules were framed so as to maintain grantees’ status as peasants, rather 
than allow them to become landlords.  Most colonists were expected, for example, 
to cultivate their land using their own families and menials, but without tenants.  In 
other words they were not expected to function as landlords.  This was also partly 
because the Punjab authorities wished to prevent a rush of labourers from 
neighbouring districts to the colonies, thereby preserving the class structure and 
economic viability of the old settled districts in the western Punjab.  However, as 
with the Talpurs in Sind, the government’s landlord allies in the Punjab were not 
neglected.68  Grants to ex-military servicemen on the colonies also helped to confirm 
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the attractiveness of loyalty to the regime, in the Indian Army’s most important 
recruiting ground.69   
Punjabis were expected to bring their officially-approved ethos of hard work 
onto the Jamrao tract.  As well as making a crucial contribution to the area’s 
agricultural economy in their own right, they were expected to set a good example 
to Sindhi landowners and cultivators.  But officials were wary of potential conflicts 
between locals and immigrants, and were careful to keep ‘foreigners’ separate from 
Sindhis, in one of the Jamrao project’s most rigid instances of social engineering.  
Immigrants were not to be given land in the same village – and thus on the same 
karia (small watercourse taking off from a canal) – as indigenous zamindars, 
reducing the potential for conflict over water-sharing.  Immigrant colonists were to 
be settled in large enough groups to form autonomous communities, which were 
even ordered according to the colonists’ origins.  By July 1901, two villages had been 
settled by Amritsar Sikhs and one by Jalandhar Sikhs; nine villages were of Punjabi 
Muslims; three villages contained Kachhis from Cutch; one village was home to 
Muslims from Jaisalmer in Rajputana; and one village had been bought up by a 
Punjabi capitalist, who had brought cultivators from the Punjab himself.70  This kind 
of segregation had an immediate practical aspect: one reason for the exclusion of 
Sindhis from areas marked off for ‘outsiders’ was the “great danger of these areas 
being frittered away in small grants to Sindhi zamindars” under the pressure that 
local zamindars and even subordinate officials would otherwise bring to bear on the 
canal administration.71  This would only exacerbate the ancient Sindhi problem of 
fragmented, scattered landholdings, and fatally interrupt the ordering of cultivation 
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which the Jamrao project’s logic demanded.72  On another level, officials were 
concerned to limit the socio-political upheaval that these migrations – and indeed 
the Jamrao project more generally – could spark.  Allowing immigrants to mix with 
Sindhis and with each other was expected sooner or later to lead to unrest, and 
even the favoured Punjabis were also held responsible for causing “trouble” in some 
areas which they settled.73   
Community management, of which the separation of different immigrant 
groups formed a part, also had important implications for the way that the project 
related to colonial rule.  The segregation of Jamrao immigrants into ‘their own’ 
villages had a parallel function to the grouping of colonists on the Punjab Colonies 
into district- and caste-groups: it maintained parallel social structures and allowed 
the authorities to rely on established, highly mediated ways of relating to 
communities and community members.  The segregation of Punjabis of different 
origin into different Jamrao tract villages also perpetuated the approach to canal 
colony villages taken in the Punjab itself, where official understandings of these 
villages depended on their continuity with aspects of ‘traditional’ peasant life.  
Gilmartin and Daechsel have both argued that colonial officials in the Punjab insisted 
on viewing canal colonies and even urban Lahore through the lens of an idealized 
Punjabi village social structure, with the result that an easily regulated model of 
village society was imposed on, and taken up to the advantage of, certain members 
of otherwise complex and irregular communities.74    In particular, Gilmartin asserts 
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that the Punjab government’s decision to use the ‘village’ as the vessel for settling 
canal colonies held critical implications for the colonies’ role as harbingers of 
modernity: colonists would leave their villages, he argues, but not the social 
framework which their villages provided.75  In effect, the Jamrao’s segregated 
villages transplanted the Government of Punjab’s management of Punjabis into 
Sind, along with the cultivators themselves. 
Official decisions pertaining to land usage could also have Imperial 
resonances.  The Governments of Bombay and India both saw the potential for 
expanding the Jamrao lands’ uses beyond crop-production and revenue-raising.  For 
example, the Horse and Mule Breeding Commission’s 1901 proposal that horses and 
mules for military use could be bred on government land in canal colonies76 was 
answered by the Sind administration’s decision to use some of the land to breed 
camels for the same purpose.  Indeed, the Jamrao Canal Colonization Officer offered 
to reserve 2,000 acres of land on the Jamrao Canal and 20,000 on the Dad Canal for 
camel-breeding, which would produce an estimated 1,373 camels.  This too followed 
the precedent set in the Punjab, where 2,073 squares (expected to produce 2,331 
camels) had been allotted as camel-breeding grants on the Chenab Canal.  The 
grants were progressing well, according to the Chenab Colonization Officer, and the 
camels were indeed appearing.  Moreover, this officer felt that on the Jhelum Canal, 
everyone who was granted land should be made responsible for producing a camel, 
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mule or cart when necessary for war purposes.77  The concern at all levels of 
government, from the Government of India to local officers, for schemes that would 
aid India’s war-readiness belied the fact that, despite the relatively pacific nature of 
northwestern India, the eyes of the administration were always turned towards the 
extraterritorial threats to British India which Russia embodied, and to the possibility 
of internal revolt.  As in Rudyard Kipling’s 1901 novel Kim, the Great Game was an 
ever-present factor: the strategic security of the British Empire in Asia and the 
Middle East depended on the Indian Army, and provinces such as Sind and the 
Punjab, on the fringes of direct British control, were expected to contribute.  The 
importance of camel-breeding grants in Sind and the Punjab serves as a reminder 
that the provincial governments' enthusiasm for revenue, social experimentation 
and politically-useful prestige were not the only factors in colony development: the 
Empire's strategic needs could impinge on, and if necessary overrule, such parochial 
concerns. 
Controlling irrigation and cultivation on the Jamrao tract  
As well as arranging for colonization on the Jamrao tract, the administration also 
determined which crops should be grown and how farmland would be laid out.  This 
was crucial to the project’s financial success, because revenue receipts from Jamrao 
land would have to go a long way towards repaying the debt incurred by the 
Government of Bombay in constructing the project, and to its technical success, as 
only enough water was available for one third of the cultivable land to be farmed 
each year.  Agriculture formed the basis of the economy, in Sind as in most of British 
India, and the state’s contact with the population revolved around the collection of 
agricultural taxes as well as (in Sind’s particular case) providing irrigation water.  The 
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legal codification of agricultural practice was therefore an important way in which 
the administration could assert control over cultivators and, thereby, over the 
agrarian economy.  Officials utilized the lack of customary rights on this virgin land 
to create an opportunity for the rationalization of the agricultural production 
process.  For a start, land on the Jamrao was to be given out only for agricultural 
purposes:78 the Government wanted a square return on the capital it was investing 
in creating conditions for higher agricultural yields, and other types of land usage 
would be less profitable.  Perhaps the most important of the state’s decisions about 
land-use at the time was the prohibition of rice-growing.  This was motivated by the 
huge amount of water that rice required, which would have far outstripped the 
Jamrao’s designed volume of supply.  Draining the fields of excess water afterwards 
would also have posed a great problem, since sufficient drainage facilities did not 
exist on the Jamrao tract.  Severe waterlogging and salt deposits on the soil would 
have resulted, rendering the land useless.   
Such a restriction, however, troubled many of the officials involved in the 
project, including those in the Governor’s circle.  "The Sind Irrigation settlements 
contemplate perfect freedom to the cultivators in planting any crops they may 
desire,” the Revenue Secretary to the Government of Bombay informed the 
Government of India, “but for the proper economy and distribution of water on the 
Jamrao Canal the Irrigation Department will have a voice in the conditions under 
which occupancies may be given, so far as the kinds of crops to be grown and the 
area to be watered annually are concerned."79  The Commissioner-in-Sind rejected 
the Government of Bombay’s suggestion that Jamrao colonists should simply be 
forbidden to cultivate rice, because it contravened the principle of the irrigation 
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settlements.  However, he understood the imperative against rice cultivation on the 
tract, and fully supported its prevention by the indirect means of restricting the 
water supply so that not enough water was available to cultivators for rice 
cultivation.80   
Yet regret at curbing cultivators’ freedom could not mask the technocratic 
and authoritarian effect of the land- and water-use rules on the relationship 
between cultivators and officers.  All aspects of the Jamrao Canal’s operation were 
intended to be rationally controlled by the Public Works Department (P.W.D.), which 
sometimes conflicted with cultivators’ accustomed irrigation practices.  Colonists 
who were used to taking as much water as they wanted while an inundation canal 
was flowing found it difficult to adjust to a system in which a farmer upstream could 
divert the watercourse’s supply onto only one square of his fields at a time, allowing 
downstream users to take water between each turn.  As the Colonization Officer 
explained, outlets were designed only to deliver a certain amount of water in a given 
time, set by engineers and not by cultivators themselves.  The reason for this, he 
went on, was to ensure that sufficient water remained in the canal for the later re-
watering that crops would require to grow properly, whereas the supply in 
inundation canals often failed towards the end of the growing season.81   
This was an example of the ethos of the project, which was led by technical 
imperatives to which people had to conform, rather than by fitting the project to the 
wants or needs of the users.  The layout of villages on the Jamrao tract was geared 
towards enabling this.  In the Canal administration’s terminology, a ‘village’ included 
both the residences of cultivators and the fields that they worked.  Unlike most 
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villages in Sind, village boundaries on the Jamrao Tract were demarcated before the 
canal was completed, and before colonists moved into them.  Based partly on the 
system of villages laid out in the Chenab Canal Colony, the tract was divided into 444 
separate villages, each of which obtained water from one or more outlets from one 
of the minor canals that branched off from the main Jamrao Canal.  Within each 
village, the land was divided into squares of 16 acres, which were then (in principle) 
further divided into one-acre squares, so that the distribution of water could be 
precisely controlled, although in practice cultivators were lax about building the 
barriers necessary for dividing up the 16-acre squares.  Villages were supposedly 
limited to 2,000 acres in area, and watercourses to 3 miles in length, designed to 
optimize the efficiency with which water could be distributed.  In fact, both often 
exceeded these limits.82 
While it was intended that technical principles would govern village layouts 
and the use of water, the logistics of maintaining close technical control often 
defeated the administration.  Yet despite the irregularities found on the Jamrao 
tract, these villages and the accompanying water distribution system were far more 
ordered and regular than those found elsewhere in Sind.  This partly allowed for 
closer supervision of living conditions by officials; similarly, one near-contemporary 
economic investigation into the canalization of the Punjab, whose villages were 
taken as the model for the Jamrao tract’s, extolled their “marked sanitary 
advantages over the ordinary Punjab villages which just grow with the needs of the 
community without definite plan”.83  As Mitchell has argued in the case of village 
reconstruction in nineteenth century Egypt, colonial building projects aimed at 
order, removing crowded and haphazard native villages and replacing them with 
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new, regular, neat villages laid out according to a plan.84  Jamrao tract villages 
exemplified a colonial approach to Sind that began with a plan for a new 
phenomenon and proceeded to enact it, rather than working with what already 
existed.  This approach was often impossible, as during the resettlement of the 
Talpurs: in that case, officials were severely limited by practical politics.  Laying out 
villages, on the other hand, gave them an opportunity to match a closely-controlled 
canal with closer control of people and agricultural space. 
Increased technical control over the Jamrao Canal and its tract marked a 
shift towards technocracy that characterized contemporary developments in Indian 
irrigation,85 and this was celebrated by the Superintending Engineer in overall charge 
of the Canal.   He favourably compared it with the neighbouring Mithrao Canal, 
extolling the virtues of the fact that the whole of the Jamrao tract was divided into 
small irrigation villages, each with its own water course, made of sufficient size only 
for that village, and controlled by subordinates employed for that express purpose.  
On the Mithrao, by comparison, "the old Sind system prevail[ed] - large karias, made 
on no particular system and with merely the nominal control of Revenue Tapadars - 
no control at all.”86  Indeed, the same officer complained shortly afterwards that, 
even on the Jamrao, not enough control was exerted over cultivation by the 
Revenue Department, and that the people would only understand the system if 
water allocations were put under the P.W.D.87   
Dunn's accusations may have been the result of inter-departmental bad 
blood as much as a carefully considered response to a problem; and conversely 
other officers could become frustrated with P.W.D. officers when the latter based 
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their actions on technical principles, without reference to the realities of local 
cultivation practices.88  But however unsubtle engineers’ understanding of 
cultivation conditions could be, a technical understanding of irrigation, rather than 
extensive knowledge of local farming conditions, reigned supreme during the 
administration of the Jamrao Canal.  The Jamrao project, then, seems to have helped 
the process by which the local knowledge prized by revenue officials was slowly 
displaced in India by the universal principles of engineering.  This was not a simple 
battle of ideas, however.  Rather, tensions between departments and their habitual 
ways of viewing Sind were constrained by circumstances.  Elsewhere the 
administration did not have, in Commissioner Giles’s words, “even a fraction of the 
establishment necessary to supervise every private channel,” whereas "On the 
Jamrao every occupant [was] bound to make his watercourses on plans and in 
positions approved of by the Canal Officers".89    Given the financial stake that the 
government held in the Jamrao project, and the prestige that was attached to a 
canal designed and built by the British rather than inherited from the Talpurs or 
earlier rulers, it was unsurprising that the Government took care to ensure the 
scheme’s success at the expense of established, less restrictive relationships with 
agriculturalists.  Dunn's urging of tighter administrative control over cultivation and 
water allocation by engineers, rather than revenue officials, also foreshadowed the 
supremacy of science and technology as the lynchpins of material development: the 
valorization of engineering, and its close association with the British and elite 
indigenous ruling classes, would come to underpin the rhetoric surrounding large-
scale irrigation projects throughout the twentieth century.  
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Conclusion  
How much difference, then, did the Jamrao Canal make to Sind?  After all, the 
Jamrao tract was only a small proportion of Sind’s territory, and the great majority 
of cultivation in Sind was still practised on the old inundation canals.90  While the 
1911 census commissioners reported that new irrigation works were responsible for 
drawing in 20,000 people born outside Sind in the decade 1901-1911, they ascribed 
this to the Dad, Nasrat, Mahiwah and Navlakhi canals, as well as the Jamrao.  That 
the Jamrao Canal contributed significantly to the dramatic population growth in that 
decade of Thar Parkar district (the highest in Sind at 22%), however, did show that it 
was an important feature of the province’s south-east.  It was also responsible, 
along with the colonization of the Nara Canal, for a five-fold increase in immigration 
into Sind from the Punjab. The administration’s efforts to increase the productive 
population in this sparsely-populated district, drawing migrants from outside the 
province rather than risking the depopulation of other parts of Sind, had paid off.  
Moreover, the census commissioners highlighted the direct link between state-led 
irrigation provision and population by stating that, across Sind, increases in 
population on a per taluka basis had varied according to the opening of new 
irrigation facilities. 91  In a fertile but thinly populated land such as Sind, population 
increases were linked with increases in productive capacity and prosperity. 
But Sind’s continued ‘backwardness’ and reputation for stagnation was a 
favourite bugbear of the administration well into the twentieth century.  Although 
the Jamrao project represented the rationalized water distribution and cultivation 
that officials associated with ‘modern’ agriculture it was only a forerunner of things 
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to come.  This is not to suggest that the Canal’s officers saw it as a stage in a specific 
programme: the perpetual debates about fully renovating Sind’s irrigation system 
had long predated the scheme, and despite its success there was no certainty at this 
stage that a weir would eventually be constructed in Upper Sind.  The Irrigation 
Commission of 1901-1903 reported that, on the technical evidence provided by Sind 
engineers themselves, and in view of the huge capital outlay involved, a large-scale 
weir project should not be initiated in Sind.  Nor was the matter closed, however, as 
the same Commission recommended that a thorough investigation be made into the 
question, and that a weir scheme be prepared and held ready in case of future need; 
meanwhile, improvements should be made to the existing canal system where 
possible.92   
Much of the Jamrao Canal’s importance lay in its effect on the theory and 
practice of irrigational administration in Sind.  It was a modernizing project, one that 
aimed to introduce into Sind a new kind of irrigation and cultivation, and which 
adhered to an ideal of careful resource use and greater productivity.  This was in 
essence a statist vision, placing bureaucratic control at the heart of the process.  Yet 
while a narrative that posits the Jamrao as an early inroad of an inevitable 
modernity into a formerly peripheral and stagnant territory is attractively neat, it 
would be flawed.  The modernizing aspects of absorbing the Talpur Mirs into the 
project and thereby removing one of the most visible reminders of pre-British 
‘feudal’ rule from the country in general should not be allowed to obscure the 
financial and political imperatives behind the endeavour.   
On the other hand, other features of the project did suggest that it had an 
important place in the broader changes that were occurring in agriculture in north-
western India at the turn of the century.  Moreover the overwhelming 
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predominance of agriculture in both Sind and the Punjab means that the story of 
agriculture is a vital part of the region’s social, political and economic histories.  The 
introduction of greater state intervention in agricultural practise, and the reciprocal 
attempt to create the conditions in which ideal-type cultivators could flourish and 
spread their beneficent influence, lay at the heart of the Jamrao project.  This type 
of control was not always limited to the canal colonies: for example the Punjab’s 
1900 Alienation of Land Act, which forbade the passing of land from agricultural to 
non-agricultural castes, and allowed land transfers only within related agricultural 
groups within each district, applied to the whole province.  The Act has been 
described as “a remarkable piece of paternalistic legislation”93 in the face of the 
intensive marketization and ‘modernization’ of agriculture on the Canal Colonies.  In 
Sind, there was no equivalent prohibition on land alienation, but a raft of less 
comprehensive orders served to limit landowners’ rights to dispose of their assets 
however they pleased.  The fearsome list of conditions on which Jamrao land was 
leased demonstrated the legal rigidity with which the administration was ready to 
protect and support the newly rigid agricultural landscape that it had created.  This 
list mirrored those issued in the Punjab, adjusted for Sind conditions but intended to 
bring about a similar level of control. The idea of creating a more rational irrigation 
system and, by extension, more rational cultivators in Sind hinged on the 
relationship between the state as the provider of water and the collector of revenue 
and the cultivator as an individual actor, especially when it came to self-cultivated 
peasant grants.  Yet this individual was not to be wholly a free agent, but one who 
would practise agriculture on officially-approved lines.  The Jamrao project may have 
been limited in scale, but it was consonant with the massive changes occurring in 
the Punjabi landscape, with attendant effects on politics, society, and demographics.  
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As the Sind administration went forward into the twentieth century, it would 
become more assertive in its arguments for extending the Jamrao’s modern 
conditions across the province – an argument that would become increasingly 
trenchant in the face of an altered India after the First World War.
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Chapter 2: The Sukkur Barrage and Sind’s transformation 
 
A white-bearded and saffron-robed saint from the north stretched his 
arms in benediction over each of the canals and in a loud voice intoned 
a solemn song of praise and prophecy.  He gave rather more thanks to 
God and less to the engineers than His Excellency had done, and was 
less concerned with history and more with poetry.  He looked like a man 
from a thirsty land, and his picture of the blessings brought by irrigation 
was a vivid one. 
-The Times of India (1932) 1 
 
 
After the experiment of the Jamrao Canal, the colonial government in Sind decided 
to build a much larger project: a barrage, located at Sukkur in Upper Sind, which 
would regulate the flow of the Indus and provide water to a huge area.  As with the 
Jamrao Canal, officials were quick to see the prospect of reinforcing and re-
configuring the link between state power and irrigation to the administration’s 
advantage, as well as to encourage commercialized agriculture.  This project was, 
they maintained, revolutionary (even though the idea of a barrage across the Indus 
in Sind had first been mooted in 1847):2 by far the biggest seen in Sind, and a rival to 
those under development in the Punjab in terms of size, cost and grandeur.  In 1923, 
London sanctioned a scheme that would improve the reliability of irrigation water 
supplies to more than 1.5m acres of existing agricultural land, and irrigate for the 
first time more than 2.6m acres.  Indeed, the Sukkur Barrage became one of the 
province's defining features, and the colonial regime lost no opportunity to claim it 
as proof of the wisdom and beneficence of their rule, staging publicity events such 
as an opening ceremony, and promoting the project in newspapers.  However, the 
project’s grand potential to re-shape Sindhi rural politics and society – as well as the 
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physical environment – was always constrained by the colonial state’s need for 
financial stringency.  By examining the reports and correspondence that pertained 
to the barrage’s planning and building, this chapter shows that a tension between 
what the officials concerned wanted to do, and what they were able to do, 
influenced how the barrage was built and its tract colonized.  Most of these issues 
were raised and debated in the form of letters between officials concerning the 
proposed projects, and it is from this correspondence that the bulk of the evidence 
in this chapter is drawn. 
Planning the Sukkur Barrage 
Two major proposals for a barrage at Sukkur were submitted from the Government 
of Bombay to His Majesty's Government in London, via the Government of India, in 
1912 and 1920.  During this period, the political and environmental challenges that 
the Sind administration faced intensified: a long-running dispute over the right to 
use Indus waters flared up between Bombay and the Punjab, while a severe drought 
in Sind in 1918 challenged the received opinion that the Indus's waters would always 
guard Sind from food shortages.  Officials’ concerns about the revenue thereby lost, 
and potential political instability, forced a revision of the complacency surrounding 
the administration’s management of the environment in Sind, especially as Indian 
anti-colonial politics escalated after the First World War. 
The renewed debate about a barrage in Sind began almost immediately 
after the Irrigation Commission had rejected the Sind administration’s desire to 
build a weir on the Indus.  In 1904 Dr T. Summers, the Supervising Engineer of the 
Indus Left Bank, toured his area and concluded that Sind needed perennial irrigation 
immediately.  His report justified the preparation of detailed estimates and plans for 
a Rohri canal and Sukkur weir, which was sent to London in 1912.  While seeming to 
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be a dry proposal for a technical project, this correspondence was underlain by a 
profound if incompletely articulated sense that the position of the British in India 
was changing, and that the government had to take a more active role in the 
development of Indians’ material welfare if its power were to be preserved.   
One of the most important aspects of this changing role was an increasing 
official recognition of the dangers of famine, which had come to underpin 
discussions about irrigation in India by the beginning of the twentieth century.  The 
terrible droughts of the 1890s have been credited by historians with shocking the 
British in India out of their neglect of unprofitable public irrigation works,3  but this 
did not mean that the British in India suddenly abandoned their belief in market 
forces.  On the contrary, officials usually favoured keeping state intervention in 
everyday affairs to a minimum.  The first Famine Commission (1880) confirmed that 
the minimum of government interference in private trade should be allowed during 
times of scarcity, because (they reported) the commercially-driven flow of foodstuffs 
from productive to famine-struck areas had proved their worth in 1877, when grains 
were sent from the north to relieve the Deccan.4  The success of this laissez-faire 
approach was, moreover, credited to Indians' commercial use of the British-built 
railway system: an example of just enough state intervention.  Similarly, the 
Irrigation Commission recommended a raft of new state-funded irrigation projects 
to reduce the risk of famine in India, but emphasized that the extension of irrigation 
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by private works was at least equally important.5  This view was shared by the then 
Commissioner-in-Sind, R. Giles, who told the Commission that “By assuming the 
entire management of the canals we have spoilt the people for the construction of 
new private canals.”6  Moreover Sind, relying as it did on inundation agriculture 
rather than the annual monsoon, was thought at that time to be largely safe from 
food scarcity.7  Accordingly, the Irrigation Commission had recommended that plans 
for an Indus barrage in Sind be put on hold, and that existing canals could be made a 
great deal more efficient instead.8   
The assumption that the Indus would always provide water in Sind, 
however, came to be challenged.  The Punjab lay upstream of Sind, and had earlier 
access to Indus waters than the latter.  Consequently, the canal colonies, and 
projected works such as the Triple Valley scheme, were considered by officials in 
Sind and Bombay to pose a threat to the amount of water which would be available 
in Sind.  If vast volumes of water were taken from Indus tributaries in the Punjab, 
Sind’s supply would be reduced.  By the early twentieth century many large 
irrigation works were being constructed,9 and the Governments of Bombay and 
India believed that these posed a threat to Sind’s existing irrigation system.  In light 
of this concern Sir John Benton, Inspector-General of Irrigation in India, had gone to 
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Sind in 1906 to enquire into the possibility of providing perennial irrigation.10  In 
March 1912, seven months before the despatch of the barrage plan, Benton wrote 
that two projects – the Punjab Triple Canal and the Upper Swat Canal in the North-
West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) – would significantly affect Sind.  However, he 
pronounced that these projects, and further proposed Punjab works, could not 
legitimately be halted when Sind had the option of constructing weirs on the Indus 
to ensure its own water supply.11  The Jamrao Canal project had demonstrated that 
perennial irrigation projects could work in Sind, having boosted Sind’s prosperity and 
successfully attracted colonists.  
The 1912 Despatch 
The proposal for a barrage submitted to the Secretary of State for India in 1912 
relied on the prospect of financial returns, in the shape of increased land revenue 
receipts, to promote the project's worth.  It estimated a reasonable return of Rs. 
3,859,457 in revenue in the tenth year after completion.12  These figures were 
accompanied by strong expressions of the idea that Sindhi cultivation was far from 
fulfilling the potential it would have if given appropriate technological support.  The 
poor quality of Sind’s irrigation infrastructure, which was unable to negate this 
instability, was considered to have prevented the development of intensive 
agriculture such as that seen in the Punjab.  This argument was encapsulated in the 
despatch’s introduction:  
Irregular hot weather supplies have however resulted in wasteful methods of 
cultivation and insufficient cold weather supplies have stunted the 
development of rabi crops. To devise a productive scheme having an assured 
and perennial supply of water has been a problem before our canal engineers 
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during the past fifty years, of which the present project represents the 
outcome and a part solution.13  
The desire for intensive irrigated agriculture spoke to the British desire to draw 
colonial possessions into the Imperial and international market systems.  In Sind and 
across British India, an integral part of the Imperial system was the use and 
promotion of market capitalism.14  Washbrook has shown that British rule was 
attended by (though not necessarily the only cause of) a near-univeralization of 
peasant commodity production, due in large part to British export interests and 
foreign demand for Indian primary products.15  Similarly, Stein has argued that “A 
general objective of colonial policy was to enhance agrarian commercialization and 
its link to world trade”; this was effected by, among other changes, the monetization 
of revenue collection and the promotion of “irrigation schemes intended to increase 
the acreage under cash crops”.16  Both of these phenomena occurred in Sind.  
Ludden has demurred somewhat, arguing that capitalism was not a wholly foreign 
imposition on ‘village’ India:  land revenue in the Mughal period, “even when 
collected in kind, was made liquid and useful as state revenue through markets in 
agrarian commodities, including crops but also myriad village products”.  However, 
Ludden does admit that away from the coastal trading centres,  
Agricultural surpluses were small; commercial wealth trickled through the 
rural economy and could be gathered to any extent only in major urban 
centres [...] where merchants collected profits from long-distance trade and 
royal authorities collected tribute.17   
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Sind, which lay at the crossroads of several important trade routes between India, 
the Persian Gulf and Arabia, was the home base of many international traders;18 but 
these Hindu merchants did not have the power (nor necessarily the desire) to 
promote the systematic commercialization of Sindhi agricultural production.   
By contrast, the British administration had both.  One striking example of 
the push towards growing crops for market was officials’ repeated experiments with 
cotton-growing.  The chief crops in Sind at the turn of the twentieth century had 
been rice, wheat, and two locally-grown grains called bajri and juari.  The last two 
were staples for the local workforce, with no significant export market.  Indigo and 
tobacco, two of the British Empire’s favourite cash-crops, were hardly grown at all.  
Oilseeds and cotton were among Sindh’s chief exports, but were only cultivated on 
respectively one-ninth and one-twelfth the acreage of cereals, and so the vast 
majority of Sind’s crops were not suitable for export.  Because of the importance of 
cotton to the Imperial economy,19 experiments to improve the yield and quality of 
cotton grown in Sind had begun in 1846, with disappointing results.  Further failed 
experiments were carried on until 1906, when a suitable high-quality seed was 
finally bred.  This process was subsidized by the Government of Bombay, which also 
undertook the marketing and propagation of the seed;20 in doing so, the 
government declared its stake in further integrating Sind into the international 
markets.   
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By introducing more stable cultivation conditions, in which commercial 
crops could be reliably grown, the Sukkur Barrage was expected to make agriculture 
more profitable.  This can be demonstrated by briefly turning to the 1920s, when 
the project was underway.  Hugh Dow – later the Governor of Sind, but then the 
financial adviser to the Government of Bombay on the Sukkur Barrage project – 
wrote that cultivators had previously been often unable to choose which crops they 
would cultivate, because in the absence of a well-developed irrigation system, the 
choice of crops to be cultivated was perforce determined by the timing of the annual 
inundation.  Though perhaps wishing to grow cotton, the cultivator would often be 
forced to use bajri instead.21  In the context of the Empire’s commercial functions, 
official enthusiasm for improving irrigation facilities could well have been stimulated 
by the links between the colonial economy and global markets.  The aim of 
increasing the province’s productive capacity was itself underpinned by a firm 
conception of India as a producer of primary goods and consumer of finished 
products in the Imperial division of labour, which reserved the middle-ground of 
manufacture to capitalists in Britain, the Imperial centre.22   
The problem of an unpredictable environment was, in official eyes, closely 
intertwined with the failings of Sindhis themselves, who were considered to be 
slovenly and ineffective cultivators.  Shades of opinion varied as to how far Sindhi 
attitudes had been determined by the environment in which they lived.  The author 
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of the 1907 Sind Gazetteer had lamented that leisure took precedence over work in 
Sindhi agrarian culture:  
the truth is that, in the absence of competition, ambition and every other 
stimulus which urges the husbandman to get the most he can out of his field, 
the Sindhi has for generations cherished the gentler ideal of allowing his field 
to divorce him as little from his hookah as might be compatible with keeping 
the latter filled.23   
In the light of British officials’ experiences of settling Punjabis in both the Punjab 
canal colonies, and in Sind on the Jamrao and Nasrat tracts, the suitability of Sindhis 
for the colonization of virgin perennially-irrigated lands was viewed with some 
scepticism, whereas Punjabis were considered to be model farmers for arid, canal-
irrigated land. However, hope was held out for the improvement of Sindhi attitudes 
once the barrage came into operation.  As the Government of Bombay argued in 
1910, the introduction of perennial irrigation would, over many years, encourage an 
increase in population, and population pressure on the land.  This land-starved 
populace would, in theory, follow the example set by the Agricultural Department 
and “the better class of cultivator” on the tract to greatly intensify cultivation.24  This 
attitude was taken up with increasing enthusiasm in later years, and Dow wrote that 
once a stable water supply was assured, “the traditional indolence and fatalism of 
the Sindhi cultivator may be sought in vain”.25 
When the Government of India sent the 1912 despatch to London, however, 
there was still no guarantee that the project would be approved.    The Secretary of 
State, the Marquess of Crewe, appointed a committee under Colonel J.W. Ottley to 
review the plan and advise him whether it deserved execution.  This committee, the 
‘London Committee’, reported against the scheme in December 1913, arguing that 
the work was unlikely to prove productive, and that Sind’s existing inundation-canal 
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system was adequate to the province’s requirements.  It also denied that the 
Punjab’s withdrawal of water from Indus tributaries posed a real threat to Sind.  
However, the London Committee ruled that a plan and estimates for a barrage 
scheme should be prepared and held ready, in case it became necessary in the 
future.26  The 1912 plan, then, was cursed by its authors’ inability to demonstrate 
either its profitability or its absolute necessity.  Like the Irrigation Commission 
before it, the committee accepted the idea of the Barrage scheme as desirable but 
not as necessary.   
The 1920 Despatch 
The Government of Bombay received the committee’s report in March 1914, and 
disputed its rulings that the scheme would be unprofitable, and that the existing 
canals system was adequate protection against Punjabi withdrawals.  Bombay 
realized that the scope of the project had to be widened if London were to be 
convinced of its necessity.27  Initial work began on a new plan in 1916 but was held 
up by the First World War, and little was done until 1918.  The revised plan, now 
named the Sukkur Barrage and Canals Project, was submitted by the Government of 
India to the Secretary of State for India in 1920.  This again proposed a barrage at 
Sukkur, but the proposal for a single Rohri Canal had transformed into something 
much grander: on the right bank, a (smaller) Rohri Canal, two kharif-only Feeder 
Canals to take water to Khairpur state, and extensions and modifications to the 
existing Eastern Nara Canal; on the left bank, the North Western, Central Rice and 
the Dadu Canals.28  It was approved by both Houses of Parliament in Britain in 
August 1921, and formally sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India in 1923.   
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The obvious question, then, is what had changed between 1912 and 1923?  
The immediate answer is twofold: a poor inundation in 1918, which threatened the 
province with famine; and the volatile post-First World War political situation in 
India.  Before these came about, however, Sind initially continued to press the case 
that irrigation projects in the Punjab threatened to reduce the volume of water 
available downstream.  The matter remained under discussion in the Governments 
of Bombay and India.  Sir Michael Nethersole, who succeeded Benton as Inspector-
General of Irrigation, wrote in 1916 that for technical reasons it was difficult to 
determine even the general trend of Punjab effects on Sind irrigation, and 
impossible to be specific.  But, he went on, there was overwhelming evidence that 
Sind water levels could fall extremely low, and that Punjab withdrawals must 
undoubtedly “enhance this menace to Sind irrigation”.29  Moreover, Nethersole 
challenged the London Committee’s view that Punjab works, including protective 
embankments, had led to usefully higher river levels in Sind.  The issue, Nethersole 
argued, was not the general level but the level extant at critical times for watering 
crops, and these certainly were threatened by Punjab withdrawals.30 
Nethersole’s support gave the planning process continued impetus, but the 
case took a new turn after 1918.  In that year, the inundation was abnormally low, 
and Sind came to the brink of famine.  With the failure of the inundation the 
province had a grain deficit for the first time since the British annexation, and could 
not feed its own people let alone export to other provinces.  This lent the barrage 
project the possibility of a protective as well as productive role,31 which was 
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emphasized by the Government of Bombay and the Commissioner when the revised 
plan was sent to the Government of India in July 1920.   The plan also emphasized 
that the 1920 inundation had been very late and damaged the cotton crop,32 a 
significant source of revenue for the Sind government.  The issue of contention in 
the debates about Punjab withdrawals – i.e. was perennial irrigation in Sind 
necessary or merely desirable? – was now, the Commissioner-in-Sind argued, 
resolved.33  Although the barrage was still proposed as a productive work, the 
spectre of famine could now be used to give Bombay’s arguments a more immediate 
force.   
Famine in Sind, as throughout twentieth-century India, was understood by 
the British as not just a humanitarian issue, but a financial and political one.   Food 
shortages hurt Government revenues: the plan noted that a Sind barrage would 
have averted the 1918 disaster, and the surplus value in crops grown in that year 
would have been £10 million in a conservative estimate.34  In terms of law-and-
order, the food shortages that had swept other parts of India in 1896-1897 and 
1899-1902 caused their victims enormous suffering, but also prompted direct 
threats to British rule when starving peasants took the law into their own hands.  
During the 1896-1897 famine, for example, peasants in the Central Provinces 
assaulted grain depots rather than face the appalling conditions and indignity of 
government poorhouses, as Davis puts it.35  After 1918, Sind and the Government of 
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Bombay could argue that the instability of Sind’s agricultural environment 
threatened not only government revenues, but also the regime’s control over the 
population.  
The implicit political threat that famine presented was made explicit in the 
Commissioner’s memorandum, which claimed that the question of irrigation 
development was becoming dangerously politicized in Sind: 
Apart from the material benefit to Government, and still more to the people 
of the province, there can be no doubt that the project will have a beneficial 
and steadying political effect.  The agricultural classes of Sind [...] were always 
loyal and well-affected [...] but the leaven of agitation has been introduced 
among them, and no efforts are being spared to make them discontented 
with the measures of Government.  It is open for agitators at present to point 
out that comparatively little has been done in Sind of recent years in the way 
of great works by Government.  The engineering projects carried to 
completion and success in the neighbouring provinces of the Punjab and 
North-West Frontier are well known to many Sindhis.  The more educated 
have heard of the canal works that have been or are about to be executed in 
the United Provinces and Madras.  They can read of the schemes sanctioned 
for the water-ways of Bengal.  The great protective irrigation works in the 
process of execution in the Deccan are well known.  The undertaking of a 
great scheme such as that now proposed in Sind would undoubtedly have an 
excellent effect.36 
The Commissioner, then, was appealing to the idea that a grand, large-scale 
modernization project would bolster British prestige in the province, and distract 
attention away from nationalist claims against the colonial power.  Sindhi zamindars, 
traditionally regarded as pacific, had grown restless as a result of the Khilafat 
Movement, which protested at the deposing of the Caliph, the political leader of the 
Ottoman Empire and a leading figure in the Islamic world, by the Allies after the 
Ottomans’ defeat.  This restlessness was exacerbated across India by the extension 
of wartime powers to suppress public expressions of dissent into peacetime.37  
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Moreover, the positive impact of reforms announced in 1909 by John Morley, the 
Secretary of State, and Lord Minto, the Viceroy, had been outweighed by the 
negative impact made by the government’s use of the repressive powers that they 
had granted.38  By the time the Commissioner’s memorandum was written, the 
predominantly urban Khilafat leadership in Sind had obtained the co-operation of 
many pirs, who brought with them the massed support of their rural followers.  The 
British authorities became concerned, and the Government reacted by arresting 
leading Khilafatists, in line with state action across India.39  Since Sind was an 
overwhelmingly agricultural province, it was the rural upper classes – and not the 
urban middle classes associated with nationalist sentiment elsewhere in India – 
whose loyalty had to be fought for.  The barrage could challenge the agitators by, 
quite simply, making life ‘better’ for the zamindars and haris who worked the land.  
Although the Khilafat Movement was not directly referred to, the agitation that it 
inspired certainly was.  As the provincial authorities endeavoured to navigate these 
troubled waters, the implicit political weight of the 1912 plan turned into the over 
politicization of the barrage scheme in the 1920 plan.   
The final element in the 1920 plan’s favour was that the financial forecast 
had improved.  Both the 1912 and 1920 plans had expressed the opinion of senior 
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officials that the cost and revenue estimates were sound,40 and both plans went into 
considerable depth to explain and justify how these estimates were calculated; but 
the 1920 plan offered better returns.  It projected a 5.57% return at 10 years, and a 
handsome 10.5% at 30 years.  The 1912 plan, by contrast, had estimated only a 
4.28% return on the sum-at-charge at 10 years.  Presented with a stronger argument 
for the barrage’s political (and humanitarian) necessity, and a more attractive 
financial proposition, the Secretary of State was willing to sanction the scheme. 
 
Constructing the barrage 
The construction of the project proved as contentious as its planning, especially as 
far as its finances were concerned.  It remained, however, within the familiar 
framework of public works projects described in Chapter 1.  The project was 
ultimately to be paid for by the Government of Bombay (this responsibility was 
transferred to the newly-constituted Government of Sind in 1936), but in the short- 
and medium-term it was financed by loans advanced to the Government of Bombay 
by the Government of India.  London kept a tight reign on construction works 
finances, with the Secretary of State’s sanction required for various rises, e.g. in 
1925 for extra expenditure of Rs. 255 lakhs for steel and iron work, and machinery 
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and plant equipment.41  This was a testament to the project’s importance, and its 
massive cost.  However, this control was subject to repeated demands from Sind for 
more funds.  The initial estimate put forward in 1920, of a little over Rs. 184 million, 
had risen to approximately Rs. 204 million by February 1928.  Moreover, the 
project’s financing attracted some criticism.  The Government of India’s decision to 
provide only loans for barrage works, rather than to actually pay part of the cost, 
was the subject of acrimony in a Times of India article.42   
It also attracted adverse comment in a report commissioned by the 
Government of Bombay and prepared by Sir M. Visvesvarya and Nawab Ali Nawaz 
Jung Bahadur, two Indian engineers. This report recommended that the Government 
of Bombay should ask the Government of India to take over some of the barrage 
debt.  The Government of India, however, refused to do so, and the Bombay 
government publicly responded to Visvesvarya and Bahadur’s suggestions in an 
appendix to a pamphlet about the barrage.  The two engineers, it said, had not 
taken account of the fact that the barrage debt would be mostly cleared by revenue 
raised on the land once the barrage and canals were operational.  The provincial 
government constitutionally had control over revenue rates, and so the Government 
of India was unwilling to take over the debt if it could not also take over the source 
of remuneration.43  Although the pamphlet did not state as much, it implied that the 
Government of Bombay would be unwilling to relinquish control over the rates, and 
so the barrage debt remained where it was.  The barrage was a uniquely massive 
and complex project in Sind, requiring some re-organisation of the region’s 
administration, but at the level of Presidency-centre relations it was not such a 
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major event as to encourage either side to overstep the normal financial boundaries 
set between them.   
Bombay was not the only government with a stake in the barrage project, 
however.  Nasirabad Tehsil of the neighbouring Baluchistan States Agency was also 
to receive barrage water under the scheme, and the Government of Bombay, 
concerned to emphasize that this should be done as a productive work rather than 
for political gain, insisted that irrigation in Nasirabad Tehsil should be conducted 
under the same conditions as on ordinary land in Sind.  The latter’s revenue rates 
would be applied, and rice cultivation was to be restricted, following the Jamrao 
Canal’s precedent.  The Government of Bombay also proposed that the Government 
of India should directly pay for the costs incurred in building the barrage and 
extending a canal into Nasirabad, and that Nasirabad should be brought under Sind’s 
administrative control.  This would simplify such financial arrangements by making 
the Government of Bombay wholly responsible, and would allow Bombay irrigation 
and revenue officers to control the canal in the same manner as in the rest of Sind, 
whereas the Baluchistan administration was inexperienced in operating under 
Bombay revenue rules.  It was also noted that incorporating Nasirabad into Sind, 
under the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier, would bring under one 
administration the tribes such as the Bugtis who currently held land in both British 
Sind and Baluchistan, and simplify policing and other government matters.44  This 
would make it easier to capture the bandits who had historically troubled the 
frontier, and then taken refuge across the border where Sind’s police could not 
follow without special permission.  Bombay’s suggestion followed the precedent of 
the earlier canalization of upper Sind in John Jacob’s day, when improved law and 
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order was expected to follow the extension of irrigation into ‘wild’ lands.  In the late 
1920s, although Sind had long been considered a settled province, canals were still 
perceived to some extent as conduits for the administration’s authority.  Just as the 
canals were dug into virgin land, governance would cut into the tribal areas. 
The matter was further complicated when, after construction had begun, it 
transpired that the canal would irrigate a portion of Kalat State as well as Nasirabad 
Tehsil; this had not been realized during the planning stage because the Baluchistan 
authorities had no maps of Nasirabad Tehsil, and so had not been able to determine 
exactly where the canal would flow.45  Eventually it was agreed that the existing 
provincial boundaries would remain in force.  The Government of India would take 
financial responsibility for irrigation outside Sind, meaning that it paid the cost of 
construction and maintenance but assessed the land revenue, kept the revenue 
receipts, and granted remissions as its agents saw fit, while Bombay irrigation 
officers would actually operate the canals.46  Again, although alternatives were 
raised, the Governments of India and Bombay agreed to maintain their familiar roles 
with relatively little alteration to allow for the new irrigation conditions.  The 
number of financial and legal issues, which have only been touched on here, 
surrounding the extension of an irrigation system from its ‘home’ province into 
another was a testament to the complexity of governance in colonial India, where 
modes of administration varied between areas for expediency or historical 
continuity.  The scale of the Sukkur Barrage project, and the fact that it spilled over 
into Baluchistan, made it a novelty.  As with the general financial arrangements 
between the Government of India and the Government of Bombay, however, the 
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distinct administrations showed the capacity to incorporate it into their normal 
operations.  While the question of inter-provincial water rights was very important 
in the case of Sind’s relationship with the Punjab, the impact of the financing and 
construction of the barrage within Sind itself by far eclipsed the importance of its 
extra-provincial tendrils. 
The actual construction of the barrage and canals was another story.  No 
infrastructure project of comparable scale had ever been undertaken in Sind, and 
none was in progress in the contemporary Bombay Presidency.47  As such, it was a 
golden opportunity for the P.W.D. to prove its worth and the efficacy of the latest 
scientific methods of construction, which began in July 1923 and continued until the 
barrage was opened in January 1932.  The dam itself was a huge river regulator, 
consisting of 66 spans, each 60ft wide.  The rate of flow through these spans was 
controlled by steel sluice-gates.  Naturally, the foundations of the spans had to be 
laid on the river-bed itself.  This necessitated the construction of huge cofferdams, 
i.e. walled enclosures on the bed.  The river would flow around the sides, and work 
could be done inside in the relative dry.48  In close proximity to the barrage were the 
head regulators for the eight trunk canals.  On the right bank of the river were the 
Northwestern, Rice and Dadu Canals; on the left bank, the Eastern Nara, Rohri, 
                                                          
47
 Public Works Department of the Bombay Presidency, Irrigation Administration Report Part 
II, For the Year 1933-34 (Karachi: Government Press, 1937), p.1. 
48
 A Times of India article gives a sense of the massive difficulty of carrying out this work: 
“These cofferdams have been constructed of interlocking steel piling driven deep into the 
sandy bed of the river, and inside them the work has been carried on, often at a level twelve 
or fifteen feet below the surrounding river.  The cofferdams have been of a size never before 
attempted or thought possible, and when it is realized that the area enclosed by this 
season’s cofferdams was about 46 acres, and that within it as many as five thousand men at 
a time were working many feet below the level of the river, the magnitude of the task and 
the weight of the responsibility which have been shouldered by the engineers in charge can 
easily be imagined.  The difficulties and risks have during the last two seasons been gravely 
increased by the exceptional height of the river floods.”  ‘Progress on the Lloyd Barrage’, 
Times of India, 03.10.1930, in Dow Papers, MSS Eur 372/2, B.L. 
 97 
 
Khairpur Feeder East and Khairpur Feeder West Canals.49  These allowed the flow to 
different areas of Sind to be regulated individually.  Further regulators, at intervals 
along each main canal, allowed water to be controlled and diverted to different 
subsidiary canals.   
Alongside technical challenges, getting the work done was complicated by 
the question of who should do it.  The P.W.D. argued that using purely manual 
labour on the project would have cost 50% more, and also have been a disaster for 
Sindhi zamindars, whose agricultural operations would have been brought to a 
standstill when their haris left farmland unattended in order to work on the project.  
By using dragline machines to dig out the canal beds, the government claimed to 
have done the equivalent of the work of 77,000 coolies during each five-month 
winter construction ‘season’, thereby not interrupting cultivation, and reducing the 
logistical problems of getting workers to construction sites.50  A fixation on using 
machines to dig as a sign of ‘modern’ construction methods remained prevalent in 
both official and non-officials discourses, British and Indian.  The importance of this 
for the administration’s self-image, and the image that it wished to project to the 
public at home and in India, will be considered when the opening ceremony is 
discussed below.  However, not all machines performed as well as had been 
anticipated, especially at the barrage site itself; a good deal of the work that had 
been intended to be done by machines had to be done by hand.51  Certainly the 
priority was to get the work done in whatever manner possible, despite the 
attraction of showing off modern British and American technology in the form of 
plant machinery. 
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The changes wrought on the province by the construction process also 
extended into the status of privately-owned land in Sind.  Firstly, some of the land 
on which the works were constructed was appropriated from private individuals.  
Secondly, the land in the proposed barrage zone was ‘rectangulated’, a process 
similar to the demarcation of village and field limits on the Jamrao Canal.  During 
this process, the Survey of India divided agricultural land into 320-acre rectangles, 
which the Sukkur Barrage and Canal Project’s Revenue Officer further divided into 
one-acre plots.  These were then levelled, in order to facilitate the distribution of 
water.  Notably, the process was compulsory: the state was able to exercise 
significant control over private land.  The literal re-shaping of the Sindhi agricultural 
landscape extended down to this one-acre level, and was designed to suit the state’s 
requirements for an orderly, easily-regulated and chargeable irrigation system.  Land 
for headworks, canals, distributaries, and all channels other than water-courses 
were acquired by government, and their previous owners were ‘paid’ for them.  
(Watercourses were cultivators’ own responsibility anyway).  However, this payment 
was credit given to zamindars against the amounts which they owed to government 
for the construction of watercourses.52  Thus, zamindars hardly stood to make a 
profit from the enterprise, and in fact the ‘payment’ they received propagated the 
extension of state power.  
Ceremonial events 
On 24 October 1923 Sir George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, laid the foundation 
stone for the Lloyd Barrage, as it was then called.  The event took place, according to 
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one report, ‘Amid scenes of gorgeous splendour, attended with pomp and ceremony 
rarely excelled even in the presence of Kings and Princes’.53  To understand the 
political implications of the barrage project, this section will examine this ceremony 
and a similar one held to celebrate the completion of the project in 1932, and 
publicity materials associated with them.  These afford a unique insight into the way 
that the projects were publicly presented, i.e. how officials desired the project to be 
seen, and at the same time the ceremonies demonstrated something about the way 
that celebrations of the regime’s power over the environment reinforced state 
authority.  Spectacles denoting Imperial power and celebrating achievements were, 
of course, nothing unusual in the Raj’s political vocabulary; Haynes has argued that 
ceremonies connected with Imperial power were, far from being empty gestures, 
perceived as a crucial space for the construction of political authority in the 
provinces by both their British and elite Indian participants.54   
In light of this, it is not unreasonable to see the barrage ceremonies as 
helping to construct the political meaning of the project, especially from the 
administration’s point of view.  Indeed, the events crystallized clearly the dominant 
official attitudes towards Sind and Sindhi cultivators.  The barrage ceremonies were 
located firmly on the ‘European’ side of Hansen and Steppaut’s description of how 
the European colonial states in the non-West sought to assert both legitimacy and 
de facto power: “Colonial sovereignty was constructed slowly and piecemeal and 
oscillated between confrontation and alignment, between spectacular 
representation of European might and culture, and incorporation of local idioms and 
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methods of rule.” 55  Moreover, they argue, colonial sovereignty was more 
dependent on spectacles and ceremony, along with demonstrative and excessive 
violence, than the forms of sovereign power that had emerged in contemporary 
Europe.56  These ceremonies celebrated the engineering and logistical expertise that 
the colonial government could bring to bear on the twin problems of an 
unpredictable agricultural environment and an inefficient agrarian culture: the same 
problems identified by officials as correctable by the barrage’s regulation of 
perennial water flows.  This could only be solved by the intellectual discipline of 
those trained in the natural sciences in the European tradition.57   
Mitchell has influentially analysed the 1899 Exposition Universelle in Paris as 
a system of the representation of the non-West, and argues that the exhibition’s 
representations were extended into Europeans’ perceptions of the ‘real’ non-West, 
so that the world itself was intellectually ordered as a continuous exhibition.  “This 
world-as-exhibition”, he argues, “was a place where the artificial, the model, and the 
plan were employed to generate an unprecedented effect of order and certainty.”58  
While the Sukkur Barrage ceremonies did not take place on anything like the scale of 
the Exposition Universelle, they made a political performance of the imprinting of 
order onto Sind that the barrage represented.  When the foundation stone was laid, 
the Executive Engineer's speech outlined the history of the project, from its roots in 
shelved nineteenth-century irrigation schemes to its sanctioning by the Secretary of 
State, casting the story of the barrage as one in which the tenacity of Sind’s British 
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administrators and engineers finally resulted in the construction of the barrage 
system, which would: “convert a desert into a garden, [and] also ensure prosperity 
to those cultivators who [...] live on from year to year in that demoralizing 
atmosphere which is produced by an uncertain and scanty supply of irrigation 
water.”59  The Governor himself continued in an heroic vein, declaring that: “Nothing 
indeed could be more strikingly indicative of the magnitude of the problem which 
this Barrage is to solve than the long story of the many attempts that have been 
made to convert this great waterless tract into a land of rich harvests.”60   
Similarly, a representative of the Hyderabad District Local Board asserted 
that the barrage's ‘magnificence and the beneficial effects [...] are not excelled by 
any attempt that has yet been made for harnessing any of the great rivers of the 
world.”61  The Governor also expressed an early indication of the celebration of the 
barrage as a material fact which would become such a strong recurring theme of the 
later ceremonies:  “It is hardly possible to imagine how fine an appearance of 
massive yet elegant strength this giant work will present to the travellers who 
approach it by any of the great main roads which it will serve to connect.”62  These 
predictions might seem over-eager, but their importance lay in the way that the 
speakers sought to depict a revolutionary transformation of Sind’s landscape, and in 
doing so to demonstrate that the barrage was a powerful manifestation of the fruits 
of human endeavour, and particularly of British officers’ devotion to the welfare of 
the Sindhi people.  This meant, to use terms similar to Mitchell’s, that the land itself 
would become an exhibition of British authority and ability to re-shape the colonial 
possession. 
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By the time of the barrage’s opening ceremony in 1932, after the 
administration had proved its ability to complete construction, these celebrations of 
the project’s general impact had been transformed into a more particular 
celebration of engineering ability.  The fascination that the artificiality and 
materiality of the barrage seemed to have for its builders was relayed in a souvenir 
booklet given out to attendees at the opening ceremony, twenty pages of which 
consisted solely of photographs of the barrage and canals, in various stages of 
completion.  In none of these photographs did any human feature prominently: 
instead the construction process itself was prioritized, with shots of construction 
machinery, the barrage structure itself, and partially-dug canals.  Taken en masse, 
these served to emphasize the magnitude of the project’s impact on the 
countryside.  At the same time, the imagery of the project in various stages of 
completion gutted the construction process and laid it out before the reader, 
insisting thereby on the artificiality of the barrage.  The barrage had not, these 
photos demonstrated, sprung spontaneously out of the ground.   
By contrast human workers, when they did appear, were dwarfed by the 
machines they were using and by the products of their labours.  In fact, the only shot 
which specifically showed any living creature in close-up is of two donkeys, with the 
caption ‘Dumb Workers’.63  Even here, however, a hierarchy of representation 
placed British (and a few Indian) engineers, the possessors of the organizing 
intelligence and technical expertise that had allowed the barrage to be built, above 
the thousands of Indian contractors and labourers who did the manual work.  While 
engineers were no more clearly shown in the photographs than labourers, their 
names were listed at the back of the booklet.  In other words, their place in the 
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scheme’s success, not just as individuals but in their capacity as agents of the state, 
was memorialized.  For the thousands of Sindhis, Baluchis and Punjabis who worked 
on the project there is barely a mention, except in connection with the operation of 
plant machinery.   
The progress that the barrage and canals embodied was not purely 
technological.  Just as the physical landscape could be manipulated by the barrage, 
the Sindhi cultivator was displayed as a malleable material onto which ‘progress’ 
could be stamped.  The very first page of the souvenir booklet articulated this: 
The uncertainty of supply, so uncertain that no cultivator has been in a 
position to forecast what is likely to happen a fortnight ahead, has led to 
haphazard cultivation and the cultivator has felt that kismet rather than his 
own systematic exertions, is the ruling factor in his agricultural operations.  To 
put an end to this uncertainty [...] it was necessary to devise some means of 
assuring a level of the water in the river which would permit of more certain 
and orderly irrigation conditions.64 
The cultivator's trust in kismat, or fate, was used to draw a binary opposition 
between ‘spiritual’ India and the ‘modern’ West.  The cultivator’s close relationship 
with the Indus also pointed to a distinction between the Sindhi as limited by the 
natural world, and the British engineers as its masters.  The ability to bring certainty 
and order to the chaotic process of cultivation became a justification for imposing a 
new system on the cultivators: physical engineering intersected with socio-cultural 
engineering.  However partial and hesitant the latter may have been, it was integral 
to the rhetoric that defined the sort of progress that the barrage was expected to 
instil.  The anti-cultural implications of the claim that the government were 
successfully re-shaping Sind to the benefit of all, which dominated the ceremony 
and souvenir booklet, were suggested by the contrast between ‘native spirituality’ 
and rational European knowledge drawn by an article published in the Bombay-
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based, English-language, daily newspaper the Times of India.  The article reported 
that: 
On the morning after the official opening of the Barrage by His Excellency the 
Viceroy, there might have been witnessed a second opening ceremony, in its 
way no less impressive.  A white-bearded and saffron-robed saint from the 
north stretched his arms in benediction over each of the canals and in a loud 
voice intoned a solemn song of praise and prophecy.  He gave rather more 
thanks to God and less to the engineers than His Excellency had done, and 
was less concerned with history and more with poetry.  He looked like a man 
from a thirsty land, and his picture of the blessings brought by irrigation was a 
vivid one.65 
The article suggested a distinction between the material 'reality' of the barrage and 
the saint's 'illusory' approach to it, which invoked the irrational fields of prophecy 
and poetry rather than the supposedly solid and objective categories of engineering 
and history.  The newspaper’s audience – expatriate Europeans or English-literate 
Indians – naturally ‘knew’ that His Excellency’s praise of the engineers and historical 
progress expressed the true facts of the matter.  This again carried the implication 
that the barrage, and the engineers who oversaw its construction, were naturally 
enmeshed in the slow stamping of both ‘modern’ ideas and ‘modern’ structures 
onto the Sindhi physical and cultural landscapes.  Admittedly, it asserted that the 
barrage could be symbolically interpreted by the saint in a different way to that 
presented in the official ceremony.  But on the other hand, this suggested that the 
ability to actually construct it was reserved to the British-dominated ruling class, 
whose vision of a productive Sind would be made a reality through the proper 
application of scientific principles.  The saint’s irrational, spiritual response to the 
fact of the barrage represented precisely the culture which the project was credited 
with helping to reshape.  The article’s wry implied dismissal of the saint’s way of 
engaging with the barrage as a harbinger of change encapsulated the equation of a 
spiritual/material binary with an Indian/European one.   
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Land distribution policies 
The barrage’s expected happy effect on the province, and on government revenues, 
would not be brought about without further intervention.   Apart from the P.W.D.’s 
continuing responsibility for operating the barrage and maintaining its canals, the 
state’s main stake in the project was now the sale and management of the land that 
it brought under irrigation for the first time.  Indeed the effective use of barrage 
land was absolutely essential if the project were to maintain its status as a 
productive work.  However, the plans submitted to London for sanction contained 
few details of how barrage land would be used, and by whom.  Indeed, land 
distribution policy was not formulated until the 1920s and was only finalized in 
1929, almost six years after construction works began.   
 Hugh Dow, the Financial Adviser to the P.W.D. in Sind, was given 
responsibility for investigating the distribution of irrigated land in Punjab, and his 
consequent recommendations for Sind seem to have been largely followed.  As on 
the Jamrao Canal, land colonization policies for the Sukkur Barrage took comparable 
experiences in the Punjab as a starting point.  However, as had been the case thirty 
years earlier, conditions in Sind made it impossible to transfer wholesale the type of 
colonization practiced in the Punjab.  Of the 7.5m acres irrigated by the Sukkur 
Barrage, most was already privately owned.  After deductions for uncultivable land 
and land reserved for public purposes, the relatively small area of 1.5m acres was 
available for sale.66 
A great deal of the project’s impact was necessarily, therefore, felt by 
zamindars on established farms.  Since rural estates in Sind tended to be spread out 
over a large area, privately-owned fields and Government wasteland formed a 
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haphazard and irregular pattern;67 new colonies therefore had to be established 
within the framework set out by existing settlements.  The opportunities for social 
engineering that had characterized Punjab projects such as the Sutlej Valley Scheme, 
which had required the colonization of large contiguous areas of wilderness, were 
closed in Sind by the limited, fragmented amount of land at Government disposal.   
Rather than simply analyzing the distribution of new land, then, we must try 
to determine how the fact of the already-existing farms interacted with the social-
engineering ambitions of the colony areas, for here the tension between financial 
necessity and social ideals came into play most forcefully.  Like the Jamrao Canal, 
the building of the Sukkur Barrage can be seen as a reinforcement of the Raj’s 
attempts to strengthen its power in Sind by manipulating the irrigation system.  But 
any social change had to rest on the twin pillars of the colonial state in Sind: 
economic viability and political stability.  As with Jamrao tract colonization, the 
social-management aspects of Sukkur Barrage colonization had to be balanced by 
recognition of the need to maintain pre-existing state-society structures in Sind, 
where irrigation and agriculture had been the state’s centre of gravity long before 
the British had arrived.  In a summary of the likely requirements of the as-yet 
unformulated land policy, the Governor of Bombay, Leslie Wilson, told Lord 
Birkenhead, the Secretary of State, in 1925 that:   
The political effect of the Barrage is going to cause considerable trouble.  The 
great majority of the land in Sind is at present owned by the old Sind 
Zemindar, who is a fine type of the old Mahommedan loyalist, but generally 
out of date, and nearly always extremely lazy.  This vast area to be brought 
under inundation by the canals from the Barrage must mean, if we are to sell 
the land at all, a great influx of population from the Punjab and from the 
north and south of Sind, with the result that the Sind zemindar [sic] will be in a 
very different position to that which he now occupies, and the Hindu element 
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will be enormously increased.  The Sindhi will not like this at all, but it is 
inevitable if the Barrage is to be paid for.68 
This showed how far the barrage had already become entrenched in the 
priorities of the administration.  Radical changes to Sind’s social and economic 
character were accepted with little regret, even though these were expected to 
seriously undermine the position of the government’s traditional rural collaborators, 
on the grounds that the project’s financial position demanded it.  This was a 
departure from the previous colonial position of treading very carefully to avoid 
alienating the very same zamindari element.  The brazenness with which Wilson was 
prepared to distance the government from its existing allies spoke of the enormous 
potential for socio-economic re-ordering that the barrage project held.   Wilson was 
perhaps mistaken in believing that Sindhi zamindars would find their position 
dramatically altered, but he was right that a significant influx of Punjabis would 
result; his confidence in the administration’s ability to manage such a demographic 
change without undue political disruption was perhaps guided by the success of the 
canal colonies in creating a loyal, readily governable class of smaller landowners in 
western Punjab, where the local administration was not so much at the mercy of a 
few magnates. 
A good deal of attention was, however, paid to the complexities of the 
existing land-ownership pattern in Sind.  The order of priorities for distribution of 
newly-irrigated state-owned land was eventually set out as, firstly, the “legitimate” 
claims of zamindars already established in the barrage command; secondly, ‘special 
classes’ such as peasant cultivators and military servicemen; and finally recouping as 
much of the project’s capital cost as possible, by selling government-owned land on 
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the open market. 69  Each of these three points represented an attempt to 
strengthen – or at least to conserve – the state’s position.  This was, in the first 
instance, legitimated by the idea that Sindhi cultivators had first claim on the new 
lands; and that among Sindhis, pre-existing zamindars had the best claim.  Such an 
approach to the matter would do much to preserve the structure of Sindhi agrarian 
society, which had thus far supported colonial rule.  To this end, 350,000 acres 
(nearly a quarter of the land) were set aside to be granted to existing landholders in 
the Command.  These would be sold at the ‘nominal’ rate of Rs. 15/acre.  This was a 
major concession, because the Government’s capital expenditure on the same land 
was more than Rs.30/acre:70 financial gain was subordinated to political imperatives, 
despite Wilson’s previously bullish attitude.  Once the Khilafat Movement had died 
down after the abolition of the Caliphate by the new Turkish Republic in 1924, Sind 
again became relatively isolated from the Congress-dominated nationalist politics 
that plagued British administrators elsewhere in India, so we should be cautious 
about seeing these favours to Sindhi zamindars as response to political problems in 
the immediate term.71  But the government was always aware of its need to 
maintain goodwill with its rural support base.  This was perhaps heightened by the 
demands that some Sindhis were by now making for the province’s administrative 
separation from the Bombay Presidency.72   
Another concern was that a lack of care in barrage-land arrangements might 
lead to what Hugh Dow termed: “The Sind Mahomedan zamindar [...] being rapidly 
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expropriated from his ancestral lands.”73  Dow recommended that a Land Alienation 
Act should be introduced to offer landholders greater legal ‘protection’ against 
potentially destabilizing outsiders.  This would make it much more difficult for 
landholders to transfer their property to others, whether to pay off debts or to make 
a profit.74  Officials’ concern about this phenomenon had a long history: nineteenth-
century officials were continually preoccupied with the debt faced by many rural 
landholders, and the idea that Muslim zamindars were at risk of obliteration by 
Hindu bania moneylenders.  This frightened the colonial administration because 
their system of control was dependent on the co-operation of Muslim wadero 
landlords, and not on the Hindu moneylenders who could often take over land as 
debt collateral.75  Not only did Sind’s major zamindars own vast swathes of land, 
their local influence also extended far beyond their own property.  They 
commanded the loyalty and respect of haris and smaller zamindars.  Such was their 
power and relative wealth that the Government was hard pressed to either offer 
incentives for ‘good behaviour’ or to punish ‘bad’.76  Without effective checks on 
their most powerful subjects’ actions, the colonial administration in Sind existed on 
unsteady local foundations.  Thus barrage land distribution policies needed to 
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preserve – and if possible strengthen – existing zamindars’ acquiescence in colonial 
rule.  For this reason the constant cry of financial stringency was somewhat muted, 
and Governor Wilson’s optimistic assessment of the administration’s ability to act 
against the zamindars’ interests was undermined. 
But the idea of financial stability was by no means expelled from official 
discussions, even when it came to established zamindars.  The Sind and the Lloyd 
Barrage official pamphlet’s warning against ‘sentimental’ over-promotion of 
zamindars’ interests had precedent in another letter by Dow, which set out his 
proposals – based on his assessment of the Punjab’s canal colonies and of likely 
barrage conditions – for colonization policy.  Here the trope of ‘endangered’ Muslim 
landlords instead appeared as “landgrabbing big zamindars”.  Along with Sindhi 
smallholders, Dow wrote, they were constantly agitating for the bulk of new lands to 
go to zamindars already established on the tract.77  Dow believed that this showed 
that ‘the Sindhi zamindar’ had not taken full cognizance of the difference in intensity 
between inundation and perennial irrigation.  “I am convinced”, he wrote, that 
it is not his advantage, nor to that of the State, to encourage him by grants of 
easy terms to put his money into new lands.  If this is done, the Sindhi 
development of the Barrage area will be delayed for many years.78 
The concern that Sind’s sparse population would not be able to cultivate the new 
land was common and, as we saw in the previous chapter, had also influenced the 
development of the Jamrao Canal tract.79  As Sind and the Lloyd Barrage argued, the 
project’s success could not be jeopardized by interests that might have been 
incompatible with the general and financial stability of the scheme.80  Zamindars’ 
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demands had to be assessed according to their place in what the Government 
wished to do, and what it felt able to do.  Officials knew that they had to preserve 
the agrarian power structures on which their system of governance rested, but they 
also had to make the scheme a financial success.  
Sindhi peasants were the next ‘class’ to be sold land on special 
concessionary terms.  For the first five years, peasants were to pay Rs 3/acre per 
year, to “comply with certain conditions framed with a view to ensuring that they 
actually live on or near their land and bring it under cultivation.”81  Thereafter they 
could choose to repay the government in five-year gradations, ranging from 15 years 
at Rs. 5/acre per year to 40 years at Rs. 3/acre per year.  The value of these 
payments was around Rs. 50/acre: substantially more, eventually, than the 
zamindars’ one-off payments of Rs. 15, and greater than Government expenditure 
on the land by Rs. 20.  The Government of Bombay would, however, be paying 
interest on the money which had been raised in London by the Government of India 
in order to finance the project, and which it would not recoup from the peasants 
concerned for several years.  Therefore the financial concessions made to zamindars 
and peasants were perhaps comparable.  The residency condition may have been 
influenced by the Punjab Government’s unhappy experiences with absenteeism in 
the Chenab colonization scheme, which had begun in 1892; certainly the long 
minimum period of repayment, 15 years, was designed “to get the peasants settled 
on the land and not to encourage them in the speculative sellings of their 
holdings”.82   Only Sindhi peasants were to have land on these special terms: 
Punjabis were expected to be alive to the value of perennial irrigation, and able to 
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buy land on the open market in the ordinary way, if given the opportunity to pay in 
sufficiently small instalments.83   
The policy regarding Sindhi peasants was perhaps the most radical element 
of land distribution.  It provided unprecedented opportunities for haris to become 
landowners, and brought the state, for the first time, into a direct relationship with a 
number of those who had previously relied almost entirely on intermediaries, 
namely their landlords, local magnates, and low-level officials.  Given that no 
legislation was ever enacted in colonial Sind to protect or improve haris’ rights,84 it 
would be difficult to argue that the apportioning of land to them was part of any 
coherent strategy to promote agrarian justice.  Moreover, the amount of land 
reserved for peasants was far smaller than that reserved for zamindars.  This may 
have followed the logic that zamindars were more easily able to raise the capital to 
buy land, but in effect it was certainly socially conservative, largely preserving the 
structure of rural power.  However, the colonial state had decided against relying on 
village organisations (such as the village councils favoured under the ryotwari 
system in the mid-nineteenth century)85 as intermediaries.  The favoured 
relationship between the state and the new peasant proprietors was to be one 
mediated directly by Colonization and Revenue officials: Dow recommended that 
the role of peasants’ co-operative societies in colonization be limited, because 
similar organisations in the Punjab had failed in directly managing colonization or 
land-distribution.86 
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Peasants were not the only ‘special class’ to be considered.  Reward grants 
to military servicemen had a proud tradition, especially in the Punjab, where 75,000 
acres of land were reserved under the Sutlej Valley Project for military personnel 
who were natives of the Punjab or Delhi.  In Sind, which was not an army recruiting 
ground, there were not enough potential grantees to justify such consideration.87  
Consequently the government set aside only 10,000 acres for servicemen, and even 
then on condition of full payment.  Financial concessions would only be made in 
fulfilment of commitments made before the barrage had been sanctioned: these 
were free leases granted to ex-soldiers, which would now be converted into 
permanent grants.  These amounted to another 9,000 acres.88  Finally, a host of 
other possibilities for special grants was dismissed.  Most notably, despite barrage 
officials’ enthusiasm for all things ‘progress’, applications by private individuals for 
price concessions on large tracts of land to be used for special purposes – such as 
cotton-growing, cattle-breeding or fruit-farming – were to be discouraged.  The 
history of these grants in other provinces made severe scrutiny of such proposals 
necessary, and the Revenue Officer was ordered to gain higher authorities’ 
permission before sanctioning any application involving more than 500 acres, or 
asking for special price concessions.89  Press calls for educated urban unemployed to 
be given farmland were also dismissed.90   
So apart from two particularly favoured groups, Sindhi zamindars and 
peasants, concessions were to be severely limited.  The possibility of fostering 
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goodwill towards Government among diverse groups, and of rewarding loyalty, was 
negated by the need to recoup capital expenditure from sales receipts and to limit 
the amount of land allotted to classes believed to be less productive (and therefore 
less able to contribute revenue).  The majority of land would be sold on the open 
market, usually by auction.  The chief target demographic for land sales were 
Punjabi zamindars and peasants.  Dow advised his seniors that: 
it seems clear that it is to the Punjab that we must look for purchasers of our 
Barrage lands.  The resources of the Sind zamindar will be for many years 
most profitably employed both to himself and Government, in bringing 
existing lands into cultivation under the new conditions.91 
The importation of Punjabis followed lines laid down during the colonization 
of the Jamrao Canal project.  It stemmed initially from the continued belief that Sind 
alone could not provide enough cultivators to farm the land irrigated by the 
barrage.92  Furthermore, the prospect of too much easily available land might lure 
Sindhi zamindars and haris away from land already under cultivation.  British 
officials’ warm feelings towards Punjabis, considering them loyal, self-reliant and 
hard-working,93 continued unabated.  Indeed, they were even stronger now that 
Punjabi peasants had proved themselves in Sind on the Jamrao Canal command, 
where Sindhi peasants had fared badly.94  Attempts to create Punjabi yeoman and 
capitalist-farmer classes on the Jamrao tract were, however, considered to have 
been a failure. 95   
The social control that officials considered necessary for the maintenance of 
order in an increasingly diverse agrarian cultural landscape was also reiterated in the 
Sukkur Barrage command: immigrant peasants were again to be grouped according 
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to religion and caste.  However, it is debatable how far this represented a conscious 
attempt at control, and how far it merely took cognizance of existing conditions.  In 
1928, Dow warned that scattered Government-owned land situated in Punjabi areas 
of the Jamrao and Nasrat tracts would have to be given out only to other Punjabis 
and not Sindhis.  New colonizers should even originate from the same district of the 
Punjab as the local population of 20 to 30 years’ standing, as otherwise “serious 
disaffection or even bloodshed” could well ensue.96  The administration’s policy of 
favouring certain groups with land grants, and especially of locating them together 
to form artificial demographic pockets, had of necessity become self-perpetuating.  
Indeed, the idea of imported communities forming natural units with which the 
government could form a separate relationship was reinforced in Sind, as across 
India, by communal organization.  The Jamrao Sikh Association, for example, wrote 
to the Minister of Irrigation in Bombay and to the Chief Engineer in Sind about 
deficiencies in the canal’s water supply.  While the Chief Engineer vigorously denied 
the value of the Sikh Association’s proposals for improving the supply, the 
Commissioner-in-Sind admitted the root of the problem to be the disappointing 
performance of the Jamrao Canal in general, which would be improved once the 
barrage was constructed.  The fact that the Association’s petitions provoked a 
response from the Government of Bombay, where petitions by individual Sindhi 
zamindars often received little attention, perhaps suggests that its communal status 
– and the fact that it represented the interests of a deliberately-imported immigrant 
group – accorded it more importance in official eyes than the numerous petitions 
forwarded by individual Sindhi zamindars.97    
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Punjabi settlers were not the only group to lay claim to the government’s 
special attention or to react unfavourably to incoming ‘outsiders’.  Sindhis, too, 
proved part of Governor Wilson’s earlier prognosis accurate, by condemning what 
was already perceived as an anti-Sindhi land allocation policy.  The Times of India 
noted in 1930 that Sindhi newspapers expressed vehement concern that the 
Government would lease large barrage areas to ‘foreign syndicates’.  “One paper”, 
the article claimed, 
scents an attempt on the part of cotton magnates “to exploit Sind as they do 
the Sudan,” and another under the caption “Horrible if True,” fears that “the 
land which belongs to the landless peasant” is to be snatched from him.98 
The author of the article dismissed these fears, arguing that they were unrealistic 
given that only small, scattered pockets of land would be available.  Moreover, the 
author refused to: 
accept the definition of the more moderate of the Sind journals we have 
referred to above that “by the word foreigner we mean all non-Sindhis”; and 
it is hardly to be expected that such an interpretation will appeal to the 
people of this [i.e. Bombay] Presidency whose credit stands pledged for the 
repayment of the vast sums which are being expended on the Lloyd Barrage 
Scheme.99 
Although this was a press opinion, and not an official one, the dismissal of Sindhis’ 
fears about outsiders was characteristic of the British administration.   
A note of caution should be sounded, however.  Given the enthusiasm with 
which the barrage’s planners treated the idea of importing Punjabis to work the 
land, it is perhaps surprising that figures revealing the extent and nature of ‘foreign’ 
immigration linked with the barrage have not been found.  The statistical tables of 
the 1941 census do show that Districts whose population grew under barrage 
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irrigation contained more speakers of Punjabi as a mother tongue than others.  
Nawabshah and Thar Parkar, for example, contained 271 and 444 Punjabi speakers 
respectively, while Dadu District contained only 41.  Punjabi speakers, however, 
made up considerably less of the population than speakers of other ‘foreign’ 
languages, such as Baluchi and Gujarati.100  Indeed, although most immigrants onto 
barrage land per se were Muslims, more Hindus than Muslims came into Sind as a 
whole after the barrage was completed: more Menghwards, Kolis, Bhils and Cutchies 
were entering the province from the east and south than Balochis, Punjabi Muslims, 
and Pathans from the west and north.101  The importance of Punjabi immigration 
was, as on the Jamrao Canal, due as much to what it revealed about officials’ 
perceptions of Sind and its irrigation projects as to actual demographic changes.  The 
perceived link between Punjabis, modernization, and ‘good agriculture’ highlighted 
the rationalizing ethos of the project, but did not eclipse the administration’s need 
to maintain political stability by appeasing ‘indigenous zamindars’. 
The formulation of land distribution policies, then, was overall a 
conservative exercise.  It was intended to preserve the existing social order: to allow 
the barrage to push up agricultural productivity and the revenue gained thereby, 
while minimising social and political disruption to the governance of the province.  
Its most radical element – the forging of a more direct relationship between the 
government and peasants (both Sindhi and Punjabi), cutting out the zamindar 
middleman – was limited by the comparatively small number of acres made 
available for this purpose.  A more significant, but perhaps less planned-for, effect 
was likely to be the importation of a large number of Punjabis into the province.  
This was largely motivated by financial necessity and the fear that Sind’s indigenous 
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population could not work all the new barrage land.  This influx had a marked impact 
on Sindhi nationalism, by establishing a large group of ‘outsiders’ on land that 
Sindhis believed to be rightfully theirs.  This was to take on great political 
significance after the great additional inflow of refugees from East Punjab into the 
Sindhi countryside after Partition in 1947. 
Conclusion 
It would be disingenuous to claim that the story of the Sukkur Barrage was unique.  
While Sind officials made much of its ‘revolutionary’ status, the barrage project was 
not unusual in the wider context of colonial India.   Even its chief technical feature, 
the provision of perennial supplies to a previously inundation-dominated region, had 
lagged almost fifty years behind parallel developments in the Punjab.  Despite the 
increased codification and systematizing of Indian irrigation works after the 
establishment of the national and provincial P.W.D.s, Sind had lain on the outer 
fringes of the Indian empire’s irrigation programmes, as well as its geography.  This 
could seem surprising given the province’s near-absolute dependence on canal 
irrigation for agriculture.  Sind’s overlords in both Bombay and Calcutta/New Delhi 
gave short shrift to major administrative or irrigation reforms, wary of incurring 
extra costs.  Indeed the type of colonial authority at work was mediated through 
money matters: the provenance and use of money in the barrage project created 
vertical links that tied together the local, regional, national and Imperial levels of 
government.  As has been suggested above, the system of Imperial rule expressed 
itself as fully in financial matters as it did in policy and planning matters, and 
engineering and financial issues were inextricable from each other.  Thus the 
barrage had a presence in the committee minutes and balance sheets hundreds and 
thousands of miles away from the Indus plains; and influences were exerted over 
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the barrage’s planning and construction from far beyond its geographical location.  
Control over the project had travelled far from its physical location. 
However, whether revolutionary or not in the wider Imperial context, the 
barrage was very important in the province itself.  It epitomized the idea of changing 
Sind ‘for the better’, which had found a frequent home in official writings 
throughout the nineteenth century.  Similarly, the experimental work done on 
cotton-growing hints at some impetus to integrate Sind more fully into a commercial 
farming structure.  The provincial government remained, however, singularly 
unwilling to meddle in the affairs of powerful zamindars, and risk angering their 
rural collaborators.  In this sense, officials in Sind were caught in what Washbrook 
has described as the characteristic contradiction 
between the Raj’s role as colonial power and as agent of capitalist 
development.  The colonial imperative dictated conservative policies aimed at 
preserving a stable ‘Tradition’; the capitalist imperative dictated commitment 
to a social transition which threatened to undermine both colonial authority 
and core economic influence.102  
It was not until the 1910s, under pressure from the Punjab’s use of upstream 
waters, that Sind’s engineers convinced higher authorities in India that something 
major must be done for Sind irrigation.  Even then, it took the charged post-First 
World War political climate, plus an even more ambitious scheme, to gain London’s 
approval.   
The barrage was meant to transform Sind’s landscape, to revolutionize its 
agriculture: to make one of the poorest, most backward provinces of India into one 
of the richest and most productive.  Following the Jamrao Canal, it was meant to lay 
to rest the ghosts of over half a century’s irrigational and agricultural stagnation, to 
finally make good on Napier’s determination to show the province’s people what 
they had to gain from British rule.  Officials wanted to increase revenue receipts, 
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provide the means to intensive perennial cultivation, and to secure the goodwill of 
Sindhi zamindars.  Above all, it was meant to stamp the evidence of British power 
onto Sind’s landscape, administration and financial processes.  Once the project was 
underway, a new mood seems to have come upon officials both inside and outside 
Sind: the government, which had long been unable to challenge the rural magnates, 
now felt confident enough to forge a newly direct relationship with low-level 
cultivators, and to encourage an influx of Punjabis into the country.   
However, colonization priorities still had to be carefully balanced.  The 
possibility of ‘buying off’ Sindhi zamindars with land was limited by their perceived 
inability to work it effectively, and by the need to import Punjabis into the region to 
make up sales receipts.  Every addition to Sind’s political stability came at the price 
of cash not realized, and every endeavour to fill the state’s coffers was the loss of a 
chance to politically strengthen the government.  Thus, for political and financial 
reasons, the government was forced to allocate a great part of the benefits accruing 
from the barrage – in the form of irrigated, productive land – to those who were 
already doing very well out of colonial rule: Sindhi zamindars and Punjabi owner-
cultivators.  This phenomenon was greatly enhanced by the fact that the great 
majority of barrage land was already privately-owned, and so would at best merely 
enrich those who took the lion’s share of agricultural wealth: again, Sindhi 
zamindars (and perhaps their creditors).  For the non-zamindari element, the 
government turned chiefly to non-Sindhis.  Thus, Sindhi haris and smallholders were 
left with a relatively small portion of the increased wealth that the barrage was 
expected to bring.  The combination of financial and political necessity effectively 
undercut the reforming intentions that found expression in the grand rhetoric 
surrounding the barrage.  As the next chapter will demonstrate, the uneven nature 
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of the ‘progress’ that the barrage brought about was to exert a continuing influence 
on the province until the end of the colonial regime and beyond.
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Chapter 3: From Empire to Nation: irrigation and 
governance during provincial upheavals 
 
“Take away the Barrage, and what would be the condition of Sind?” 
-Mir Banehali Khan Talpur (1937)1   
 
The Sukkur Barrage and its canals had a dramatic effect on Sind.  As its builders had 
hoped, it did indeed do much to transform the province’s landscape, people, and 
agricultural economy.  At the same time, during the 1930s and 1940s, three very 
important constitutional changes occurred in the way that Sind was governed.  
Firstly, the 1935 Government of India Act devolved much greater powers to 
provincial governments, and constituted elected provincial assemblies that had real 
power over certain areas of governance.  Secondly, Sind was administratively 
separated from the Bombay Presidency in 1936, and constituted as a fully 
autonomous province with a governor and a provincial assembly.  Thirdly, and most 
importantly, the British withdrew from India in 1947, leaving two sovereign nation-
states behind, India and Pakistan.  Sind formed part of the latter.  Sind’s experience 
of these three changes was enmeshed with its experience of the Sukkur Barrage, 
and this chapter will show how the barrage played a crucial role in the politics of the 
day.  It will also demonstrate that the colonial ideas of material progress and 
governance were undergoing a subtle transformation that allowed them to be re-
deployed after the 1947 Partition as a discourse of ‘nation building’. 
The new irrigation system had a rapid effect on Sind.  In 1931-1932, the total 
cultivated area in the province had been approximately 3m acres, of which 2m lay in 
what would become the barrage zone once the project was completed.  By 1937-
1938, the cultivated area outside the barrage zone remained 1m acres, while more 
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than 3m acres were cultivated in the barrage area alone.2  Urban growth in ‘young 
towns’ in the barrage area, especially Nawabshah and Mirpurkhas, eclipsed even 
that of Karachi.  Their growth was partly driven by the movement of Hindus from 
villages and small towns into trade centres, from which they could manage the 
agricultural transit trade resulting from barrage cultivation: the areas growing cotton 
and wheat almost trebled and quintupled respectively after barrage waters began to 
flow.  At the same time, urbanized Muslims tended to move out of towns and take 
up smallholdings on barrage land.3   
Population growth in talukas served by the new irrigation system was 
astonishing.  In Tando Allahyar taluka of Hyderabad District, which had previously 
been ill-served by inundation canals, the barrage -fed Nasir Branch had prompted a 
50% growth in the population between 1931-41.   Dero Mohbat taluka, in the same 
District, grew by 62%, for similar reasons.  By contrast, Hyderabad District talukas 
outside the barrage zone fared much worse.  Guni and Badin, for example, 
respectively remained stationary and declined by 12%.  The most rapid growth 
under barrage irrigation was in Thar Parkar District, where the population increased 
overall by 24%, by far the highest in British Sind.  Parts of Larkana, Nawabshah, and 
Upper Sind Frontier Districts also gained population under barrage irrigation, with 
only Dadu District failing to grow.  Khairpur State, with a population increase of 35% 
between 1931-1941, was by far the biggest gainer in population terms.  Here 
barrage irrigation, coupled with improved governance, had re-attracted many 
people who had previously left the State for British Sind.4  These figures alone 
cannot give a satisfactory picture of the effect of the Sukkur Barrage on Sind, but 
they suggest changes in conditions that affected the way in which the state related 
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to the people.  Alongside such demographic evolution, the new irrigation system 
facilitated the taking up of colonial ideas about human dominance over nature and 
the state’s role in agrarian society to by Indians.  It therefore provided a means by 
which the colonial concept of material progress could be incorporated, as the Raj fell 
and an independent Pakistan emerged, into ideas about ‘nation-building’. 
The Sukkur Barrage and Sind’s constitutional status 
In the discussions about Sind’s status within British India that dominated the 
province’s public life in the 1920s and 1930s, Sind and the barrage became 
inextricably entwined, due to the project’s massive cost on the one hand, and the 
force with which Sindhis forecast its beneficial effects on the other.  By seeking to 
link the barrage to Sind’s status, the administration perhaps further enhanced its 
importance in discussions about Sind’s present and future.  An important 
component in these discussions was the idea of material progress, and its power to 
re-make Sind, which arose repeatedly in connection with the barrage, in the context 
of demands for Sind’s separation from the Bombay Presidency.  Demands for 
separation had previously been voiced by Karachi’s predominantly Hindu merchants, 
but now, against the backdrop of increasing communal tensions across the 
subcontinent, Sindhi Hindus were wary of losing the protection of Hindu-dominated 
Bombay, while the Muslims who formed the province’s demographic majority 
wished to assert greater control in their home territory.5  The communal angle to 
the separation demand was emphasized by the All-India Muslim League’s adoption 
of separation as a country-wide campaigning issue in 1925.  These debates 
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1940: Muslim identity and the demand for Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
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confirmed the key position that the Sukkur Barrage already held in Sindhi 
understandings of how their province functioned.  They also demonstrated that 
Sind’s socio-political elite shared, to an important degree, British officials’ views that 
the barrage system was a force for moral and material good.   
Articulating this attitude to press for separation, Mohammed Ayub Khuhro, 
a prominent Sindhi zamindar-politician and later provincial Chief Minister, asserted 
in a 1930 pamphlet that the Sukkur Barrage was “the greatest irrigation scheme in 
the world,” and that Sind was “honour bound to accept responsibility for its success 
or failure.”6  In echoing the rhetoric of the foundation stone ceremony, which would 
re-appear when the barrage was opened in 1932, Khuhro accepted that the project 
was a positive development for Sind, and went further in claiming that the scheme 
had become inextricably entangled with Sind’s existence as a self-conscious entity.  
This attitude had been foreshadowed two years earlier by Jamshed R. Mehta, the 
President of the Karachi Municipality and a prominent Parsi politician, banker and 
financier.  In 1928 Mehta had asserted that “the separation means the progress of 
the Province in health, sanitation, education and prosperity of the whole country.  
One strong Province, educated and healthy, is a source of power to the whole 
nation.”  Having established that the barrage was beneficial, Mehta went on to 
argue that Sind alone could manage the project, without Bombay’s help: “May I 
venture to ask if the land is going to fetch more price, or nature going to bless it with 
more luxuriant crop if the Barrage is managed by Bombay and not by Sind?  What 
Bombay can do, Sind can.  [...]  All that has to be done is that in the Ledger of the 
Government of India, on the page of Sukkur Barrage account,” the debtor should be 
entered as “Sind Provincial Government” rather than “Bombay Provincial 
Government”.  This was intended to repudiate claims made by Sindhi Hindus that 
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the barrage was too big a project for Sind’s financial and administrative capacity: 
that the barrage project tied Sind irrevocably to Bombay.7   Progress, in Mehta’s 
view, could be managed as easily by Sind as by Bombay. 
Similarly Syed Mohammad Shah, a Muslim member of the 1928 Royal 
Statutory Commission on Land Reforms, argued that separation would help Sind to 
develop its infrastructure, which he claimed that Bombay had neglected.  The 
Commission found against the separation, but Shah claimed in a dissenting minute 
that “No sincere effort has been made to develop the country except lately by the 
construction of the Barrage,” simultaneously accepting the barrage as a step 
towards development, and expressing scepticism about Bombay’s inclination to take 
further steps.8  The  Commissioner-in-Sind had, in 1920, hoped the barrage would 
produce a ‘beneficial effect’ on ‘agitators’ in Sind,9 but clearly the  Indians’ appetite 
for material progress demanded more.    
 Those who argued against separating Sind from Bombay agreed that the 
barrage had already, while still under construction, become a defining feature of 
Sind.  Instead of viewing this as an opportunity for Sindhis to prove their mettle, 
however, they argued that the scheme’s size, expense and complexity required 
Bombay’s active involvement.  “The very success of a big scheme like this requires 
an experienced administration,” claimed the deputation sent by the All-Sind Hindu 
Association to the 1928 Commission on Land Reforms.  “Judging from the 
proceedings of the Bombay Council, the Sind zamindari element is likely to 
predominate in the Sind Council and will not allow sale of land on commercial 
principles which will be, really speaking, very necessary for the success of the 
project.”  The deputation’s spokesman, Professor H.L. Chablani, a Delhi-based 
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economist and Hindu Mahasabhite, emphasized his point by questioning Sindhis’ 
ability to utilize “scientific irrigation”, which required “that the administration must 
be free of popular pressure.”  This statement implied concurrence with the almost 
universally-held view among officials that democratic governance would be 
positively detrimental to Sind’s material and moral progress because Sindhis 
themselves were backward: in this case, particularly Sindhi (Muslim) zamindars.  As 
such, Chablani deployed the imperatives of financial responsibility and the efficient 
development of agriculture as restraints on the evolution of administrative and 
political arrangements that were more responsive to popular pressure.  Chablani 
also claimed – contrary to Shah’s dissenting minute – that Sind would not be able to 
bankroll further railway and road construction, which would be needed to move 
increased crop yields from field to market.10 
The intertwined issues of the Sukkur Barrage and the call for separation also 
impacted on all-India nationalist politics, showing that the building of the barrage 
had political repercussions entirely different from those imagined by the Sind 
administration.  In this context, ‘progress’ meant devolved political control as much 
as increasing material wealth, but the implications of such devolution on the 
material progress of the province were not lost on British officers or Indian 
politicians.  A committee appointed by the 1928 Congress-led All Parties Conference 
and chaired by Motilal Nehru, which was tasked with considering the separation of 
Sind, concluded that separation was not financially viable, especially since revenue 
income from the barrage was expected to be mortgaged against the debt incurred in 
building it until at least 1965, and so could not be used to support an autonomous 
Sind.  Material progress, in this picture, had not advanced far enough to form the 
financial basis for political autonomy for Sind. 
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Soon afterwards, separation re-surfaced in the dialogue between Indian and 
British representatives at the Round Table Conferences, which were convened in 
London in 1930-1931 to discuss constitutional reforms in India.  Debates there about 
separation revealed much about how Sindhis and British officials viewed the barrage 
scheme’s relationship to Sind’s governance.  A subcommittee was formed to 
determine the desirability or otherwise of separating Sind from Bombay, which took 
the Government of Bombay by surprise.  Sir Frederick Sykes, the Governor, wrote to 
Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State, of his dismay at this in January 1931.  Sykes 
warned Birkenhead that, while losing Sind would be a financial relief to Bombay, the 
former was an unproductive province and the Government of India would be left to 
finance its deficits.  Moreover, he wrote, echoing his predecessor Wilson, allowing 
Sindhis to dominate the hypothetical new province entirely would lead to a “risk 
that [a] policy of Sind for Sindhis will lead to [the] exclusion of immigrant cultivators 
from Punjab to take up lands, which would still further increase the burden and 
possibly render the scheme unproductive”.11  Sykes wrote of officials’ well-
established concern that Sindhis would not farm the land effectively, thereby not 
earning money that could be taxed, and leaving the government without increased 
revenues to compensate for the debt incurred in building the barrage and 
renovating the canals.  Devolution of provincial power onto Sind, and more 
particularly onto Sindhis, thus appeared to threaten the financial basis of the 
barrage scheme, and fail to fulfil the promise of material progress, which had been 
expected to manifest as improved crop yields. 
That the barrage project’s financial implications formed the primary 
battlefield for the separation debates was key, because it demonstrated a 
remarkable consonance of perspective among officials and Sindhi politicians.  
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Arguments made by adversaries such as Khuhro and Chablani accepted wholesale 
the idea of the barrage as a matter for Sindhis: there was no question of disowning a 
project that the foreign British colonial administration had imposed on the province, 
without prior consultation.  The scheme’s financial and political meaning for the 
province was contested, with anti-separationists asserting that the expense of the 
scheme effectively tied Sind to its Bombay overlord; and, as Chablani argued, the 
assumption was common that the dominant forces in rural Sind were insufficiently 
‘advanced’ to make efficient use of the new irrigation system.  This in turn 
redeployed the view, examined in Chapters 1 and 2, that Sindhi zamindars and 
cultivators were ‘backward’, and would have lasting implications for the way that 
the Sukkur barrage’s successor projects after Independence were handled.   
Tellingly, all parties agreed that the barrage represented progress in Sind.  
This can be partly explained by the fact that the Gandhian anti-colonial struggle, 
which emphasized the need to preserve or reclaim indigenous lifestyles and 
technologies,12 had little influence in Sind, where post-Khilafat Muslim politics 
focussed on specifically Sindhi issues such as the separation, while Sindhi Hindu 
politics was more closely aligned with the All-India Hindu Mahasabha than the 
Congress.13  That the Sukkur Barrage was fundamentally a good thing was taken for 
granted.  A further question mark hung over the issue of whether or not the barrage 
represented sufficient progress, but this was a subsidiary issue.  Sindhi politicians 
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shared the dominant official conception of material-moral progress that had driven 
the construction of the barrage, and official representations of the project’s 
meaning. 
Separation granted: agriculture and the legislature  
The work done by the Round Table Conferences culminated in the passing of the 
1935 Government of India Act, which introduced a new constitution into India.  It 
also laid the ground for the 1936 separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency, which 
the Conferences had approved.  Sind’s constitutional status remained a recurring 
concern for officials, however, and the financial status of the barrage project 
remained important.  Moreover, Sind’s burgeoning political class, given a legislative 
voice by the Act’s provisions, entered into lively debates about the barrage, 
especially the way that it was managed and used as the basis for an increase in the 
land tax by the administration.  In this context, the barrage’s hitherto unchallenged 
‘beneficial effects’ came to be questioned.  With close Sindhi involvement in day-to-
day governance and the operation of the irrigation system, however, arguments for 
the barrage as the basis for material progress continued to be taken up by Sindhis 
themselves, who took on much of the worldview of colonial administrators, along 
with the latters’ responsibilities of government.   
Government was not, however, delivered wholesale into Indian hands in 
1935, and the retention of special powers for the barrage by the Governor meant 
that the British still controlled one of Sind’s defining features.  Tomlinson has argued 
that the 1935 Act, responding to the still-reverberating political consequences of 
India’s sacrifices in World War One and the Imperial crisis caused by the world 
economic depression in the early 1930s, effected a British strategy of abandoning 
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the provinces and retreating to entrenched positions in the central government.14  
Yet the British retreat left a substantial rearguard in action, in the form of a special 
power devolving on the provincial governors under Section 52(2) of the 1935 Act, 
which allowed then to take executive action when the stability of a province was at 
stake.  In Sind, matters connected with the barrage were considered to be so 
important that this provision applied, because the financial success of the barrage 
scheme was integral to the provincial government’s ability to function.   The 
question of Sind’s ability to ‘stand alone’ may have been resolved in favour of 
separation, but this did not mean that Sindhis themselves were to be let far off the 
leash.   
  Indeed, the centre was perhaps wise to insist on maintaining control over 
matters related to barrage finances.  Sindhis’ enthusiasm for the project while it was 
under construction waned somewhat when the project’s ‘completion’ left more 
complications than the pro- barrage rhetoric of the 1920s and early 1930s had 
suggested, and now the barrage  was  only occasionally touted  as a panacea for the 
province’s ills.15  Members of the new Legislative Assembly raised matters relating to 
the barrage on the house floor, and attacks on the way in which the barrage was 
administered could serve as attacks on the incumbent ministry by its opponents.  
Members complained that malaria had worsened after the barrage had impeded the 
natural flow of the river and created pools of stagnant water;16 that the zamindars 
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of Lower Sind had lost their share of water to the new lands upstream;17 that the 
barrage canals suffered from a deficiency of water;18 and that other improvements 
in Sind’s infrastructure lagged behind irrigation development.19  Concerns were 
raised about the barrage’s impact on the province’s agricultural patterns, and some 
resistance was displayed to the displacement of gardens and other ‘non-productive’ 
uses of water in favour of the production of cash-crops such as cotton.20   
Outside the Assembly’s formal proceedings, the Sinjhoro Taluka Zamindari 
Association passed a resolution in 1935 condemning the Lloyd Barrage Revenue 
Officer for ‘unlawful’ conduct towards zamindars whose revenue payments had 
fallen into arrears, although the allegations were withdrawn when the Association 
failed to produce evidence to support their claims.21  Back in the Assembly, the 
project’s financial performance was also criticized, especially when open auctions of 
land appeared not to attract as many buyers as had been anticipated.22  Moreover, 
the land that it had opened up for cultivation was considered over-priced and 
affordable only to established big zamindars.23  The sincerity of the government’s 
intention that the barrage should help Sindhis was also questioned, as one member 
accused the Secretary of State of keeping the interest on barrage debt high for the 
benefit of bondholders in London, at the expense of the ordinary Sindhis whose 
revenue payments went towards servicing the debt.24  Such criticisms, however, 
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were levelled at the way in which the barrage altered life for Sindhis, and did not 
amount to a fundamental questioning of the principle of material progress.   
Instead, material progress remained an important ideal, and the barrage 
also had its defenders in the Assembly.  Chief Minister G.H. Hidayatullah answered 
criticisms by arguing that wheat cultivation had increased nearly fivefold, showing 
that plenty of water was available, and that people were still anxious to buy up 
barrage land.25  Mir Bandehali Khan Talpur, a big jagirdar of Hyderabad and Dadu 
Districts, and the leader of the important ‘Mir-Baloch’ bloc in the Assembly (who 
supported Hidayatullah’s Ministry at the time) asked the House: “Take away the 
Barrage, and what would be the condition of Sind?”26  The unspoken implication was 
that Sind relied on the barrage for those advances that had been made in its 
material wealth.  That Sindhi members of the government were defending the 
barrage, and the vision of a more prosperous Sind that it embodied, demonstrated 
that colonial ideas of progress remained in circulation among Indians. 
Such support did little to encourage the executive, however.  Sir Lancelot 
Graham, the first Governor of separated Sind, remarked gloomily on the trouble 
caused by Sindhi complaints about water-course charges, the collection of land 
revenue arrears, and the collection of instalments in payment for the purchase price 
of barrage land.  The Sindhi zamindars, he wrote, were made confident in these 
complaints by their dominance of the Assembly.27  Shortly afterwards, he was 
prepared to tell the Viceroy that the administration had been “conspicuously 
disappointed” in hoping that “the native of Sind *…+ would eagerly avail himself of 
the new opportunities for amassing wealth” presented by the barrage.  Land sales 
had already fallen off by 1939, especially after a drop in cotton prices, which left 
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many zamindars without the spare capital to put down a deposit.  Even those Sindhi 
zamindars who had already bought land had done little to develop it.28  The reality 
of the barrage was far less happy for both government and zamindars than had 
been predicted during the heady days of its construction and opening.   
The political problems posed by the new barrage became focussed on one 
particular issue in 1938-1939, which would demonstrate how important it was to the 
central government to retain bureaucratic control over the barrage’s financial 
aspects.  Opposition benches in the house came into furious conflict with both the 
executive and the ministerial benches in the legislature, over a report produced by 
the Settlement Officers for the Indus Left and Right Bank Divisions.  This report 
recommended that assessment rates on barrage land ought to be raised, much to 
the dismay of the zamindars in the Assembly.  The ensuing conflict demonstrated 
not only that the Government of India Act was proving a success for the colonial 
administration, in that it drew Indians themselves into defending the government’s 
actions, but also that Sindhis were fully aware of the barrage’s pivotal role in their 
agrarian economy.  They realized that the government’s policies regarding the 
barrage and the land that it irrigated were crucial to the way in which the province 
was governed.  This lent the debates an importance beyond its absorption into the 
communal and factional conflicts that then dominated the Assembly.29  Indeed, the 
following discussion will show how debates about land revenue rates challenged the 
details of government policy, but not the teleology of material progress.   
Historical accounts of Sindhi politics during this period have tended to focus 
on its factionalism, and ask how far Sind fitted, or did not fit, into the wider Indian 
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politics of the time. 30  The riots at the Masjid Manzilgah in Sukkur have been taken 
up by Khuhro, for instance, as an example of the increasingly communal tinge to 
politics – both legislative and popular – in Sind, in concurrence with trends across 
India.31  These perspectives, however, have excluded the considerable controversy 
that could arise over everyday local matters such as the revision of assessment 
rates, even though this demonstrated the way in which Sindhi politicians actively 
engaged with the most significant issues in the countryside as well as pursuing 
personal power.  Since the matter was protracted and complicated, a few 
paragraphs will set out the main events, and the debates between ministers and 
officials, before the remainder of this section examines how these reflected and 
influenced the relationship between the barrage, agriculturalists, and the legislative 
and executive arms of the state, showing their implications for how the concept of 
material progress was deployed to political effect. 
This conflict, which remained prominent in the politics of the legislature 
between 1937-1939, focussed on the question of whether land assessment rates 
(which included water charges in Sind) should be raised when the first temporary 
settlement ran out in 1937.  Constitutionally this was a matter to be dealt with by 
officials under the Land Revenue Code, but the government nevertheless agreed to 
listen to the Assembly’s views on the topic.  This had become one of the Congress’s 
chief demands in Sind,32 in keeping with its argument throughout British India that 
land revenue was already too high.33  The price for material progress, as Congress 
would have it, should not have been paid by zamindars and peasants.  Feelings 
became so inflamed over the course of the following two years that senior figures in 
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both the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Congress Party eventually 
became involved.  Governor Graham asserted that settlement revision in barrage 
areas, for securing the proper administration of the Sukkur Barrage and Canals 
Project, fell under his special responsibility for the stability of the province under 
Section 52(2) of the Government of India Act.  Yet he was aware of the difficult 
political balance maintained between Indian groupings in the new ministries, in Sind 
and elsewhere.  If he could not get his ministers’ agreement to a rise, he wrote to 
Viceroy Linlithgow, and had to force through an increase against their wishes, “I may 
provoke a political crisis which will not be limited to Sind”.34  The new conditions 
imposed by the barrage therefore had the potential to destabilize the colonial 
administration’s authority on a wider scale, at least in Graham’s estimation.   
The Viceroy agreed that Graham could legally invoke his special 
responsibility in this case, as did the Government of India’s legal and constitutional 
advisers.  In keeping with his conservative and unbending nature, Linlithgow 
emphasized to Graham that political considerations could not be allowed to 
endanger financial stability.35  Increasing the rates was crucial, as the Viceroy 
reminded the Governor: a moderate rise would allow the barrage to serve its own 
debt, cover a fall in subsidies received from the centre, and leave a big surplus for 
Sind’s own use and development, “leading eventually to Sind being comparatively 
one of the wealthiest and most fortunate of the provinces”.36  Graham concurred in 
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this sentiment, writing that “the real purpose of the Barrage will not be fulfilled 
unless we get a pronounced improvement in the general level of cultivation”, which 
would increase the wealth of both zamindars and Government.37  Building the 
barrage had fulfilled the promise of material progress only in part, then; more work 
was required to make it a reality. 
However, many junior officials did not feel that raising the assessment rates 
was the best method of achieving this.  In early 1938, Graham reported that the 
majority of I.C.S. officers in Sind felt that rates of assessment should remain static 
while cotton prices were low.  Even this concession would not be enough for the 
Sind Congress, however, which wanted a reduction in rates.38  The large number of 
Punjabis now resident in the barrage area was expected to cause additional 
complications, judging as they would the revenue rates and other agricultural 
conditions by those prevailing in the Punjab as well as in Sind.39  Accusations of 
incompetence and malpractice continued to be levelled against the government by 
Sindhis, including in one case that the P.W.D.’s estimates for barrage rates were 
maintained at an artificially high level in order to allow government subordinates to 
extract bribes from zamindars.40 
As the matter dragged on, the Sind Revenue Department argued hat 
assessments on barrage land had been, and would still be, deliberately fixed well 
below the 30% to which Government considered itself entitled (according to their 
interpretation of the pre-colonial state’s ‘customary’ share of agricultural yields) 
“because the methods of post-Barrage cultivation [had] not yet been fully learnt and 
developed”.41  Moreover, the revized settlement would apply for only a five-year 
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term.  In July the Ministry in Sind, a cross-party coalition led by Allah Baksh Soomro 
that included Hindu and Muslim members but excluded the Muslim League and the 
Congress, accepted the principle of a sliding scale of assessment based on prevailing 
prices.  The Ministers had been brave in the face of hard facts, wrote Sind’s Chief 
Secretary in his fortnightly report to the Viceroy’s office (which was also usually seen 
by the Sind Cabinet), but now faced the wrath of the Congress.42  The Government 
of Sind remained in close touch with the Viceroy, even as agitation against the 
Government’s orders continued, with Assembly members particularly indignant 
about not having been consulted before the order to raise the rates was issued.43   
Graham tried hard to avoid using his special powers, on the basis that it 
would be politically preferable for the ministry itself to overcome opposition to the 
rise, rather than for the Governor to lay himself open to charges of behaving 
autocratically.  The ideal thing from the administration’s point of view would be for 
the ministers to take responsibility for a raise in revenue rates, and therefore to 
defend the provincial government’s operation of the barrage scheme on the lines 
laid down by the Government of India.  While Graham was on leave during August, 
the Acting Governor, J.H. Garrett, reported that Acharya Kripalani, a Sindhi Hindu 
who operated in the All-India Congress, had tried to persuade Allah Baksh to use the 
rates issue to force the Governor to use his special powers.  Allah Baksh stood his 
ground, and insisted that the Ministry took full responsibility for the rise, and that 
there was no need to involve the Governor.44  Shortly afterwards Vallabhbhai Patel, 
the Chairman of the Congress Parliamentary Board, whose additional responsibilities 
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included direct charge of Congress’s parliamentary affairs in Sind, declined to find 
fault with the new rates.45   
Within a week, however, the Sind Congress Parliamentary Committee 
threatened the Chief Minister that, unless the revision in rates was postponed for 
one year, the Congress would not oppose any no-confidence motion against the 
Ministry that might be brought in the Assembly.46  In October Lord Brabourne, acting 
as Viceroy, predicted to the new Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, that Allah 
Baksh’s Ministry was unlikely to survive long, despite Jinnah’s failure while attending 
the Sind Provincial Muslim League conference in Karachi in October to persuade the 
incumbent ministry to resign in favour of a purely Muslim League ministry.  A 
successor ministry, Brabourne went on to comment, would probably be found only 
if the revision were postponed for a year.47   However, the ministry survived and 
Graham, on returning from leave, took a bullish attitude towards the Congress, and 
inspired the same in his Chief Minister.48   
A no confidence motion against Allah Baksh's ministry was indeed moved in 
the Legislative Assembly in early January 1939.49  The motion was debated on 10 
January, and failed; the attack on the Ministry had, as Graham put it, “fizzled out”.50  
But the question of the barrage revenue assessment had not been resolved, and 
Allah Baksh threw it open to debate in the Assembly on 25 January.  During the 
following week, Allah Baksh made a generous offer to the Assembly regarding 
remissions on cotton assessments if cotton prices fell below a certain point, which 
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Graham refused to countenance; Allah Baksh backtracked and proposed a more 
realistic programme for rebates.51  Finally Graham's orders, imposing the 
recommended revision of assessment rates, were published on 1 March.52  During 
subsequent political manoeuvrings, the Barrage Revision Settlement rates were 
understood by all to be non-negotiable,53 but the question of barrage finance 
recurred often, especially in the form of demands that Sind's barrage debt to the 
Government of India be cancelled, reduced, or the terms of repayment eased. 
The extended deadlock over rates revision confirmed the concerns 
commonly held by British officials about Sindhis’ ability to guide their own ‘progress’ 
towards increased productivity and prosperity.  Raising the revenue assessment was 
pressed by engineers in Sind as an incentive to zamindars to get more out of their 
land, on the assumption that they would be stimulated to produce more, in order to 
leave a wider margin of profit after the assessment had been paid.54  This spoke to 
the assumptions that had dominated planning of the Sukkur Barrage and its canals, 
especially the plans laid by Hugh Dow as Colonization Officer: that Sindhis would 
need to be induced to change the way they practised agriculture, in order to fully 
utilize the opportunity for development presented by the new perennial canal 
system.    
Dow’s confidence that removing the uncertainty of inundation cultivation 
would lead to ‘improved’ attitudes among zamindars and haris had been balanced 
by recognition that old habits were unlikely to die easily.  The idea of stimulating 
increased production through financial mechanisms, and indeed the very 
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reservation to the Governor of special authoritarian powers, was based on the belief 
that administrative intervention into cultivation must accompany mechanical 
intervention into environmental conditions.  Similarly, the Agricultural Department 
had made pedagogical interventions during the 1920s and 1930s by issuing a series 
of leaflets to zamindars, which explained about improved varieties of cotton 
recommended for growing in Sind, instructions for growing rabi oil seeds in barrage 
areas which had not previously been guaranteed a rabi crop, and the proper 
irrigation of field crops in barrage and non-barrage areas of Sind.  Zamindars were 
also encouraged to visit the Government seed farm at Mirpurkhas to see research 
into and demonstrations of agriculture under the new barrage conditions.55   
These interventions were all underpinned by the belief that zamindars in 
Sind remained backward and required further tutelage before their methods of 
cultivation could be as ‘up-to-date’ as the new irrigation infrastructure that had 
been provided to them.  In the case of rates revisions in 1937-1938, the Governor 
and the Viceroy were both clear that those who held land on the barrage tract must, 
one way or another, be persuaded to exercise responsibility for its finances.  This 
meant, in other words, that they would have to be made to pay for the material 
progress that the barrage was intended to produce.  Indeed, Graham voiced 
sympathy with the attitude of some other officials that Sindhi zamindars had failed 
to “make proper use of the great gift which they have received in the Barrage.”  The 
barrage, in Graham’s view, absolutely demanded higher standards of cultivation.56  
Not coincidentally, Sindhi zamindars’ supposed inability to meet this challenge had 
been vigorously deployed in arguments against separation from Bombay made, 
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during the 1920s and early 1930s, both by the anti-separation lobby in Sind and by 
elements within the Government of Bombay.  The struggle of Sindhi zamindars to do 
as well as they could out of the new arrangements, constitutional and irrigational, 
clashed with the government’s reciprocal struggle to make the project a financial 
success.  Talk of prosperity as a boon to the whole province (and, indeed, the whole 
of India) fell flat in the face of contradictory ideas about whom that prosperity 
should benefit, and to what degree. 
However, tutelage did not necessarily mean a total lack of autonomy, and it 
must be stressed that the administration as a whole did not follow the kind of rigid 
bureaucratic efficiency that, for example, Viceroy Curzon had advocated as more 
important for India than the benefits of self-government.57  The financial imperative 
behind the Governor’s special powers – that the Empire, Sind included, must be 
financially self-supporting – had to be balanced against political conditions in India, 
and neither the health of the government’s coffers, nor the idea of material 
progress, was allowed to override the government’s need to ensure that Sindhis 
remained co-operative.  Graham’s reluctance to use special powers stemmed from 
his recognition that the position and authority of the Governor’s office must, in light 
of the constitutional changes and partial devolvement of government to the 
Provincial Assemblies, be maintained by working with the legislature wherever 
possible.  Only in this way could political trouble be avoided.  Moreover, once Allah 
Baksh and his Ministers had accepted the principle of raising assessments and taken 
on the task of pushing them through the Assembly, the Governor was able to deflect 
criticisms of what was fundamentally a demand of British administrators onto Sindhi 
politicians, while simultaneously maintaining the dignity of his office by not overtly 
‘choosing sides’ from among Assembly members and descending into the political 
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fray.  This strategy was condoned by Linlithgow,58 and allowed Graham to privately 
push the legislature into approving a scheme to make Sind pay for the barrage while 
avoiding a public debate about the irrigation system’s merits, which would detract 
from the administration’s role as the driving force behind material progress. 
This suggests that the 1935 Government of India Act’s operation in Sind 
admirably fulfilled its intended objective of giving certain sections of Indians a stake 
in the stability of government in their provinces.  That is, it strengthened British rule 
over India by allowing Indians in the legislatures to sit in judgement over certain, 
carefully chosen, aspects of official action.  The Governor’s special powers for 
barrage revenue assessments in Sind ensured that the administration always had 
claws in its political paw, should the Assembly become too ‘unruly’.  In this case, the 
administration’s mix of bullying and cajoling paid off: by the later stages of the 
Second World War, Sir Hugh Dow, the new Governor, pronounced public interest in 
the whole question of his special responsibility for the barrage to be “quite dead”.59  
In the longer term, the executive had succeeded in maintaining control over the 
development of the project.   
The assessments controversy also revealed much about the nature of 
politics in Sind during the 1930s.  This has been viewed as hopelessly factional, 
disengaged from the world outside Sind, and based on personal power struggles 
rather than policies and principles, both by contemporaries and by historians.60  
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While this view is not an unfair assessment of party-political manoeuvring in the 
province, it misses the fact that Legislative Assembly politics did often come to 
revolve around agrarian issues that undoubtedly affected conditions in the 
countryside, where both the overwhelming majority of the population and the bases 
of support for the major politicians were to be found.   This is not to say that the 
Assembly was a forum for the politics of the cultivators themselves: apart from G.M. 
Syed, few Muslim politicians in the legislature supported agrarian reform.  Yet while 
the politics of the Legislative Assembly did not address the concerns of Sind’s lower 
social orders, the politicians who sat in it were often landowners, with their own 
strong opinions on agricultural matters, and especially on the delivery of and 
charges for the irrigation water that made agriculture possible.  Proceedings in the 
Assembly reflected this, as when a member demanded that the possibility of 
bringing barrage water to lands on the Rohri and Dadu canals, which had suffered 
shortages since the barrage's construction, should be investigated;61 when the 
Agriculturalists' Debt Relief Bill was tabled in 1940; or when calls for the Land 
Revenue system to be reformed were heard.62  Despite the practical inefficacy of 
policy-formulation by Assembly parties, irrigation and agriculture were consistent 
themes for many of the province’s post-separation political groupings, reflecting the 
central place of water and crops in Sind’s economic life.  This perhaps also reflected 
the fact that the Sindhis expected to see improvements in their material conditions, 
in light of the grand claims previously made on the barrage’s behalf.   
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Wartime development schemes 
The discourse of material progress met a serious challenge when the Second World 
War broke out.  The war years were marked by the cessation of development 
activity, not only on the scale of the Sukkur Barrage, but also much smaller schemes 
such as agricultural education.   Instead the government imposed what Khan has 
termed “a simplistic and basic imperialism”, focussed on “keeping the peace and 
extracting the necessary resources to fight the war.”63  Yet despite the suspension of 
‘schemes for the betterment of the people’, the ideal of material progress remained 
strong.  The administration made a show of its intentions to undertake such 
activities in the future, and laid a large body of plans for post-war development, 
many of which were taken up by the new Pakistani administration after 
Independence.  These plans continued to represent material progress, an idea that 
was also taken up, to a great degree, by the post-colonial government.  During the 
war, therefore, trends of the early twentieth century crystallized in Sind, and 
provided a point of departure for the subsequent decades. 
At the time, however, it seemed that the war only served to interrupt Sind’s 
development by diverting the administration’s attention away from irrigational and 
agricultural schemes.  The political, moral and social benefits associated with visible 
development activity were eschewed, along with the possibility of increases in 
collectable revenue, in favour of the rigid maintenance of the government’s 
authority.  The chief resource extracted from Sind was food, which the province 
provided from its now highly productive barrage zone.  Indeed, the province was 
able to utilize its increased agricultural output to sell food to other parts of India 
where food was short, most notably to Bengal during the famine of 1943.  This did 
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not necessarily directly aid the war effort, but certainly contributed to the political 
stability of India, one of the Allies’ key strategic bases.  Sind’s food exports to other 
parts of India were so essential, and fetched such a high price, that the province was 
accused by the central Food Department of profiteering.64  Whatever their moral 
status, these profits negated the debt incurred during the Sukkur Barrage’s 
construction, and meant that Sind finished the war with a financial surplus.  Large 
quantities of timber and fuel-wood were also harvested in Sind.65 
In terms of ‘keeping the peace’, the province remained largely free from the 
turbulence caused by the Congress’s all-India Civil Disobedience and Quit India 
campaigns, beginning respectively in 1940 and 1942.66  Sind’s wartime politics were 
idiosyncratic, and the main challenge to the administration’s political control came 
in the shape of uprising among the Hurs, the Pir Pagaro’s restless followers, which 
began in 1941.  While the main rising was put down by 1943, the Hurs were not 
finally pacified until after Independence.   
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Against this backdrop of revenue extraction and political authoritarianism, 
development activities – never consistently promoted by the government in Sind – 
received even less attention.  The suspension of such activities was mourned by at 
least one junior officer who took a keen interest in agricultural improvement, and 
had an immediate perspective on conditions in the province.67  This was a matter of 
short-term expediency, however, and was not expected to herald a lasting reversal 
of the twentieth century Raj’s trend towards using ‘development’ to legitimize itself.  
To this end, schemes for the post-war development of Sind were set out in a 
Government of Sind publication in 1945, promising that “The object of any 
Government Plan should be to increase the happiness of the people”.68  Cooper has 
argued that colonial regimes in Africa in the 1940s and 1950s self-consciously 
cultivated the idea of ‘development’ as a force that could reinvigorate colonialism, 
while at the same time modernizing discourses gave colonial bureaucrats a sense of 
direction and purpose, even as events were shattering their sense of control.69  The 
idea of (and the particular types of power-relationship embedded within) ideas of 
moral and material ‘progress’ in Sind and India had a longer lineage, but the 
instability of the war years, especially the uncertainty felt throughout the 
administration about the future constitution of India’s government, and the role of 
British officials within it, perhaps accentuated the need that officials felt to lay plans 
for post-war development.   
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 In Sind, the feeling among officials that material progress and other 
‘advances’ could only be driven by British initiative had been confirmed as late as 
1944, when Governor Dow complained to the Viceroy that: 
The comparative apathy with which all Sind ministers have regarded the so-
called “nation-building” departments is a noticeable feature of our 
administration [...]  Since the introduction of provincial autonomy in 1936 (in 
Sind), the leading ministers have always taken charge of the old reserved 
departments [such as Home and Revenue], and the nation-building 
departments have been regarded as minor charges, with which the less 
competent and influential ministers have had to content themselves.  This 
attitude still persists, although there is now money enough for development.  
Sind is likely to suffer greatly during the next few years for lack of ministers 
competent and interested enough to direct (or even not to hamper) the great 
drive forward in education, agriculture and medical relief which is now a 
matter of practical politics.70 
The planned post-war projects certainly revealed an intention to continue the 
development of Sind along the lines that had been pursued since the late nineteenth 
century, thus demonstrating an abiding official faith in the power of material 
progress.  Irrigation was to be accorded high priority.  “In fact,” said the introductory 
pages to the collected post-war plans, “Sind is obliged to push ahead with its 
schemes of irrigation.  It is almost a case of doing so or perishing”.71  This refrain 
would be heard again and again over the following decades, as increasing 
agricultural productivity remained a constant and pressing requirement for the 
stability of Sind’s, and Pakistan’s, economy and political system.  32 of the schemes 
had an agricultural focus, based on the All-India Plan drawn up by the Imperial 
Council of Agricultural Research, 72  while other schemes including training for 
government staff, road and irrigation infrastructure projects, education, and public 
health.  By prioritizing irrigation, the plans maintained the primacy of a type of 
material progress arrived at by increasing human control over nature. 
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Indeed the proposals that followed most closely the pattern of Sind’s pre-
war development were those for two new barrages on the Indus, one to irrigate 
Upper Sind, and one for Lower Sind.  These also set the strongest precedent for 
post-war development.  Plans and estimates for the latter, to be constructed at 
Hajipur, 18 miles downriver from Kotri, had already been prepared, and work was 
expected to begin in November 1945.  It would require 2,000 skilled and 12,000 
unskilled workers, plus 1,500 technical and clerical staff, and would therefore 
present a partial solution to the problem of finding employment for the Indian 
servicemen who would be demobilized after the war’s end, something that greatly 
troubled the Government of India.73  Work had to begin on this barrage 
immediately, the plan stressed, because the lower Sind inundation canals were 
suffering heavily from withdrawals upstream in the Indus Basin.74   The need was 
especially pressing because the Punjab also wanted to increase its usage of water 
from Indus tributaries, a desire that brought it into conflict with Sind, and sparked a 
round of negotiations under Justice B.N. Rau, a judicial heavyweight who went on to 
be India’s representative at the United Nations, and later Judge-Designate of the 
International Court at the Hague.  While the Rau Commission resulted in a draft 
agreement in which engineers representing Sind and the Punjab agreed on all 
technical points,75 negotiations broke down before this was ratified by either 
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province.76  Under the circumstances, the new barrage seemed essential to the 
administration, as did a second barrage to be constructed in Upper Sind after the 
completion of the first. 
The new barrages were intended to extend the material progress for which 
the Sukkur Barrage already formed the basis, but also to preserve the productivity of 
areas of Sind that were suffering the negative effects of the Sukkur scheme.  Dow, 
the Governor during most of the war, had toured the Indus Delta region in 
December 1944, and reported on the devastation that the diversion of water from 
the Indus into canals by the Sukkur Barrage had visited on the area, having deprived 
the previously extensively-cultivated rice crop of timely water delivery.  He noted 
that the zamindars of this area, who were unable to pay land revenue and were 
therefore not awarded a vote in provincial elections, had correspondingly little 
political influence.  The proposed new barrage in Lower Sind, Dow wrote, would 
make these zamindars’ situation even worse.  Nonetheless, the principle of large-
scale development was not questioned: instead, Dow recommended that these 
zamindars be found lands on the proposed new canals.77  Setting a pattern that 
would hold true in the 1950s-1960s, Dow’s recommendation answered a problem 
caused by an intervention into Sind’s river-system by intensifying irrigation 
development.  The answer to damage done by previous infrastructure works, it 
seemed, was to initiate another round of similar works.   
In fact the lynchpins of the post-war plans, the two new barrages, were not 
constructed until Sind had become part of Pakistan.  That such huge schemes as the 
new barrages were not executed before the departure of the British was hardly 
surprising given their great cost, and the Raj’s post-war poverty.  Yet the emphasis 
that these plans put on irrigation was nothing new for Sind.  Rather, these plans 
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represented a continuation of the trends in Sind’s interwar development, 
exemplified by the Sukkur Barrage and the agricultural projects connected with it, 
maintaining Sind’s position as a producer of agricultural goods in the Imperial and 
world economy.  While they may have embodied a degree of wishful thinking about 
what the colonial administration could actually achieve in the time remaining to it, 
these plans set much of the context for the post-war development that was 
eventually undertaken by the Government of Sind as a part of Pakistan. 
‘Progress’ after Partition 
The fall of the Raj followed closely upon the end of the Second World War, and the 
independent nation-states of India and Pakistan were created on 15 August 1947.  
Sind became one of the constituent parts of Pakistan, along with Baluchistan, the 
North-West Frontier Province, the western part of partitioned Punjab and the 
eastern part of partitioned Bengal.  Sind was now severed from the central authority 
of the Government of India, which had played such a great part in directing its 
affairs, and from His Majesty’s Government in London.  Instead, its overlord became 
the Government of Pakistan, based in Karachi.  The logic behind, and process of, the 
creation of Pakistan has received enormous critical attention, and need not be 
extensively rehearsed here;78 rather, this section will argue that Pakistan’s 
newfound status as a nation-state, however troubled and flimsy, provided a 
framework in which ideas about development and material progress familiar from 
colonial days took on new tinges, under the pressure of the challenges that 
stemmed from the transfer of power itself, and as nationalist fervour allowed 
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bureaucrats and politicians to set out their claims to authority in developmentalist 
contexts.  In the first years of Independence, the Imperial discourses of progress 
associated with the barrages were transformed into nationalist discourses about 
‘building the nation’.  Thus it is demonstrated that the Sukkur Barrage, and other 
development projects that shared its ethos, had become firmly implanted into 
Pakistan’s mental framework.   
Amid the chaos and excitement of the transfer of power, the 
developmentalist tendencies of the state in Sind, and the teleology of progress that 
justified and underpinned them, remained virtually unaffected.  The new national 
government in Karachi proved to be at least as enthusiastic about the consolidation 
of state power in Sind through the construction of infrastructure projects as had the 
British-controlled government in New Delhi.  This was at least partly facilitated by 
the retention of the office of Development Minister by Mohammed Ayub Khuhro 
into the Pakistan era, a post he had held before Independence and which, his 
colleagues in the Sind Ministry thought, gave him “too much” power.79 
Material progress was not considered to be the only type of ‘development’ 
necessary in Sind after colonialism, but was one of a web of related concepts, 
clustered around ideas of nation, economy, material welfare, moral development, 
and above all self-reliance.  The activities that these sentiments endorsed were 
never codified, but can be conveniently labelled ‘nation-building’, following the 
occasional use of that term by officials and the media both before and after 
Independence.  Underlying them all, however, was the sense that Pakistan and its 
citizens were – or should be – embarked upon a journey towards a better life: the 
quintessential utopia of material progress.  The colonial regime had invoked material 
progress as an end in its own sake and as a gift of the colonial authorities to the 
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Indian people.  After Independence, the proponents of development cast material 
progress as, paradoxically, both the nation's gift to its citizens, and the foundational 
requirement for producing citizens who could, in turn, produce the nation.   
Defining this nation, and the relationship of different communities within 
Sind to it, was nevertheless a challenge.  Important changes occurred in the 
province’s demographic makeup following inward and outward migrations, which 
took place because of the division of India, which was based principally on religious 
affiliation, left substantial minority populations in both new countries.  Pakistan was 
intended to be a homeland for Indian Muslims, while India was to be avowedly 
‘secular’, but with a majority of Hindus, ‘backward castes’, and Sikhs.  Sind was, 
then, to be part of a nation created principally by and for ‘Indian Muslims’ – a 
category whose value had been much-contested, but which had, as a result of the 
Muslim League leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s successful scheme of wartime co-
operation the British authorities, been accepted by the departing regime as a 
legitimate basis for nationhood.  Yet the communal logic of Pakistan’s existence was 
by no means settled during the early years of Independence, and even after decades 
of Muslim League organization on the principle of a political community defined by 
Islam, the place of the religion in Pakistan was uncertain.  This did not, however, 
prevent waves of communal violence from sweeping across the Punjab and, to a 
lesser extent, Sind.  These stemmed from the fact that substantial minorities were 
left in both new states, especially in the Punjab, where the now-Pakistani western 
districts were home to a huge number of Hindus and Sikhs, and the now-Indian 
eastern districts to many Muslims.   
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Refugee movements had a great demographic impact, even in Sind, where 
Pakistan’s creation did not see the mass-bloodletting that traumatized the Punjab.80  
As early as September 1947, Karachi held nearly 10,000 refugees, principally Urdu-
speakers from the United Provinces, who had made their way to the only city in 
Pakistan capable of sustaining the new central government.81  The Pakistani state 
took on the responsibility for finding these refugees food and shelter in the short 
term, and settling them into local life in the longer term.  The impact of the refugee 
influx into Sind can barely be overstated, and became a long-standing point of 
contention between the central and provincial governments.  The relationship 
between refugees and national identity-formation in early Pakistan and India was 
extremely important and has been taken as one of the most powerful sources of 
tension afflicting early attempts to define citizenship in the new countries.82  This 
influx meant that the ‘nation’ being built would consist of an altered, and extremely 
unsettled, population, and yet the discourses of material progress remained 
unchanged.  The mere movements of people did little to alter the kind of power 
over nature that sustained the state’s authority, and nor did the transfer of political 
control from British India to Pakistan.   
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Refugees also moved in the opposite direction, with more important 
implications for the structure of agrarian society in Sind and, consequently, for the 
role that the state played in the agricultural economy.  By mid-1948 an exodus of 
Sindhi Hindus from Karachi had extended to other parts of the province, which 
meant that Sind’s urban centres lost a huge proportion of their merchants and 
traders, while rural areas lost the much-maligned but essential moneylenders, 
without whom credit for agricultural activities was much less easily obtainable.83  In 
March 1948 the Indian High Commissioner in Karachi found on a tour of Sind that all 
the Hindus in northern Sind had made up their minds to go.84  As many of them left 
behind valuable agricultural land, which the Government of Sind could use to 
resettle refugees deemed to be ‘agriculturalists’, the implications for Sind’s rural 
economy, the chief target of schemes such as the Sukkur Barrage, began to become 
clear.  Firstly, the land was either lying uncultivated, or had been occupied and put 
to work by locals who would not necessarily use the land in an approved manner or 
yield up the appropriate revenue payments.  In Sukkur District, some Sindhi Hindus 
returned from India later in 1948 to re-take possession of their lands, but found that 
Muslim refugees, as well as local zamindars and haris who had taken over some of 
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the lands, were in no mood to relinquish them.85  According to a statement in the 
Sind Assembly, 510,232 acres of land had been allotted to refugees by January 
1950.86  This seems to count together state land and land abandoned by Hindus, but 
indicated that Partition had had a significant demographic effect in rural Sind, as 
well as in the cities.  The rural communities upon which the ‘nation’ in Sind was 
being built, then, were somewhat different in character from those that had existed 
before Independence.   
This did not mean, however, that the ever-evolving relationship between 
those communities and the state was fundamentally altered.  Instead, upheavals 
associated with Partition and the transfer of power forced the Pakistani state into 
taking on an even greater role in agrarian affairs than under the Raj.  Like the British 
insistence on managing the land revenue raised on the Sukkur Barrage, the colonial 
government’s willingness to intervene in the rural economy after Independence 
showed that it would take action to ensure that the capital investment made in giant 
schemes for material progress was protected by continued productivity in the fields.  
In this way, the trend towards increasing state intervention into rural life, which had 
been exercized through the Jamrao and Sukkur irrigation projects, received a fillip 
from socio-economic circumstances, complementing that given earlier by river-
diversion schemes.   
The new administration’s response to the collapse of the rural credit system 
after the Hindu exodus is a case in point.  Officials took the only course of action that 
seemed sensible and possible, and stepped in to plug the gaps in the agrarian 
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economy, building upon the institutions of the colonial state.  The loss of the private 
and semi-formal mechanisms by which cultivators had obtained rural credit, which 
Sindhi Hindus had often provided, ultimately led to the state itself taking on the role 
of moneylender.  Like their colonial predecessors, Pakistani officials recognized that 
providing zamindars and cultivators with credit for the purchase of seeds, fertilizer, 
and equipment was necessary if individual cultivators were to raise production and 
increase their contributions to the national economy.  Providing credit to cultivators 
became essential state function, if Sind’s agricultural sector were to continue to 
develop and enhance the province’s ‘wealth and happiness’.  Accordingly the 
Agricultural Development Finance Corporation was established in 1952 to fill this 
gap, and had become operational by March 1953.  It functioned alongside similar 
organisations in other fields, such as the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation.  
However, agricultural credit remained a problem in Sind, as across Pakistan.  Only a 
small percentage of agriculturalists had access to institutional credit, loan limits 
were low, and loans had to be repaid too quickly to make them effective.87  This 
remained the case throughout the 1950s, and the Agricultural Bank of Pakistan, 
created in 1959 to supplement the Agricultural Development Finance Corporation’s 
work, was itself later replaced by an Agricultural Development Bank.   
The state’s entanglements with agricultural credit, apart from being 
practical economic actions, were rooted in discourses that located the post-colonial 
state in the same space of authority as its colonial predecessor, and an examination 
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of the logic of the former will demonstrate where it concurred with and deviated 
from the latter.  Like other aspects of 'development', rural credit was perceived to 
be more than a problem of mere economics: instead, it was a field that the Pakistani 
state proclaimed a moral responsibility to regulate and support, in the same manner 
that the colonial administration had proclaimed the construction of the Sukkur 
Barrage to be a moral responsibility.  Indeed, the trope of the cultivator made 
vulnerable by his own ‘backwardness’ later reappeared in the First Five Year Plan, 
which warned that rural credit organizations served men who were largely illiterate 
and easy victims of fraud or exploitation.88  The state's role was, by implication, to 
facilitate the integration of the farmer into the national body by providing a service 
which would otherwise not be provided.  Like the Sukkur Barrage and its two 
successor projects, therefore, agricultural credit was perceived by the government 
as crucial to material progress, and essential to ‘nation-building’. 
While engendering national feeling was a priority of the state in Sind 
immediately after Independence, the fluid concept of nation-building, which would 
coexist with and eventually be superseded by the terminology of ‘development’, 
embraced the same enthusiasm for large-scale infrastructure projects that had 
underpinned the construction of the Sukkur Barrage.  This meant a continuity of 
goals and methods prevailed in the way that the new administration approached 
agricultural conditions.  The authors of the First Plan concurred with colonial 
governors in considering the average cultivator to be in need of paternalistic care in 
order to defend him against those who would exploit him.  This helps to confirm 
Adas’s suggestion that British colonial attitudes remained strong into the 1950s and 
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1960s,89 undergoing changes more in the ultimate professed goal than in content or 
even terminology.   In this vein the very first issue, in 1948, of a Government of Sind 
public-information periodical had carried a feature on ‘Building up the Nation’, 
which celebrated Pakistani industrial and trading companies, cottage industry 
developments, cotton research and spinning, the electrification of railways, the 
development of Chittagong port in East Bengal, and the establishment of the State 
Bank of Pakistan, among other things.  To emphasize that such projects were 
essential to creating a strong nation-state, Jinnah, the “architect of Pakistan”, was 
quoted as saying: “The opening of the state Bank symbolizes the sovereignty of our 
State in the financial sphere”.90  Other issues of the same periodical demonstrated 
the range of activities deemed ‘nation-building’, including a degree college for 
women and a national library in Karachi, a plant for small arms manufacture, 
development of Pakistan’s oil resources,91 and aircraft workshop, and labour 
exchanges.92  These activities all shared the common effect, at least in theory, of 
creating the human, industrial, and commercial infrastructure considered necessary 
to a nation. 
Conclusion 
That a nationalist concept of ‘nation-building’ could replace colonial ideas about 
material progress and good governance in the late 1940s and 1950s seemed to 
indicate a change in the state’s frame of reference in Sind.  Was this true?  From the 
1920s onwards, the increased cohesiveness and assertiveness of nationalist 
challenges to British rule prompted new interactions between European officials and 
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Indians.  This period was also – not coincidentally – marked by shifts in the 
discourses that had ideologically underwritten the agricultural modernization 
projects connected with the Jamrao Canal and the Sukkur Barrage.  The extent to 
which Indians – in this case Sindhis – could take charge of their own affairs was 
extensively debated among Sindhi political groups, and the same groups had several 
opportunities to set out their cases before influential committees.  These debates 
formed part of a wider discourse of ‘progress’, which questioned Sind’s ability to 
‘live up’ to the expectations of forward-thinking and financial responsibility set both 
by the Sukkur Barrage and by new constitutional arrangements.  At the same time, 
the terms of these debates, the technical and material basis on which morally-
loaded concepts  of ‘progress’ rested, were set by the administration and accepted 
almost without question by the emergent Sindhi political class.  In this way, the 
ideas embodied in Sind’s earlier perennial irrigation projects passed onto the people 
who would become the ruling politicians and bureaucrats after Independence.  The 
shift in emphasis from literally building the markers of the Empire to building up the 
nation masked, therefore, a strong continuity in the attitudes and objectives of 
those who governed Sind.  The implications of this, and the complexities of post-
Independence river-development politics, will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: The nation-state versus the natural 
environment 
In the development of any country the Engineers have to play a great 
part.  […]  The task of constructing this new Nation will mainly fall on 
their shoulders. [...]  Our Irrigation Engineers have already made their 
mark and I am happy to say this Barrage is entirely the work of our 
Pakistani Engineers. 
-West Pakistan Minister of Communications and Works (1957)1  
 
 
Two of the projects that the Government of Sind had proposed for post-war 
development came to dominate the province during the years shortly after 
Independence.  These were two new barrages, one located near Hyderabad in lower 
Sind, and the other in upper Sind; they came to be known respectively as the 
Ghulam Mohammad Barrage and the Gudu Barrage.2  After Independence, such 
works offered room for symbolic interpretation, as well as being among the more 
tangible aspects of nation-building activities – metaphors for national progress that 
were physically inscribed on the landscape.  Their political importance combined 
practical and symbolic elements: on one hand, they helped Pakistan meet severe 
food shortages and stimulate a stagnant economy; on the other, the barrages 
became a focal point for the narrative of the state’s exercise of agency over the 
physical environment.  This became one way in which the post-colonial state, like its 
British predecessor, asserted legitimacy.   
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These barrages were especially significant in the drive for ‘nation-building’ 
identified in Chapter 3.  The ‘national’ aspect of the projects was particularly 
stressed because, unlike other irrigation projects in both West and East Pakistan, 
they were constructed almost entirely out of Pakistan’s own resources, and the glory 
did not have to be shared with foreign donors.  The concerns of Pakistani 
bureaucrats and politicians, relatively free from foreign influence, can be 
determined more easily in this context.  It will be argued that the representation of 
the barrages as a technical achievement pivoted on the claim that Pakistan had 
successfully appropriated the kind of Western knowledge necessary for making a 
‘modern’ nation.  This heroic narrative, however, was undermined by severe 
waterlogging and salination of barrage lands, which was finally officially recognized 
as a problem during the 1960s.  This chapter also examines, therefore, how the 
interruption of real problems into a theoretical victory (over both the natural 
environment and economic challenges), which the barrages represented, revealed 
state-led development in Pakistan to have been more successful on paper than in 
fact.  
The new barrages 
The Ghulam Muhammad Barrage was sanctioned by the pre-Partition Government 
of Sind in May 1947.  Work began in earnest in 1950, making it the first major 
irrigation work undertaken in independent Pakistan, and it remained one of the 
biggest.  Like the Sukkur Barrage, the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage had been 
conceived partly to ensure that Sind would be able to effectively use its water 
apportionment, in the face of projects planned for the Punjab that would reduce the 
volume of water available downstream, in this case the Bhakhra Dam and Thal 
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Project.3  It marked an important step in the new nation-state's struggle to initiate 
large-scale development projects, and also continued the rivalry between Sind, the 
Punjab, and others for the use of Indus waters, which remained intense.   
This barrage was expected to irrigate nearly 2.9m acres of land in lower 
Sind, of which 1.5m acres would be virgin land.  The project’s urgency was partly due 
to the fact that Lower Sind had suffered from water shortages after the increased 
upstream take-offs of the Sukkur Barrage and canals4 – bearing out the fears that 
Lower Sind zamindars had expressed at the time of that barrage’s construction.  The 
construction of the Gudu Barrage, which had also been included in the Government 
of Sind post-war development plans, followed after the completion of the Ghulam 
Muhammad project, and began in December 1958.  The barrage system began to 
pass water in early 1962, providing irrigation water for 3.25m acres of land, of which 
1.7m had not previously been cultivated.  The new barrages replicated the Sukkur 
Barrage’s format of improving the water supply to existing estates as well as opening 
up new areas for agriculture; as such, irrigation development in 1950s Sind followed 
the pattern of barrage-controlled river diversion schemes, which would also later 
become manifest in the Mangla and Taunsa schemes after the Indus Waters Treaty.  
In a mirror image, the most important irrigation project in the Punjab in the early 
1950s, the Thal Project, followed the earlier Punjab pattern of canal colonies on 
virgin ground.  The decision to build the new barrages can be understood partly as a 
continuation of colonial policies, and of the late-colonial approach to public works in 
Sind and the Punjab that favoured large-scale infrastructure projects.   
These were major projects, which would greatly increase Sind’s cultivable 
area while providing protection from rival river-diversion schemes in the Punjab.  
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There were, however, additional factors that ensured that the projects, once 
planned, were executed. After all, the Gudu Barrage was not completed until 1963, 
sixteen years after Independence: its viability required continued support from 
bureaucrats and politicians.  This support was forthcoming because water remained 
the lifeblood of the region.  Almost immediately after Partition the precariousness of 
Pakistan’s economic position, and the severity of its dependence on its rivers, was 
demonstrated by a dispute with India over the apportionment of waters in the Indus 
tributaries.   
This dispute arose out of the confusion caused by the division of the Punjab, 
and therefore of Punjab’s canal system, between India and Pakistan.  Disputes 
between India and Pakistan over water had not been anticipated, and indeed an 
agreement made between the Chief Engineers of East and West Punjab in December 
1947 meant that West Punjab would continue to receive its pre-Partition share of 
water, which could then flow downstream into Sind.  In return, Pakistan would make 
payments to India for capital costs incurred in delivering the water.  This agreement 
expired on 31 March 1948, the same day that the Arbitral Tribunal that the 
departing British had set up to mediate disputes arising from the Partition awards 
ceased to function.  On 1 April, India claimed that Pakistan had failed to renew the 
agreement, and shut off the water supplies from the Ferozepore headworks to the 
Dipalpur Canal, and to the Pakistani portions of the Upper Bari Doab Canal.  This 
deprived almost 8% of West Pakistan’s cultivable command area of water at the 
beginning of the critical summer seed-sowing period.5   
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Negotiations between the Chief Engineers of the partitioned Punjab in early 
April failed to resolve the problem.  In May, Indian and Pakistani representatives 
met in Delhi to make an interim agreement, which again provided for the release of 
water to West Punjabi canals by India on condition of payments by Pakistan.  
Pakistan also recognized India's right to develop irrigation projects that might harm 
the levels of water in Pakistani canals.6  West Punjab’s canals were, for the moment, 
filled.  Pakistan later repudiated this agreement, however, and the dispute was not 
resolved until India and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty in September 1960, 
after almost a decade of negotiations sponsored by the World Bank and with the 
close involvement of the U.S. Government.7 
Did this dispute, then, have an important bearing on river-development 
projects in Sind?  The dispute ensured that the public profile of river-development 
remained high during the 1950s, but it, and the development schemes born of the 
Treaty, made little reference to Sind.  Although the dispute’s pre-Partition genesis in 
the Sind-Punjab haggling over Indus water had preceded the formation of plans to 
build new Sind barrages, the latter were not included in the eventual settlement.  
These projects, therefore, were internal matters, without explicit reference to the 
international problem posed by the division of Punjab’s canal system between two 
nation-states.  Indeed, the first new barrage in Sind, the Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage, was opened before the Treaty was signed in 1960; and the second, the 
Gudu Barrage, was well under construction.  Long before the Treaty provided for the 
construction of projects on the Indian side of the border that might harm water 
                                                                                                                                                        
The National Documentation Centre, Islamabad, holds many files on the Indus Waters 
Dispute, but these have not yet been made available for public use. 
6
 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, ‘Intelligence Report no. 5649: The 
Indo-Pakistan Canal Water Rights Dispute’, 30.06.1953, p.7, ‘PAKISTAN N-2 Canal Water 
Problems’, Subject Files (Pakistan) 1952-1955, R.G. 469, U.S.N.A. 
7
 This Treaty, too, has been criticized by Pakistanis for unfairly favouring India: see, Malik, 
Indus Waters Treaty in Retrospect, ch. 9. 
 166 
 
supplies in Sind, it was recognized that the development of the Indus Basin in 
Pakistani Punjab alone would make the Gudu Barrage necessary just to maintain 
water levels in the existing inundation canals of upper Sind.8  Yet it would be fair to 
assume that the dispute, by casting doubt on the amount of water available to West 
Pakistan as a whole, sharpened the concerns about Sind’s water security that had 
prompted the preparation of schemes for the Ghulam Muhammad and Gudu 
Barrages.  It highlighted the importance of river-development for Pakistan’s survival.  
A more direct reason for the construction of the new Sind barrages was 
Pakistan’s chronic shortage of food.  The projects would bring more land under 
cultivation and were expected to increase the outputs of existing estates.  Food 
scarcity was partly caused by shortages of water in the canal systems of West 
Pakistan’s wheat-producing areas: the unreliability of water levels in the Indus and 
its tributaries, which British officials had bemoaned, had not been nullified by 
colonial river-control works.  Nor had the Sukkur Barrage ensured that food 
production in Sind was always stable, as demonstrated by the Government of Sind’s 
concerns about food shortages in Karachi District in February 1947, following the 
general failure of the previous year’s rice crop.9  Other limitations on production fell 
within the capacity of human agency to control: ‘primitive’ cultivation techniques; 
the lack of availability of chemical fertilizers, and the poor rate of uptake of these by 
farmers where they were available; the diversion of land that could produce 
foodgrains to cash-crops such as cotton in Sind and the Punjab, and jute in East 
Bengal.10 These limitations too had been recognized by colonial officials, although 
the encouragement of cotton-cultivation in Sind had been a deliberate colonial 
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policy.  Despite the large proportion of Pakistan's area that was devoted to 
agriculture, insufficient food was produced for the population.11   
Food availability was crucial to Pakistan’s stability.  The economic and 
political ramifications that had always accompanied the threat of famine during 
colonial days still applied with full force, but now a rebellion among hungry workers 
or peasants could topple the fragile state.  This was a potential threat both to 
Pakistan and the region as a whole, with severe consequences for the balance of 
power in Asia.  From the U.S. government’s perspective Pakistan was, like India,  
on the periphery of the Soviet sphere and yet still free from effective Soviet 
penetration and therefore a possible focus of stabilization in Asia.  However, 
not only is abject poverty and hunger the common lot, particularly in India 
and Pakistan, but there has been economic deterioration in these countries 
which, with reportedly growing populations, can be expected to continue in 
the absence of aid on a substantial scale.  It is probable that the friendly and 
relatively progressive governments now in power in India and Pakistan will 
not be able to survive if the present economic trend continues.12    
For this reason, foreign bodies, especially the U.S. government, funnelled a huge 
amount of food aid to Pakistan (and India) during the early 1950s. In Pakistan the 
first significant instance of this occurred after West Pakistan suffered from drought 
in 1951-1952, and its wheat crop was below average.  In the same year, Pakistan 
cried foul again over Indian diversions of Indus tributary waters.  The summer of 
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1952 saw rising prices, despite imports from India and Turkey; procurement drives in 
Sind and the Punjab were unsuccessful.13  In March 1953 the finance minister, 
Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, estimated in his budget speech a wheat shortfall of one 
million tonnes, or nearly a quarter of the average total crop.  With price-rises, 
hoarding of wheat, and the looming possibility of famine, Prime Minister Khwaja 
Nazimuddin and his government appealed to the international community for help.  
Canada and Australia sent 160,000 tonnes of wheat aid, which made up barely 6% of 
the deficit.  The U.S., which was no friend of Nazimuddin’s,14 remained silent until his 
government, unable to meet the crisis, was dismissed by Governor-General Ghulam 
Muhammad.  Thereafter the U.S. offered wheat aid on the condition that 
Mohammad Ali Bogra, a pro-American East Pakistani, be appointed as prime 
minister, under the tutelage of the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad.   
The veracity and severity of the food crisis has not gone uncontested.  Alavi 
has argued that, since the U.S. promised only 700,000 tonnes of wheat, which was 
delayed and only partially arrived,15 and that Pakistan immediately reaped a bumper 
harvest, there had been no food crisis.  It had only, he argued, been manufactured 
by collusion between the U.S. and the pro-American triumvirate that controlled the 
central government (Ghulam Mohammad; Iskander Mirza, the defence secretary; 
and Mohammed Ayub Khan, the commander-in-chief).16  On the other hand, a 
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contemporary U.K. trade organisation blamed the panic in Sind on the local 
administration having mistakenly reported “famine conditions” in Thar Parkar 
District, when they should have reported only a “state of scarcity”.  This still 
suggested, however, that the shortage was not in fact the crisis that contemporaries 
supposed.17   
Whether or not the food crisis was manufactured must remain an open 
question, but it is widely accepted that the fear of it played a part in creating the 
political disorder that allowed Ghulam Mohammad to dismiss Nazimuddin.18  
Another important effect of the need to import huge amounts of foodstuffs from 
other countries was the stretching of Pakistan’s meagre and much-coveted foreign 
exchange reserves to simply provide wheat and rice to the population.  The other 
important uses to which foreign exchange could be put – commodities imports, the 
financing of development projects and, most troublingly for a country with a large 
and potentially aggressive neighbour such as India, defence expenditure – had to vie 
with food imports.19  The financial implications of a shortfall in food production 
remained severe, even though the initiation of U.S. military aid to Pakistan in 1954 
helped to meet the military’s budgetary demands.  Finance Minister Syed Amjad Ali 
announced in February 1956 that the attainment of self-sufficiency in food 
production would take precedence over every other field of national endeavour.20  
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The U.S. continued to make gifts of wheat and other food, alongside military and 
economic assistance, when it felt this to be important to American interests.21   
In this context, one of the key factors in favour of the barrages was that they 
promised an increase in the cultivable area and therefore in food production.  The 
Ghulam Muhammad Barrage was expected to provide 530,635 more tons of 
foodgrains, as well as 140,357 tons of raw sugar and 48,928 tons of cotton; the 
equivalent figures for the Gudu Barrage were 303,071, 52,500, and 79,285.22  The 
increases in sugar and cotton production would indirectly improve national finances 
by providing exportable goods which could earn foreign exchange, or be used in the 
domestic markets as import-substitutes; the foreign exchange thereby earned or 
saved could in turn be used to finance imports of necessary food, as well as 
commodities and capital goods.  The chief factor limiting agricultural production in 
the west wing of Pakistan remained the availability of water rather than of land or 
manpower,23 and the new barrages were Sind’s most spectacular and most familiar 
means of increasing the area that could be irrigated.  They remained uniquely 
essential to agricultural development in Sind, whereas every other province had 
more significant alternatives to river irrigation, be it the annual monsoon in East 
Bengal, hill-torrents in Baluchistan, or to a lesser extent the rain-fed barani areas of 
the Punjab.   
However, the construction of the new barrages and their canal systems 
were not completed until 1955 and 1962 respectively, and the colonization of their 
lands took even longer: the increases in food production that they promised were 
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not viable solutions in the short term.  Indeed, in February 1956, the Government of 
Pakistan’s wheat reserves had become so depleted that once again only the timely 
arrival of US wheat shipments averted acute food shortages in Karachi and West 
Pakistan.  That summer, the U.S. Agricultural Advisor to Pakistan calculated that if 
food production was not stepped up, growth in population would mean that the 
cost of importing foodgrains would reach Rs. 225 crores by 1960.  He blamed low 
yields on the style of land tenure, inadequate credit facilities and outdated and 
faulty agricultural practices24 – the same limitations that had constricted output 
since independence.  Moreover, policies addressing the food shortage could be 
counterproductive: the food procurement drives of the 1950s, for example, were 
blamed for causing a disincentive towards greater production, as wheat was 
compulsorily purchased by the authorities at less than prevailing world prices.  
American advisors to the Government of Pakistan complained among themselves 
that American food aid reduced the incentive for the Pakistan to attain real self-
sufficiency in food production and consumption.25 
  The stagnation of the rural economy, and the low yields of the agricultural 
sector, remained a pressing problem throughout the ‘democratic’ era of the 1950s.  
In virtually the final act of the pre-Martial Law government, President Mirza issued a 
directive on 7 October 1958 that the barrage lands in Sind, as well as other project 
areas in the Punjab and N.W.F.P., should be brought under cultivation forthwith.  
Even before Mirza’s order, the Central Cabinet had issued a request to the West 
Pakistan government that the allocation and colonization of the six ‘project areas’ be 
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expedited within three months.  Apart from the fact that the Cabinet’s document 
did not take into account the need for an increased establishment and was 
therefore highly unrealistic, it was only a request, and not an order, which the U.S. 
consulate condemned as an ineffectual “paper missile”.26  The need for the 
increased agricultural productivity and cultivable land area promised by the Sind 
barrages remained acute well into the 1960s. 
Feats of engineering 
The symbolic importance of the new barrages went, however, far beyond a practical 
response to the food crisis.  Instead they were, like the Sukkur Barrage before them, 
pegs on which successive administrations could hang their claim to legitimacy.  It 
may be productive, therefore, to ask what view they yield about how far the 
ideological underpinnings that had sustained the Imperial administration had really 
changed when power was handed over to Pakistani elites.  This section will examine 
the rhetoric surrounding the barrages to show that the celebration of engineering 
and man’s mastery over nature was re-deployed by the agents of the new nation-
state, with adjustments in emphasis, but a substantial continuity in content and 
logic.   
It is important to note that the national project, like the barrage projects, 
was ‘top-down’: conceived and enacted principally by agents of the state and 
mediated through public occasions, and government-issued literature such as press 
releases and pamphlets.  Yet, limited as the popular element of the pro-Pakistan 
movement had been, ‘development’ made even less reference to popular forces 
except in order to mobilize the ‘common man’ to work for the nation’s benefit.  The 
techniques used by different ruling groups to promote their particular brand of the 
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national project could vary, but the basic tenets remained the same.  In relation to 
the types of engineering projects discussed in this chapter, the key tenets were 
economic development, and the integration of the diverse groups constituting 
Pakistan into a national whole.   
These concepts existed alongside important questions, such as the place of 
Islam in the new republic, that were hotly debated across the country.  The state’s 
fundamental ability to advance material conditions, on the other hand, was virtually 
unchallenged; and mediated through its engineers, and promoted by its politicians.  
As during the colonial period, the importance of identifying technical capability with 
state authority cannot be overstated.    Shortly after Independence, and before the 
national political process ground to a halt in the mid-1950s, the Government of Sind 
Minister for the Public Works Department, Sayed Miran Mohamed Shah, made this 
identification at the foundation stone-laying ceremony for the new barrage at Kotri 
on 12 February 1950.  In a formal address to the then Governor-General Khwaja 
Nazimuddin, 27 he set out the project’s salient technical points, making a case for 
why the barrage would be impressive.28  It would provide the canals of Lower Sind 
with a newly reliable source of perennial irrigation, just as the Sukkur Barrage had 
provided for canals upstream.  It would bring water to 11 lakhs acres that were 
currently "lying waste and barren [...] thus greatly increasing the wealth and 
prosperity of the country".29  By assuring the water supply, the project was intended 
to improve the yields of staple crops, and increase the variety of crops which could 
be grown.  It would also provide water for 43,000 acres of irrigated forest 
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plantation, which would go some way towards making up Pakistan's huge fuel wood 
deficit.  In keeping with Sukkur Barrage publicity, the Minister dwelt on the new 
barrage’s quantifiable features: its length of 3,000 feet with 44 individual gated 
bays, its ability to pass 875,000 cubic feet of water per second at full flood, and the 
fish-ladders that would accommodate the passage of Sind's much-celebrated and 
commercially significant Palla fish.   
Shah’s recounting of facts and figures was straightforward, with little 
commentary.  These numbers again followed the Sukkur precedent by speaking for 
the project’s size, its importance, its impact: emphasizing its technical precision by 
confirming that its properties were rational, quantifiable, and ultimately 
controllable.  Such technical details were chiefly the realm of experts, not of 
generalists – of the engineers and the other civil servants or politicians tasked with 
understanding them, not of the majority of attendant politicians, civil officers, 
journalists, and diplomats.  These people could gain a sense of scale from the figures 
deployed, and from their simultaneous view of the barrage structure itself, but 
Shah’s implication was that this grand design was, by its very nature, beyond the 
easy comprehension of non-specialists.30   
The audience would have been expected, however, to understand the basic 
importance and supposed desirability of such a grand scheme, and to put it into a 
wider developmentalist context.  Indeed the new barrage was not the only example 
of state-sponsored material progress, and other flagship infrastructure projects in 
Sind, such as the Sind Industrial Trading Estate in Karachi,31 asserted of the state’s 
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capacity to provide for the nation.  Roy has argued that in neighbouring India, the 
common definition of nation and state after Independence in terms of lack – what 
they still needed to achieve in order to make a harmonious whole – drove Nehru’s 
promotion of the ‘need for science’.32  In Pakistan, while there was no influential 
figurehead for scientific and technological progress comparable to Nehru, the 
materialist view of progress taken by colonial administrators had also passed on to 
their successors in government and public life.  Shah, although a politician, held the 
brief for a technical department, and to an extent his speech reflects the 
professional concerns of engineering as a discipline. 
The very measurability of the qualities that Shah invoked separated them 
from the messier, poorly defined concepts of social justice, national unity, and 
happiness.  These, however, were what Governor-General Nazimuddin spoke of 
during his reply.  As an individual who represented the country as a whole rather 
than one particular discipline of expertise, the Governor-General dwelt on the 
barrage's national importance and its promise of "immense good to the country and 
the people".33  In fact he expanded upon the Minister's use of facts and figures to 
associate them with an imaginative content, declaring that such numbers would  
stir the imagination.  Lakhs of acres of barren land will be turned into smiling 
fields.  Behind these figures I see in my mind's eye, hundreds of thousands of 
contented peasants reaping rich and varied harvest and thereby making a 
material contribution to the wealth of Pakistan. 
This vision complemented Shah’s statements by referring the Minister’s technical 
definition of the project back to one that non-specialists could easily understand and 
visualize.  Shah’s attention to technical detail prioritized the material basis of 
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national development; Nazimuddin’s utopian vision represented the end result of 
the process, shared by the people in common.  
Such a kindly image contrasted starkly with the realities faced by the new 
country.  Nazimuddin himself pointed to the "tremendous problem in the 
resettlement of the millions of refugees who poured into the country after 
Partition"; and the want of fodder and grazing grounds which led to cattle being 
slaughtered "at an alarming rate" in Karachi, leading to a shortage of milk and butter 
in Sind's urban centres.  Unmentioned, but also looming large in public-sphere and 
official discussions across the country, were food shortages and the continuing 
difficulty of defining a practical balance of power between politicians, bureaucrats, 
and the military.34  As Roy has argued of India, the fulfilment of the nation’s 
development destiny appeared, in official discourses, to be on a horizon that 
retreated as much as India journeyed towards it.35  By contrast Nazimuddin was 
asserting that, while the horizon of development might have been receding, 
Pakistan was catching up with it despite difficult national circumstances.  The 
barrage at Kotri was to be the "second step forward in the advancement of the 
agricultural prosperity of the province - the first [having been] the Sukkur Barrage".36  
His optimism was not groundless: the Sukkur Barrage had helped Sind to buck 
undivided India’s negative trend in food production during the Second World War, 
and by 1951 Sind remained the only province of Pakistan that produced more food 
than it consumed.37   Pakistan's de facto rulers continued in the traditions of the 
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colonial administration that had educated them, and looked to state-led initiatives 
to produce economic, social and political results, often through large-scale 
engineering projects.  
Five years later, on 15 March 1955, the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage was 
formally opened, again amid much ceremony.  Pakistan’s nationally-minded press 
took up the idea of the ceremony as a chapter in the national story, with Dawn, for 
example, stating that: “A proud day was recorded in Pakistan's history when the 
Pakistan Governor-General yesterday flew into Hyderabad” for the event.38  At the 
scene Mohammed Ayub Khuhro, Sind’s Chief Minister, also focussed on what the 
barrage meant for the nation by claiming scientific expertise for Pakistan, which had 
previously been the preserve of the British rulers.  “The project,” he said, was  
constructed by Pakistani Engineers and staff with the exception of the Chief 
Engineer and a few British Engineers, never more than five and for most of the 
time considerably less, who were chiefly required on the mechanical side.  *…+  
With one partial exception, all the canal works are being executed either 
directly or by Pakistani Contractors.39   
Hence, Khuhro was claiming that Pakistanis had successfully taken on and 
reproduced the scientific knowledge that British administrators had deemed such an 
important marker of British superiority only three decades previously.  By judging 
the independent state’s actions by the same criteria used by the colonial state, 
Khuhro drew attention to the similar ideological space that both administrations 
sought to occupy, and which relied on a cadre of experts who could manipulate the 
physical environment. 
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However, the promotion of technical feats to the credit of the Pakistani 
nation posed a challenge, for engineering expertise in Pakistan was not of 
straightforward origin.  The British in India had made much of the superiority of their 
scientific and technological achievements over those of their colonial subjects, in 
common with prevailing attitudes exhibited by Europeans and North Americans 
towards the non-Western world.40  The Sukkur Barrage, as we have seen, had been 
claimed as a great triumph of the colonial administration’s ability to control nature 
and re-fashion local society using the power of their expertise in both technical and 
administrative fields.  Moreover, the engineers of Pakistan’s Public Works 
Departments had mostly been trained under the colonial dispensation, and used 
techniques developed by Europeans in India, the Near East, and Africa.   
This troubled the discourses of the postcolonial state, which had a political 
need to make a show of distinguishing itself from its predecessor in order to 
maintain the support of influential sections of the population.  In the case of the 
new barrage, this was an especial problem because the project’s Chief Engineer, 
Tom Foy, was a Briton who had previously been employed in colonial Punjab’s 
Irrigation Department, and who was aided by a nucleus of British engineers.  In fact, 
the British consular officer who reported on the opening ceremony opined that the 
construction of a major work in five years had been made possible only by Foy’s 
involvement, as had the redesigning of the project that had reduced the cost from 
Rs 7 crores to Rs 5.5 crores.41  Moreover, the sluice gates and hoists had been 
manufactured by the British firm Ransomes & Rapier, which had also provided them 
for the Sukkur Barrage.  This fact was not widely publicized within Pakistan, much to 
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the firm’s dismay; their representative’s forceful protestations about this caused 
Khuhro to omit a scripted reference to the firm during his speech.   
Khuhro departed from the script again to pay an especially warm tribute to 
Foy, who had by then retired,42 but apart from this the opening ceremony was an 
occasion at which the particularly Pakistani nature of the barrage was set out.  
Thanks given to Foy did not offset the fact that both Khuhro and the new Governor-
General, Ghulam Muhammad, remained silent about the project’s roots in a British 
plan for the post-war development of Sind.  These men could not miss the 
opportunity that the barrage project provided to demonstrate that Pakistan had 
mastered technological progress.  This was perhaps all the more important in view 
of the Sind government’s inability to provide a really solid institutional presence in 
rural development.  Indeed, it is telling that at neither the Sukkur nor the Kotri 
ceremony was much attention paid to the re-organisation of agricultural institutions.  
Similarly, tensions between Sind and the centre were glossed over.  Khuhro 
promoted the barrage as a Pakistani project rather than a Sindhi one, even though 
his political origins were vehemently Sindhi, and his chequered career had seen him 
lock horns with the central government over Sind’s right to autonomy more than 
once.43  At the time of the opening ceremony, Khuhro’s failing political fortunes had 
recently been revived by the centre on the understanding that he would cajole the 
Sind Assembly into assenting to the One Unit scheme,44 and this goes some way to 
explaining his apparently nationally-oriented position.   
The barrage’s impressiveness rested, as at the foundation stone ceremony, 
on its massiveness, its tangibility, and the fact that it was an artificial product of 
human endeavour.  Khuhro announced that:  
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While no money has been wasted on purely ornamental or decorative 
features, every thought has been given to the appearance of the Barrage so 
that it may have the natural good looks of a structure - soundly built, and with 
all its parts severely designed to carry out their functions without waste or 
grandioseness [sic].45   
By making simple and practical construction work into an aesthetic statement, 
Khuhro46 allowed the sheer material solidity of the barrage to stand for the work 
that it represented, and the faith in scientific agriculture that it manifested.  In doing 
so, he followed the logic of the photographs included in the Sukkur Barrage souvenir 
booklet, but emphasized technical aspects to elide the very important, and 
distinctively Sindhi, social and political implications of such large irrigation projects.  
The visually manifest functionality of the barrage further allied it, and its builders, to 
the exercise of human agency over the natural environment: matching the river’s 
strength with the visible strength of concrete.   
The importance of engineers and their place in driving the national story 
forward was even more strongly propounded at the foundation-stone-laying 
ceremony for the Gudu Barrage on 2 February 1957.  In an address presented to the 
new President, Iskander Mirza, by the Minister of Communications and Works of the 
new Province of West Pakistan, which included Sind, engineering expertise was 
again presented as fundamental to national development: 
In the development of any country the Engineers have to play a great part.  
*…+  The task of constructing this new Nation will mainly fall on their 
shoulders. [...]  Our Irrigation Engineers have already made their mark and I 
am happy to say this Barrage is entirely the work of our Pakistani Engineers.47 
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Mirza, in his reply, enunciated the same theme: 
the engineering profession holds a place of honour among the other leading 
professions in a nation-building programme.  [...]  The country expects that 
they will live up to their reputation in the execution of this Project and thus 
contribute to the building of a better, happier and prosperous Pakistan.48 
In the event, Pakistani engineers again operated with outside help, this time from 
U.N. technical personnel.49  The close identification of engineers with the national 
project demonstrated that, although the term ‘nation-building activities’ could and 
did refer to the moral and social development of the nation’s people, the impression 
made by large-scale technology-intensive infrastructure projects was presented as 
indicative of the nation-state’s capabilities.  The barrages made visible the state’s 
capacity to act on behalf of Sind’s agriculturalists, manifesting the same need for 
‘state visibility’ that underpinned development projects in contemporary India, such 
as new towns planned to house workers at steel mills. 50   
Contemporary conditions perhaps heightened the importance of this 
rhetorical safe haven.  In 1957 the food shortages continued to loom large, 
alongside the general economic malaise that afflicted the country.  Moreover, the 
bitter divisions among politicians that would soon lead to the declaration of Martial 
Law made the solidity of both the civil service (of which the engineers were a part) 
and the work done by engineers a safe rhetorical haven by comparison.  Like the 
Commissioner-in-Sind’s assertion in his 1920 memorandum that a barrage at Sukkur 
would demonstrate the Government’s willingness and capacity to do good works to 
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benefit the people,51 engineering expertise (in this context, allied to nation-building) 
could be invoked as the bedrock of state power.   
Even under the stronger authoritarian grip of the Martial Law 
administration, this technical-modernizing discourse lost none of its importance.  On 
7 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza dismissed the civilian government, and 
instituted Martial Law throughout Pakistan; shortly afterwards, he himself was 
deposed and exiled by the army chief, Mohammed Ayub Khan.  When the Gudu 
Barrage was ceremonially opened in March 1963, Ayub Khan (who had since 
declared himself President) called the project “monumental”.52  Ghulam Ishaque, 
Chairman of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority 
(W.A.P.D.A.), emphasized its extra-provincial symbolic capital by calling it a 
“monument to national determination.”53  The changing political contexts in which 
projects such as the Gudu Barrage appeared over time seemed to have little effect 
on how they were symbolically presented.  Ayub’s administration continued the 
enthusiasm for technical development as a national endeavour, repeatedly and 
publicly exhorting engineers to work for national progress.54  While Ayub himself 
was not unreserved in his praise for the profession,55 he continued to seek technical 
solutions to social and economic problems from a cadre of specialists.  By the mid-
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1960s he felt confident enough to claim to an international audience that Pakistan 
had defied the world’s scepticism about  
what it thought was an impudent adventure to establish a new state, without 
much prospect of a viable economy, by a people inexperienced in 
administration, unacquainted with modern technology, and lacking both the 
capital and natural resources for development.56 
Evidently, Ayub considered command of technology to be one of the key qualities 
that enabled a ‘nation’ to construct a state.  Throughout the 1950s and well into the 
1960s, then, Pakistan’s administrators considered engineering expertise to be 
central to national development.  The importance ascribed to the Ghulam 
Muhammad and Gudu Barrages were manifestations of this belief. 
Rationalization of resources: One Unit 
The scientific logic of engineering, which prized a rational approach to problem-
solving, found expressions outside the immediate arena of public works 
construction, with significant implications for how administrators saw the Indus 
Basin, the development of water resources, and the state’s part in the ongoing 
struggle between humans and the natural environment.  This became apparent, 
long before Martial Law, in relation to the One Unit scheme, which was established 
on 14 October 1955.  This abolished the pre-existing provincial governments, 
princely states, and other administrative areas making up the western wing of the 
country (with the exception of Karachi, which initially remained a federally-
administered capital territory), and amalgamated them into the new province of 
West Pakistan.  East Bengal became, correspondingly, East Pakistan.  While the 
scheme was primarily intended to prevent East Bengal’s demographic majority from 
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translating into political power,57 it also became a forum in which the assertion of 
rationalized administrative structures was linked to the notion of ‘efficient’ natural 
resource exploitation, a phenomenon that seems to have been overlooked by the 
scholarly literature.   
Sind’s physical landscape might have remained resolutely unchanged by the 
mere fact that provincial boundaries had been re-ordered, but One Unit removed 
the political-administrative borders by which development projects were bound.  
This had a particular bearing on the new barrages in Sind because the Indus and its 
tributaries formed one continuous system of waterways, and of contiguous 
environments.  The idea of, say, the Sukkur Barrage as a Sindhi project relied on the 
human designation of Sind as a separate administrative territory from the Punjab – 
or even from Tibet, where the river’s source lies.  Noises on this theme had been 
made prior to 1955, and the important Sindhi geographer Maneck Pithawalla, who 
served as an adviser to the government before and after Independence, had written 
as early as 1948 that: 
the concept of 'region' has to be developed in the solution of Pakistan's 
problems and the haphazard political boundaries have to be discarded at any 
rate.  That all artificial political boundaries are a nuisance in our work of 
national planning is beginning to be realized at long last.  [...]  No longer shall 
we think in terms of the N.W.F.P., West Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan, but the 
main PHYSIOGRAPHIC [sic] regions[.]58 
There is scant evidence that this view was widely-held in Sind, or that this was a 
major motive for One Unit’s creation.  The scheme’s potential for re-ordering the 
way in which river development projects were carried out was, however, taken up 
and promoted by the administration during the 1950s.  Previously, the distinction 
between development planning for Sind and the Punjab had prevented either British 
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or Pakistani administrations from taking a ‘river basin’ perspective, which would 
have perceived the Indus Basin as one hydrological unit.  As Tvedt has argued, the 
British conquest of, and planning for, the Nile Basin in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
was driven by a downstream, Egypt-centric perspective that pushed for the control 
of the whole Nile system, to construct works upstream that would guarantee Egypt’s 
irrigation water. 59  By contrast the British in India, having control of the whole Indus 
Basin (though admittedly not of the sources in Tibet and Afghanistan) argued 
amongst themselves about riparian rights.  After Independence, Pakistan could not 
unilaterally take such a perspective, because the upstream part of the Indus Basin 
was in Indian East Punjab.   
One Unit, however, allowed some movement in the direction of a basin-
wide development perspective.  In 1956, in the first West Pakistan Yearbook, this 
new constitutional arrangement was linked with the kind of physiographic 
perspective that Pithawalla had urged.  “Abolition of political boundaries in West 
Pakistan”, it claimed, 
was so obvious in the interest of sound administration and uniform economic 
development that the proposal to constitute it into a single administrative 
unit evoked spontaneous support.  [...]  West Pakistan is a compact 
geographical unit and an economic entity.  Nature has created no boundaries 
within the area.”60   
Specifically regarding irrigation, the Year Book maintained that: 
One of the strongest arguments in favour of the formation of One-Unit was 
the fact that the integrated province was geographically one and that its 
component parts were dependent for a major portion of their revenues on 
the rivers and the irrigation system based on them.  Since integration, 
therefore, the approach to irrigation development has acquired a wider and 
                                                          
59
 See Terje Tvedt, The River Nile in the Age of the British: Political ecology and the quest for 
economic power (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), esp. ch. 2. 
60
 West Pakistan Public Relations Department, West Pakistan Year Book 1956 (Lahore: Public 
Relations Department, West Pakistan, 1956), pp.8-9. 
 186 
 
less parochial outlook and the former inter-provincial water disputes have 
given way to a healthier and more rational attitude.61   
Similarly, when the Gudu Barrage’s foundation stone was laid in February 1957, the 
address presented to President Mirza noted that Sind’s integration into West 
Pakistan meant that land outside Sind could now be irrigated without causing inter-
provincial disputes.62  The scheme was therefore credited with allowing the more 
rational implementation of development projects, free of the former provinces' 
administrative and political borders: the Gudu Barrage’s potential for bringing 
progress to the countryside was enhanced by the new administrative arrangements.  
The idea that a unitary geographic region63 should underpin a unit of political-
administrative representation sought to connect the Indus’s ‘naturalness’ with a 
politically-motivated construct, one that nullified regional identities that the centre 
regarded as anti-national.   
Taking a regional perspective pretended to objectivity, but did not 
necessarily benefit all the people of that region.  The supposed ‘rationalization’ of 
resource-use and development-planning could serve as a veil for the distribution of 
patronage, in this case through land and water allocations.   This had, indeed, been 
the case on the earlier Sind irrigation projects, where land was allocated to groups 
who were already politically important in the province.  One Unit, however, was 
widely regarded within Sind as a cover for the promotion of Punjabi interests, as 
control over what had once been Sind’s provincial and local affairs was lost to a 
legislature and bureaucracy which had only a partial basis in Sind.  After Ayub Khan’s 
1958 coup, this opposition remained unchanged; as a detailed American report on a 
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tour of rural Sind undertaken by embassy staff noted, "Almost without exception, 
Sindhis were opposed to this scheme.  One civil servant went so far as to say "You 
[Americans] must convince the regime that this will not work, and force them to de-
centralize.""64  A widely-heard complaint was that ‘the Punjab’ had been using the 
new administrative framework to take water from the Indus and tributaries which 
rightly belonged to Sind.  Adding insult to injury, One Unit meant that the former 
provinces were no longer viewed as legitimate entities.  Any action brought through 
official channels had to be conducted with reference to West Pakistan’s new-found 
singularity.  Opposition to the new arrangement was perforce reduced to appealing 
to an official non-fact, and calls for the demolition of One Unit in Sind increasingly 
spoke to a distinctive Sindhi identity.65  One Unit’s pretentions to rational regional 
development, then, failed to mask the effect that it had on local politics.  It did, 
however, help to perpetuate the official view of Sind, as well as the wider Indus 
Basin, as a space in which state authority to could be inscribed through development 
projects that were clothed in the language of rational resource-use. 
Development of the barrage areas 
Whether or not One Unit improved Sind’s development prospects, the barrages 
alone were not sufficient to bring about the improved agricultural production that 
would boost the economy, and demonstrate that Sind was an environment in which 
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‘modern’ technical knowledge could improve the human condition.  To fulfil this 
promise, the type of agriculture practised on the lands would also have to adapt to 
the new conditions created by the barrage systems.  Like its colonial predecessor, 
the state took it upon itself to bring about these changes by promoting new 
agricultural techniques.  Jalal has argued that the need to intervene in the food 
markets and the commercial sector of the agricultural economy led to an expansion 
of the state’s administrative capacities and administrative structures at both 
provincial and national levels.66  While this was true on paper, it will be argued here 
that the state’s ability to intervene in rural life did not live up to this ideal.   
In Sind, agricultural institutions – like many government bodies in the wake 
of Partition – continued to operate according to their pre-1947 patterns.  In 1953 an 
attempt had been made to institutionalize agricultural extension by re-organizing 
the Agricultural Department in Sind to strengthen the Extension Service.  A new 
Agricultural Publicity section was also established.67  These actions both amounted 
to a tweaking of the system to put a little more emphasis on the subjects beloved of 
the central planning committees, rather than a searching re-think about what the 
Department’s role should be.  In addition, the areas of Sind that required the most 
attention in order to succeed, namely the barrage zones, were home to poorly co-
ordinated development departments.  This contrasted with the Thal project in the 
Punjab, where the Thal Development Authority worked alongside the Village 
Agricultural and Industrial Development Programme (V-AID) to provide training for 
‘village workers’ who would show cultivators better agricultural techniques, health 
and sanitation measures, and even better methods of weaving.68  The Sind barrages, 
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however, lacked any such co-ordinated programmes during the 1950s, despite the 
prestige attached to them. 
One way in which the authorities attempted to ‘improve’ agriculture in the 
barrage zones was by promoting methods of agricultural production that had proven 
their ability to help increase yields in other parts of the world, especially the U.S., 
which was taken as a model for large-scale intensive crop production.69  This was not 
confined to the barrage areas, but these were certainly the most highly prioritized 
parts of Sind for the introduction of agricultural development schemes.  Accordingly 
a 'Master Plan' for the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage Area, a summary of various 
schemes for colonization and development, came to be produced during the early 
1960s:  the first draft was submitted by the Central Development Working Party to 
the National Economic Council in early 1963, which approved the principle in 
February, and in July requested details of each scheme, which would be approved 
individually.  The most expensive of these included a scheme for planned towns and 
villages in the barrage area;  the provision of drinking water, in association with the 
World Health Organisation; and, by far the most expensive scheme, Rs. 394.96 lakhs 
for the development of Ghulam Muhammad Barrage land by tractors.70 
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The employment of machines was, as Scott has argued, integral to the 
project of agricultural modernization.71  The value of mechanizing agriculture in 
Pakistan, however, had never been universally accepted: in the late 1950s, the 
authors of the First Five Year Plan had argued against the extensive utilization of 
tractors in cultivation, on the grounds that Pakistan's large labour force was already 
under-employed, that individual holdings were too fragmented to make tractors 
helpful, and that tractors were expensive to buy and maintain and their importation 
required foreign exchange.72  Other Pakistani officials had been more enthusiastic 
about mechanization, but this was tempered by the reservations of their allies.73  
Pakistan had imported modern agricultural machinery worth Rs. 10 million to help 
step up food production in the first half of 1958,74 but there is no evidence that this 
made a great impact on rural areas.  Indeed the Agricultural Census Commissioner 
believed that mechanization was no panacea for low production since it required 
careful maintenance, which would not be forthcoming in a state-managed system.75  
The development of Ghulam Muhammad Barrage lands with tractors did not even 
begin until 1961, even though the revenue authorities had begun releasing Ghulam 
Muhammad Barrage land in 1956, and the land was covered with forest growth and 
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earth dunes which could not be cleared by hand labour.76  However much American 
tractor-based cultivation may have been respected as a model for intensive 
agricultural production, the conditions prevailing on Sind land and in the country’s 
budget militated against it during the 1950s and early 1960s. 
An agricultural input that had received stronger government support in the 
first decade of independence was chemical fertilizer.  From 1952, the Government 
of Pakistan subsidized fertilizer distribution to popularize its use, and during the 
following three years some 174,000 tons of fertilizers were imported, mainly 
through the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration.  The rhetoric surrounding food 
and agricultural programmes must be treated sceptically, however, since they 
appeared to make little difference during the 1950s.  By 1955, a factory for the 
production of ammonium sulphate was being set up at Daud Khel in the Punjab.77  
Like the One Unit scheme and the construction of the barrages, this was very much a 
‘top-down’ initiative.  Indeed in 1953, the Chief Minister of Bahawalpur State had 
remarked that cultivators there believed that fertilizers poisoned the soil, and so 
needed to be educated before fertilizer-use could become widespread.78  The 
Government of Sind had distributed fertilizers in the early 1950s, but with little 
apparent effect;79 and despite an increase in the area of West Pakistan under wheat 
by half a million acres between 1950-1955, the output of wheat in financial year 
1955-56 was low enough that the Government of West Pakistan predicted a need 
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for 325,000 more tons of wheat for the coming year than had been harvested.80  The 
first years of the Sind barrage projects had coincided with an uneasy half-decade, 
1950-1955, in which the agriculture-driven national economy stagnated while the 
relatively small industrial sector received a great deal of help from the 
government.81  The state was not, then, following through on the modernizing 
promise that the barrages held out. 
Not until Ayub Khan’s era, from the late 1950s-1960s, did Pakistan’s 
agricultural development strategy become truly technicist.82  Both fertilizers and 
mechanized agriculture increased in importance and effectiveness under Ayub’s 
government, which claimed in publicity material issued during the fourth year of its 
rule to have been the first post-Independence administration to recognize the 
centrality of agriculture to Pakistan’s economy and to genuinely aim at self-
sufficiency in food.83  After the declaration of Martial Law in 1958, a new central 
Minister of Food and Agriculture, Muhammad Hafizur Rahman, had directed that a 
new 'production drive' would focus on small schemes which could produce 
immediate results and which could later be co-ordinated into a long-term 
programme of self-sufficiency in food.  Accordingly, 135,000 tons of fertilizers were 
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allocated for West Pakistan in 1959, along with 110,000 tons for East Pakistan.84  
State-sponsored fertilizer factories in Multan (West Pakistan) and Fenchuganj (East 
Pakistan) came into operation in 1962, but could not nearly meet the requirements 
for fertilizer to aid the Second Five Year Plan’s expected increase of 21% in food 
grain crop yields by 1965.85  To further boost the agrarian economy, state subsidies 
for intensified agriculture remained in place throughout the 1960s, as fertilizers, 
improved seed varieties, and the use of machinery remained too expensive for 
individual farmers.86   
Some mechanization had been included in the ‘production drive’ announced 
by Hafizur Rahman in 1958, and in addition the Government of West Pakistan 
intended to import fifty tractors with bulldozing equipment to help prepare waste 
lands outside the Sind barrage areas for cultivation.87  The Second Five Year Plan 
confirmed, however, the First Plan's cautious approach towards agricultural 
mechanization in general.88  Not until the Third Plan of 1965-1970 did tractor 
cultivation seem to gain popularity with the Planning Commission, with a planned 
increase from 40,000 acres ploughed by tractor in the last year of the Second Plan 
period to 75,000 acres in the last year of the Third Plan. 
A more streamlined approach to agricultural modernization had been 
promised when the Governor of West Pakistan in October 1961 created, by 
ordinance, the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation, and put a 
range of operations related to agriculture, including the distribution of fertilizers and 
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the management of mechanization, into its hands.  This appeared successful.  In 
January 1966 a press conference was told that demand for fertilizers now 
outstripped domestic supply, and that the National Economic Committee would be 
able to reduce the subsidy on fertilizers from 50% to 15%.89  By the late 1960s, the 
'Green Revolution' appeared to be yielding results, and West Pakistan's agricultural 
sector was performing better than that of East Pakistan: it was growing by 3.1% per 
year and, according to American observers, was set to take-off in the next few years 
following successful fertilizer distribution, tube-well sinking, and other agricultural 
schemes.90  
The creation of the provincial Agricultural Development Corporation did not 
mean, however, that the central government relinquished its special interest in the 
Ghulam Muhammad Barrage zone.  Like other important agricultural projects, its 
development was enmeshed into the national planning framework, and works and 
projects connected with the barrage were included in the Second Five-Year Plan.  It 
was also the subject of schemes such as those sanctioned in 1960 and 1965 to use 
tractors and other earth-moving machinery to improve Ghulam Muhammad Barrage 
land.91  These and other schemes did not, however, drive Pakistan to achieve the 
ever-receding goal of food self-sufficiency, and a major World Bank scheme to help 
finance a new $78 million urea fertilizer plant in West Pakistan was announced in 
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July 1968.  The stated aim was to contribute to the administration's intention to 
finally achieve food self-sufficiency in the 1970s.   
The attempts of successive governments, most significantly Ayub’s, to 
provide the incentive and means to cultivators for intensive crop production on 
barrage lands had not raised production sufficiently to meet Pakistan’s needs, nor 
had it kept pace with the significant advance in providing water that the barrages 
and canal systems had brought about.  If the barrages provided an infrastructural 
framework for the renovation of agriculture in Sind, the limited impact of 
agricultural input schemes meant that this framework contained little actual 
content.  Similarly, government agencies such as V-AID and the Agricultural 
Development Corporation seemed unable to take command of development 
activities, while official attitudes towards the importation of modern aids to 
agricultural production, such as tractors and fertilizers, remained ambivalent.  The 
ideal of national progress, fuelled by the intensive development of flagship areas 
such as the barrage zones, remained unfulfilled because the initial developmental 
thrust was not followed through with successful after-care.   
Drainage: setbacks in ‘progress’ 
The authorities’ failure to fully utilize the opportunities for intensive development 
that the barrages provided was accompanied by the emergence of a serious 
problem, one that affected every barrage command.  This was the deterioration of 
agricultural land through waterlogging and salinity, due to the insufficient drainage 
of irrigation water off the land, which was actively detrimental to the barrages’ 
promise of improved cultivation and higher crop yields.  The matter reared into the 
public consciousness in the early 1960s, when the areas of formerly productive land 
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being lost to the process became significant, and undermined the heroic narrative of 
barrage-construction.   
Drainage problems affected Sind especially heavily, because Sind lay at the 
tail of the river, downhill and downstream.  Irrigation water that had been used 
upstream in the Punjab, as well as the hill run-offs from Baluchistan and the 
N.W.F.P., naturally drained to the sea through Sind.  The first large-scale integrated 
drainage project, the Left Bank Outfall Drain, was not implemented until the 1970s 
and therefore lies outside the temporal scope of this study; instead, the focus here 
will be on smaller projects.  This section will also discuss a large-scale study of the 
water situation in Sind, including but not limited to the question of drainage, which 
was undertaken during the early-mid 1960s.  The report that it produced will be 
examined in order to open a discussion about the role of plan-making in Pakistan as 
an exercise in presenting the facade of rational state action.  To complement this, 
the next chapter will discuss the challenges that were posed in parallel by the 
political and social responses of the people to the projects. 
Ironically, although much had been made of the barrages as technical 
achievements, the drainage problem was largely a consequence of the lack of 
consideration which the designers of the barrage systems had given to the drainage 
of excess waters and the regulation of soil quality.  Engineers had known that 
irrigation projects could lead to waterlogging and salinity even before the Sukkur 
Barrage had been constructed in the 1930s, and the ‘reh’ problem (as saline deposits 
on the soil, resulting from waterlogging, were known) had been discussed.92  
However, because so much of Sind consisted of virgin or under-used land, the losses 
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caused by salinity were thought to be more than offset by the amount of new land 
opened up.  Indeed, the new and remodelled canals sometimes even cut across 
existing natural lines of drainage, hampering the land’s ability to regulate itself.  
When the new Sind barrages were planned and executed, it appears that neither the 
engineers nor the departments responsible for land, i.e. the Revenue and 
Agricultural Departments, took serious account of the damage that would be caused 
by raising the intensity of irrigation.  Similarly, when the Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage was sanctioned in May 1947, the Public Works Department considered no 
surface drainage to be necessary since, as the project’s designers argued, canals 
would be aligned along natural ridges.  Sub-surface drainage channels would have to 
be sunk 8-10ft down to serve a useful purpose, but such deep drains would be 
difficult to maintain.  Moreover, the project’s designers believed that ground water 
levels would ultimately become stabilized at a certain depth below the ground as a 
result of natural evaporation.93   
This opinion turned out to be incorrect, but very little action was taken in 
the face of damage caused to land by rising water tables and saline deposits.  In the 
late 1950s, even though approximately 400,000 acres in the Sukkur Barrage 
command alone had already been damaged by waterlogging , the drainage and land 
reclamation schemes of the 1960s were mere shadows on the horizon.  Indeed, the 
Drainage Circle was considered by most engineers to be the ‘Siberia’ of irrigation.  
Most officers working in it had been transferred there as a form of punishment by 
their superiors, and spent most of their time trying to get reposted.   The Circle 
received very little support from provincial headquarters in Lahore, and their work 
was hampered by the incomprehension of haris and zamindars about the need for 
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drainage, who often objected to having drainage ditches dug in their fields.  
Moreover, the Circle found it difficult to find sufficient manual labour from among 
cultivators and lacked manpower except when Baluchis came down from the hills for 
winter employment.94  Thus, although the great changes to the river system which 
the barrage projects brought about were much-publicized, the darker aspects of 
these changes received little official attention. 
Waterlogging and salinity were finally recognized as a national priority due 
to a combination of foreign influence and the increased pace of work after the 
imposition of Martial Law.  Paul van Zeeland, former Prime Minister of Belgium, 
submitted a report concerning Pakistan’s industrial and economic to the central 
government in November 1958, which pointed out the need for, among many other 
measures, the recovery of ‘sick’ agricultural land by drainage and the adjustment of 
agricultural practices.95  After Ayub’s coup, waterlogging received greater attention, 
partially at the behest of the central government.  Thus began a phase of 
reclamation projects, which represented attempts to undo the damage that the 
great river projects – the Sind Barrages and other projects such as the Thal Scheme 
in the Punjab – had wrought on the Indus Basin system.  Human control over the 
natural environment, which agents of the colonial and independent states had so 
celebrated in connection with the barrages, was fast slipping away.  Rather than 
battling nature, the engineers were battling the consequences their own previous 
actions.   
This was made explicit when, in October 1959, President Ayub Khan asked 
the Government of West Pakistan to carry out an urgent scientific survey of the 
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barrage areas in former Sind province (as the areas previously comprising Sind and 
Khairpur State were known under One Unit).  That December, a special Cabinet 
meeting was convened to discuss new measures, where the emphasis was laid on 
the prevention of waterlogging in new areas, rather than the drainage of already-
damaged land.  Just days earlier, the Government of West Pakistan had already 
made a move in this direction by promulgating an ordinance restricting rice 
cultivation on various lands throughout the province.96  The large volume of water 
required by the crop, which had led the colonial Government of Sind to impose 
restrictions on rice cultivation on land irrigated from the Jamrao Canal, meant that 
water would be left lying on the fields if it were not drained properly away, with dire 
effects on subsoil water levels and salinity in neighbouring areas.  Ayub kept up the 
pressure on the provincial government by requesting that the Governor of West 
Pakistan take measures to educate villagers about the dangers of insufficient 
drainage before their own lands had been affected.97  Similarly, the V-AID 
administration laid plans for motivating the population, through Basic Democrats 
and Village Councils, to render all possible help in fighting the growing menace, with 
technical advice from the Irrigation Department.98   
However, the emphasis on self-help and mobilising the people did not last, 
and drainage remained chiefly the realm of engineers and other experts.  Even as 
Ayub ordered the Governors of East and West Pakistan to mobilize the villagers, the 
Government of West Pakistan and W.A.P.D.A. decided that the best way to carry out 
the Cabinet’s orders was to prepare a drainage scheme for the Ghulam Muhammad 
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Barrage.99  In this command, the Superintending Engineer in charge of drainage had 
previously complained that no serious work had been done and that other engineers 
continued not to recognize the need for pre-emptive drainage, or even the dangers 
of the rising water table in the Sukkur Barrage command.100 
Before action was taken in Sind, however, Pakistan’s first major drainage 
operation was conducted in the Punjab, where the greater intensity of cultivation 
over a longer historical period had led to even more serious waterlogging problems.  
The first of what came to be known as the Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects 
was introduced in 1961 in the Central Rechna Doab of the Punjab, and principally 
utilized tubewells to drain brackish water away from waterlogged lands and into 
drainage channels.  Six similar projects were carried out in the Punjab between 
1964-1974, along with one each in Sind and the N.W.F.P.  While the scale and 
importance of the proposed drainage works allowed for some hyperbole, the 
narrative which emerged was one of crisis management rather than national 
progress.  “So rapid has been the rate of ravage”, a Dawn article proclaimed in 1961, 
that, if left to itself, West Pakistan may, according to knowledgeable 
authorities, be turned into a desert within half a century.  No wonder that 
President Ayub has declared the present struggle against the menace to be 
the Battle for Survival *…+ *T+he farmer is losing faith in the efficacy of further 
toil and investment unless his land is rid of this scourge.101 
Inverting the trope of the desert turning into flourishing fields, which had dominated 
the barrages’ opening ceremonies, this statement depicted a nation preparing to 
fight a rearguard action rather than to forge ahead into the future.   It also 
suggested that the loss of control over the environment would hamper the spirit of 
progress, which urban dailies such as Dawn as well as the administration both hoped 
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farmers would develop under better-regulated agricultural conditions.  The fear of 
the loss of land became more pervasive as time progressed, and in 1963 
W.A.P.D.A.’s British consultants, Hunting Technical Services, had to refute press 
claims that one of their representatives had predicted the loss of cultivation to 
waterlogging across the whole Ghulam Muhammad Barrage command.102  This fear 
was difficult to turn into an heroic development narrative, and when the West 
Pakistan Governor, the Nawab of Kalabagh, announced on the same day that the 
Governors’ Conference had considered drainage to be one of the most important 
issues facing West Pakistan, he appears to have portrayed the struggle as one of 
crisis-management rather than of national progress.103 
The drainage crisis also drew Sind into an international development 
framework, which had seemed more distant in terms of the Ghulam Muhammad 
and Gudu Barrages: it was accompanied by an increase in foreign involvement in 
Pakistan’s understanding, and use, of the Indus river system.  Outside Sind, foreign 
involvement in river-development was already the norm.  The Mangla, Taunsa and 
Tarbela dam projects in the Punjab and N.W.F.P. were constructed with varying 
degrees of foreign involvement, often drawing on assistance arranged by the World 
Bank as part of the Indus Basin Agreement.  Like the Sind barrages, these projects 
aimed at increasing human control over the river, diverting its waters for irrigation 
and power-generation.  In Sind, foreign involvement was focussed on undoing the 
damage wrought by the previous barrage projects, but still had an important impact 
on the way that the state related to the river.  The involvement of foreign agencies, 
including academic researchers and consultancy firms, encouraged the prioritization 
of a view of the Indus Basin as an integrated system, according to the ordering logic 
of a ‘rational’ scientific approach.  This reinforced the ‘regional development’ 
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arguments that had been deployed in support of One Unit.  The 1960s thus saw a 
proliferation of studies of the river system and of irrigation in West Pakistan, all of 
which promoted a schematized, geophysical view that usually took account of the 
economic significance of the object of study but gave lesser priority to social and 
political aspects. 
In Sind, the first such foreign study arrived in the shape of the Lower Indus 
Report, compiled on behalf of the West Pakistan W.A.P.D.A. by the British 
consultancy firms Hunting Technical Services and Sir M. MacDonald & Partners, 
which exemplified a schematized view of irrigation development.  It had been 
commissioned in 1962, and was submitted to the W.A.P.D.A. in 1966.  Despite being 
produced at a time when the problems inherent in previous irrigation extension 
projects were becoming manifest, the Report recommended more construction 
programmes as the key to improving agricultural production in the region, plus the 
intensification of some agricultural inputs.104  The centrepiece of its proposed 
solutions was a new barrage at Sehwan, which the government rejected.  Drainage, 
on the other hand, became one of the most important elements of the 
government’s irrigation development plans.  A new plan for the Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage area was approved by the central Cabinet in 1967, within the framework of 
a Ghulam Muhammad Barrage ‘Master Plan’ that dated from 1963, as revised by the 
West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation in light of the Lower Indus 
Report.105  The Report also formed the basis for a scheme to install 200 tubewells to 
service 144,000 acres of endangered land in the Gudu Barrage command, which the 
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Governor of West Pakistan felt was important enough to secure Presidential assent 
for in 1966, before the scheme was sanctioned in, again, 1967.106   
As well as forming the basis for subsequent project formulation, the Report 
reinforced a schematic view of the Lower Indus as a space in which river hydraulics, 
drainage, government institutions and the social, political and economic activities of 
the rural population combined into a system regulating the production of 
agricultural goods.  This marked the culmination of the trend that had developed 
through the application of a range of scientific and social-management disciplines to 
the problem of low agricultural productivity in Sind from the late nineteenth century 
onwards.  The sheer bulk of the Report’s 56 volumes, covering everything from 
technical to social aspects of irrigation and drainage, spoke of the 
comprehensiveness that it aimed at.  As a study of the modern state’s attempts to 
assert control over the physical environment in West Pakistan, it was unrivalled.   
It also supported the existing corpus of development schemes in their 
purported rationalization of national resources by relying heavily upon the economic 
and development objectives stipulated in the near-contemporary Third Five Year 
Plan.107  Indeed, the Report declared that ‘optimum development’ of water, land and 
labour resources implied directing them “towards the production of those 
commodities most likely to be needed to meet objectives planned [in development 
schemes+ for other sectors”, rather than merely making “the most efficient use of 
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available resources in a technical sense”.108  In doing so, it promoted the idea that 
development activities should be undertaken with reference to an organizing 
intelligence that united technical with economic expertise.  The Report also 
recognized, however, that human imperatives limited the extent to which such 
resources could be seen purely in terms of inputs and outputs: although water was 
the limiting factor to development rather than land, the withdrawal of water from 
any already-supplied area was prevented by social and political factors, “however 
desirable technically and economically such action might be.”109  This warning 
revealed the tensions that would inevitably arise when a plan or scheme was tested 
against reality ‘on the ground’ – whether that reality was the degree of control that 
the state had over political or social forces pushing against the “efficient use of 
available resources”, or, as the example of waterlogging and salinity suggests, the 
way that a project’s technical faults could undermine its goals. 
The schematization represented by the Lower Indus Report had had a recent 
precedent in another foreign study, produced in 1965 by a group of American 
specialists who had been assembled on President Kennedy’s orders at the request of 
Ayub Khan to study the problem of waterlogging and salinity in West Pakistan.  The 
group consisted of technical specialists from universities and industrial firms in the 
United States, headed by Dr. Roger Revelle, the Dean of Research at University of 
California, Berkeley.  In keeping with the strong links between academia and federal 
policy-making in Kennedy’s U.S.,110 Revelle was also the Science Advisor to the U.S. 
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Secretary of the Interior.  The preface to a summary of the Revelle Report made 
explicit the superlative importance of technical forms of knowledge, leading to the 
creation of a “blueprint” for action: 
[The task] has required the pooling of knowledge from many diverse fields 
and disciplines *…+  The result is a blueprint, boldly designed not only to avert 
the creeping dangers of waterlogging and salinity in the Indus Plain, but to 
move forward to a substantial increase in agricultural productivity serving the 
interest of all Pakistan.
111
 
   Like the Lower Indus Report, which followed soon afterwards, this report 
helped to promote a schematized view of the Indus Basin system, divorced from the 
social and political nuances of agrarian life in the territories under discussion.  Yet 
despite their authors’ privileged status as foreign experts in possession of essential 
technical knowledge, foreign studies did not have as much impact on the 
government’s activities as their authors might have hoped.  The Revelle Report was 
almost entirely ignored, while only certain aspects of the Lower Indus Report were 
taken up.  In particular its most important recommendation, the proposed barrage 
at Sehwan, did not find favour.   
The importance of these studies and plans lay as much in their 
representation of a rationalized, modern planning process, as in their actual efficacy.  
A wider example of this phenomenon was the lineage of overarching, centralized 
plans that supposedly co-ordinated development across the country, including 
schemes connected with Sind’s barrages, which were ineffectual but still integral to 
the state’s presentation of its claim to legitimacy through development activities.  
This phenomenon had begun immediately after Partition, when a Development 
Board was immediately set up at the centre and entrusted with the scrutiny and 
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approval of all development projects.  In 1950, it was replaced by a Planning 
Commission and Economic Council.  These institutions followed in the wake of a 
meeting of representatives from Commonwealth countries in Colombo in January 
1950, at which arrangements were made for the provision of aid and sharing of 
technical assistance among member countries.  In July, the countries agreed that 
each should also produce a national development plan to cover the next six years, 
and accordingly Pakistan’s Six Year Development Programme was drawn up.112  The 
pattern was set for the production of ambitious development schemes by the 
Government of Pakistan which promised integrated national progress, but delivered 
little.  Both the future Ghulam Mohammad and Gudu Barrages, for example, were 
technically included under the Six-Year Plan,113 but this seems to have had no 
discernable effect on the projects.   
In 1953 it was recognized that the six-year plan was inadequate, and the 
Government of Pakistan began to consider forming an up-to-date long-range 
development plan to guide its economic activities.114   A new Planning Board was set 
up to review the development activities that had already taken place, to asses the 
human and material resources which could be made available for development in 
the short term, to prepare a National Plan of Development, and to suggest 
improvements in the administrative machinery necessary to ensure the successful 
implementation of this plan.115  Although individual schemes could bear fruit, these 
supposedly comprehensive plans often amounted to little more than theoretical 
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exercises.  The first Five Year Plan was particularly ineffective, with many of its 
provisions for agriculture unimplemented, and the programme for water 
development and drainage falling considerable behind schedule.116 
This disconnection between plan-formulation and actual action in Pakistan 
gives credence to Mitchell’s influential argument that a feature of the political 
dominance of Western forms of knowledge, and of those who propounded them, 
over non-Western territories during and after the European colonisation of Asia and 
Africa was the existence of ‘the plan’ or schema that claimed to be more 
representative of truth than the ‘reality’ experienced on the ground.117  The logic 
and rationale of schematic views such as those contained in the Revelle Report was 
internal, proceeding from the need to make a coherent plan rather than the 
immediate challenges facing those individuals cultivating the land and drawing 
water from the irrigation system under discussion.  The actual action taken by 
responsible authorities was, on the other hand, haphazard.  Constrained by limited 
finances, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and the frequent precedence of political 
considerations over the systemic considerations on which the report relied, the 
development bureaucracy was forced to inhabit the messy and uncertain realm that 
characterized that of the cultivators themselves.   
Conclusion 
The new barrages, then, sat at the heart of the development ethos in Sind after 
Independence.  The story of their construction and their effect on the physical 
environment in Sind reveals the prime importance of the state’s ability to manage 
natural resources in maintaining its position.  They provided an important 
                                                          
116
 Planning Commission, The Second Five Year Plan 1960-65 (Karachi: National Planning 
Board, 1960), p.2. 
117
 Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley; Oxford: University of California Press, 1991), 
pp.178-179. 
 208 
 
opportunity for successive administrations to claim legitimacy through the 
deployment of engineering expertise, and had a pivotal role in wider plans for 
agriculture.  The demands of large-scale infrastructure development added another 
motive to the centralization and ‘top-downism’ of co-ordinated activity that, in a 
parallel process, drew political power away from the provinces and towards the 
central government.    
The idea that man could gain mastery over nature by the proper 
deployment of technical knowledge, which was reserved to the state’s engineers, 
was all the more important in the face of the fractured, ambiguous nature of the 
‘nation’ of Pakistan.  Despite the often-bewildering bickering and political infighting 
that dogged the provincial and national governments located in Karachi, the 
language of man’s mastery over nature was a common resource for which all those 
in power competed.  The expression of the state’s authority, which was found in the 
structures it built, provided a tangible counterpoise to the extremely fluid politicking 
of the state’s legislative arms.  This language, moreover, was directly descended 
from that previously used by the British.  It followed directly in the modernist 
footsteps of colonial projects such as the Sukkur Barrage: technicist, secular, and 
celebratory of hugeness.   The presentation of the projects was also very similar to 
that in colonial times, mediated through public events such as foundation stone-
laying and opening ceremonies, as well as public information pamphlets and 
newspaper articles.  Like the Imperial regime in India, the builders of the Pakistani 
barrages played to a mixture of audiences, i.e. influential locals, the media, and the 
public abroad, to demonstrate the power of the state.  As during the colonial era, 
the scale and romance of the project was invoked as a demonstration of the state’s 
capacity to remake the very earth, but this time in the interests of the nation rather 
than of the Empire. 
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The primacy of technical expertise could not always be taken for granted.  In 
opposing drainage plans, for example, zamindars rejected experts’ 
recommendations.  Development projects such as drainage initiatives, however, 
along with the barrages, were much more widely and readily accepted than political 
projects such as One Unit or the administrative separation of Karachi from Sind 
province.  This suggested the more universal acceptance of – or at least 
acquiescence in – the concept of material progress based on technological and 
infrastructural modernization.  The state’s role in managing the development of the 
barrage areas, although ineffective, also pointed to the relative ease with which its 
claim to superior technical and logistical knowledge could allow it to intervene in life 
in rural areas.  
Again, this continued a colonial phenomenon into the Independence era.  
The barrages formed part of a wider trend of the continuation of colonial attitudes 
towards the meaning of ‘development’, the approach taken by bureaucrats towards 
the management of the country, and responses to problems.  The barrages 
themselves were based on colonial plans and represented an approach to expanding 
agricultural production in Sind that was identical to that seen earlier in the Sukkur 
Barrage project.  Similarly, apparently novel schemes, such as the subsidization and 
promotion of fertilizer use on an unprecedented scale, reproduced the colonial 
desire to intensify cultivation on existing land by altering agricultural practices.  
Indeed, it is hardly surprising that, with a similar bureaucratic structure, the post-
colonial state fulfilled an almost identical role to its predecessor.  Pakistan as a 
nation-state certainly faced new conditions in the sense that it had to forge a path 
through the myriad difficulties of managing its international position, but within the 
province of Sind very little had changed 
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Chapter 5: The politics of land after Independence 
The long night of darkness has passed.  Pakistan has awakened from its 
eleven years' slumber, is now putting the rascals away, and can now 
confidently set out for the task of nation building. 
-Mukhtiarkar for Hairo Khairo, speaking to a U.S. official (1959)1 
 
The discourse of ‘progress’ attached to river-control projects could only go so far in 
defining the barrage projects’ political meaning.  The land that the system irrigated 
also had to be allocated and settled, and this chapter will examine the distribution of 
barrage land in order to ask what happened when the heroic hyperbole associated 
with the barrages had to be translated into practical politics.  Land allocation was 
one of the arenas in which the state’s nation-building programme was most 
contested, both within the administrations and by Sindhis who advanced their own 
claims on the land.  Other groups, such as refugees, also claimed a stake in the land.  
Meanwhile, the press kept a close eye on proceedings.   When applied to the 
colonization of newly irrigated land, the promise of well-ordered, centrally-directed 
projects, which the actual construction process had held out, failed from its 
inception.  The story of barrage land allocation, and of wider questions of land 
reform (from which the former was inextricable), was in part a story of the victory of 
Sind’s zamindars.  On the other hand, the central government insisted that some 
land also be allocated to groups such as refugees and military personnel.  This 
chapter will therefore demonstrate that land debates in 1950s-1960s Sind 
crystallized some of the same trends that had governed the colonization policies of 
the Jamrao Canal and Sukkur Barrage projects.  The tensions between Sindhi 
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zamindars and groups of ‘outsiders’ favoured by the higher authorities continued 
long after the British officials, who had set them up, had departed. 
Land allocation proved a bottleneck to the development of barrage areas for 
almost a decade after 1947.  Because the projects were so large, this had serious 
implications for Sind’s agriculture and on the national economy.  It also 
demonstrated forcefully the lines along which rural power ran in Sind.  The 
provincial administration’s ability to formulate a land policy for the barrages had 
many limitations, not least the fact that the powerful landlords who dominated the 
Sind Legislative Assembly would not approve a plan which excluded their interests.  
This gave Sindhi zamindars an even stronger position regarding barrage land 
allocations than they had had when Jamrao Canal and Sukkur Barrage land had been 
distributed under the British.  Earlier perennial virgin-land projects in Sind, the 
Jamrao Canal and the Sukkur Barrage, had taken care to preserve the power of big 
zamindars, and the latter were in no mood to bow to a radically new social order 
simply because they were now Pakistani citizens rather than British subjects.  The 
central government tended to make grander claims about closing the gap in living 
conditions between zamindars and haris in the countryside than had colonial 
officers, but had no automatic right to determine who would get barrage land, and 
so their power to enable this to happen was not a given.  Initially, indeed, the 
provincial government retained full control of the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage 
project by financing it purely from provincial funds, and therefore the hypothetical 
land allocation policy was left to them.  So land allocation, like related questions of 
the ownership of already-irrigated land and tenancy reform, was perpetually caught 
between the demands of the groups dominant at the centre, with their vision of a 
‘national project’, and local power-holders whose support was always necessary for 
the functioning of the government in rural areas.    
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Barrage land, refugees, and centre-province tensions 
Disputes about how barrage land should be distributed had surfaced long before 
either of the post-independence barrages was completed.  By January 1951, the 
Government of Sind’s failure to announce a comprehensive land-allocation policy for 
the zone commanded by the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage was attracting severe 
criticism in the press.2  The lack of provision for haris aroused particular ire: only 
100,000 of the project’s 1.7m acres were marked for settlement by haris; the rest 
was to be auctioned publicly in an effort to recoup some of the expenditure on 
construction.  The slow progress of construction work on the barrage, coupled with 
the provincial government’s failure to formulate a land allocation policy, proved 
increasingly frustrating to figures at the centre.  This was compounded by the 
apparent difference in vision that the administrations in Sind and at the centre had 
for the project, reflecting their differing priorities.  Provincial officials and politicians 
saw the barrage as primarily an internal matter, and held the view that its 
construction, operation, and the distribution of its land should benefit sections of 
provincial society.  The centre, on the other hand, saw in the project an answer to 
Pakistan’s pressing problems of refugee resettlement, food shortages, and the 
production of foreign-exchange-earning cash crops.   
Since divisions of power between the provinces and the centre had not been 
amicably settled, it was all too easy for disputes about the Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage project to be cast by the centre’s sympathizers as a struggle between 
parochialism and the ‘national interest’, and conversely by provincial interests as the 
invasion of Sind by outside forces.  In a confidential letter to Prime Minister Liaqat 
Ali Khan, the Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation, I.H. Qureshi, articulated this 
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divide and set out the case for increasing the Government of Pakistan’s direct 
involvement in the project.  “The economic and social consequences of this vast 
Project will not remain exclusively confined to the narrow boundaries of Sind,” 
wrote Qureshi in June 1951: 
The Government of Pakistan cannot but be vitally interested in an undertaking 
of this magnitude, particularly in those of its many aspects which have a close 
bearing on the production of crops for the international market and the 
nature and type of land tenure established in the new region.  *…+  Since this 
Project has obvious implications which transcend provincial boundaries, the 
Government of Pakistan should take [a] lively interest in the completion of the 
Project and in the policies and methods employed for its economic 
development.    
In Qureshi’s view, the centre’s right to intervene was established by the ‘national’ 
scope of the project.  This depended upon a hierarchy in which ‘national’ trumped 
‘provincial’ interests.  By the time of the letter’s writing, it had become clear that the 
provincial government would require significant financial help from the Government 
of Pakistan, which would soon be arranging and guaranteeing loans for the barrage.  
Since the centre would be left to pay for the actions of those in charge of the 
project, Qureshi claimed, provincial officials and politicians could not be trusted to 
act responsibly.  The centre must, therefore, “ensure the development of the Project 
on sound economic lines and in conformity with the social and economic objectives 
of our State.”  In particular, he argued,  
We cannot afford to be complacent about the pattern of social order which 
will emerge out of the method of distribution employed in this area. Land 
constitutes perhaps the biggest source of official patronage in Sind; I 
understand there are already indications of pressure being constantly brought 
over the Administration by powerful local interests to relax the restriction on 
the sale of land in this area *…+ If big zamindars succeed in securing large 
areas, it will have obviously unwholesome results.3   
Although canal-irrigated lands in Sind had previously been granted liberally to non-
Sindhis because of the vastness of the available area, the sparseness of indigenous 
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population, and the lack of local capital for investment in the land, Qureshi wrote 
that Sindhis’ recent adverse “mental reaction” to outsiders meant that the provincial 
administration might go so far as to discourage or prevent refugees from acquiring 
considerable tracts of land.  This, he argued, was unacceptable because the centre 
had a direct responsibility for the wellbeing of groups such as refugees and ex-
soldiers (mostly Punjabis and Pathans), who could usefully be settled on barrage 
lands in Sind.  The provincial administration could not, he maintained, be trusted to 
look after the long-term national interest, and had already proved its immaturity by 
deciding to make rice the dominant crop in the barrage command, “against 
emphatic expert advice and explicit warning that uncontrolled cultivation of this 
crop might result in the rapid deterioration of soil into unproductive swamps,” in the 
interest of “a short-sighted desire for immediate profits”.   
Yet, beyond the appeal to ‘nation’ and ‘national interest’ in Qureshi’s letter, 
a more specific interest might be identified: his ministry’s responsibility for refugees.  
Since the provincial governments, especially Sind, had a difficult relationship with 
refugees, the latter were often identified with the central government.4  When, in 
1950, the Government of Pakistan withdrew refugee facilities on the Sind-Jodhpur 
border, the new Sind Premier Kazi Fazalullah told the Civil and Military Gazette that 
the refugee problem was “entirely the responsibility of the Central Government".  
This was in response to recent insinuations by Government of Pakistan officials that 
the Sind government was not exerting itself hard enough to help solve the refugee 
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problem.5  Refugees were thus a complicating factor in the question of land 
distribution, and squabbles about them illustrate the fracture between the 
provinces and the centre.  An agreement between the Governments of Pakistan and 
India meant that agricultural refugees on each side were supposed to be settled on 
land in their new countries.  Unsurprisingly, in Pakistan’s western wing this led to 
clashes with indigenous groups who felt that they had the strongest right to land 
which departing non-Muslims had abandoned, or to land which had been newly 
converted from waste to productive land.6   
Due to their huge numbers, the Government of Pakistan’s responsibility for 
their welfare, and the special status that they claimed for having sacrificed their old 
homes in the name of Pakistan, the refugees remained a constant thorn in the new 
state’s side.  Terrible conditions in refugee camps in urban centres, especially 
Karachi, heightened the importance of dispersing refugees throughout the country – 
both to smaller cities and towns, e.g. Hyderabad and Sukkur in interior Sind, and 
onto agricultural land.  From Sind’s perspective, refugees from India did not 
represent an unprecedented influx in terms of numbers: migrants into post-Sukkur 
Barrage but pre-Partition Sind outnumbered Partition refugees.7  But those earlier 
economic migrants had not had anything like the social and political impact of the 
new refugee groups, nor had they represented a huge humanitarian plight.  The 
strength of I.H. Qureshi’s argument that barrage land should be used to settle as 
many refugees as possible can be readily understood, especially if the Ghulam 
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Muhammad Barrage were compared with the Thal project in the Punjab, which had 
already provided 60,000 acres of land to civilian refugees and the families of refugee 
personnel in the Pakistani defence forces by early 1950.8   
In Sind, the majority of the estimated 250,000 refugees living in temporary 
accommodation – mostly tents – in Karachi and its environs were mostly urban 
dwellers, and so were not necessarily considered suitable for settlement on barrage 
land.9  A similar number of urban refugees were spread through Lahore, Hyderabad 
and other urban centres in West Pakistan.  However, a large enough body of 
potential agriculturalists remained in refugee groupings such that the possibility of 
settling them on barrage land in Sind was frequently aired.  An April 1953 article in 
Dawn announced that allotment of land under the 'Permanent Settlement Scheme' 
had started in Lower Sind.  A lakh of refugees from 'Agreed Areas' such as East 
Punjab, Delhi, parts of Uttar Pradesh, and some former Princely States was to be 
settled with permanent land rights and security of tenure.10  It was unclear what 
relation this scheme had to lands irrigated by the Ghulam Mohammad Barrage, but 
just over a year later the Government of Pakistan issued a statement announcing 
that considerable refugee rehabilitation could be achieved on Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage land.11  Together, these schemes confirmed the importance which the 
administration accorded to agricultural land in Sind as a resource to be used in 
negotiating refugees' status in Pakistan.   
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Land in early 1950s Sind 
While the centre considered refugees and the nebulous ‘common man’ as those 
with the best claim on the state’s support, the provincial government had quite 
different ideas.  In the early 1950s, tenancy reform was an area in which deep-
seated tensions between interests at the centre and within Sind were expressed; it 
also helped to produce the context in which later barrage land debates were held.  
Indeed, discussion of barrage land always referred to wider debates about land 
ownership, tenancy, and agricultural production.  To understand barrage land 
policies, then, other kinds of land policy must also be understood.  Before Ayub 
Khan’s reforms of 1958-1959, land reform in Sind barely existed even on paper, let 
alone in practice: during this early period, the success of politically powerful 
landlords in blocking reform attempts in the province demonstrated their 
dominance of state institutions, and contrasts with Ayub’s later, somewhat more 
successful attempt.  Sind’s Legislative Assembly had demonstrated its refusal to 
contemplate a significant shift in the socio-economic structure of the province’s 
countryside early on, when it passed the 1950 Sind Tenancy Bill.  This was widely 
regarded as ineffectual, coming under criticism from the hari movement in Sind and 
sections of the press.12  The Civil and Military Gazette suggested that the passage of 
the Bill had been a response to the government’s fear of the far-left politics of the 
hari movement, rather than a freely-made choice by the Assembly members to 
reform the land-tenure system, and pointed out that tenancy rights for 
agriculturalist refugees had been left uncertain.13   
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The slow and uncertain nature of land reform was not confined to Sind.  In 
the Punjab, the Protection and Restoration of Tenancy Rights Act of 1950, enacted 
by the provincial Governor, allowed the restoration of tenants ejected since June 
1949, subject to review by revenue officers, and offered future protection to tenants 
of private landowners.  Like the Sind Bill, it was criticized by peasant organisations: 
the West Pakistan Kisan Committee argued that the Act would, because of its  
shortcomings, actually take away rights which peasants had previously enjoyed.14  
Indeed, by June 1950, a disturbed situation had developed among the peasants of 
Multan District, who protested that the Tenancy Act actually increased landlords’ 
net power over tenants.  They also protested against the allocation of land to 
refugee landlords rather than to indigenous labourers.  Deprived of effective 
redress, as in Sind, by the landlords’ dominance over the Muslim League and 
provincial government, the trouble had attained a “semi-revolutionary” status 
according to a detailed U.S. report.15  The disturbance, however, did not lead to 
serious upheaval.  Sind’s experience of land reforms – or the lack thereof – should 
not be seen in isolation, but represented tensions between tenants, peasants, and 
landlords across the west wing, even though these tensions were traditionally 
greatest in Sind.   
The dominance of landlords did not go entirely unchallenged within Sind.  
One member of the Sind Legislative Assembly, Begum Tahera Agha, argued for the 
partial nationalization of farm management, the introduction of more advanced 
farming methods including mechanization, and a greater emphasis on rural welfare.  
She compared the lack of land reform in Pakistan unfavourably with India's reforms.  
At the other end of the social scale was the Sind Hari Committee, which had begun 
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as a moderate body during the 1930s, and became more radical in response to the 
perceived increase in landlords’ power which followed the latters’ dominant 
position in the structures of the decolonized state.16  The Committee became an 
effective intermediary body between tenants and landowners, but was unsuccessful 
in attempting to pressure the Legislative Assembly to pass legislation favourable to 
tenants and have it enforced.  After the resignation of Sind Chief Minister Yusuf 
Haroon in May 1950 and Liaqat Ali Khan’s assassination in October 1951, land 
reform in Sind had little support from those in authority.17 
One important exception was Din Mohammad, the Governor of Sind, who 
was sympathetic towards agricultural and social reform.  When in early 1952 the 
Sind Hari Committee petitioned him to have the 1950 Tenancy Act amended to be 
more beneficial to haris, following reports in the press that some Sindhi zamindars 
had been organising violent attacks on local organizers in the hari movement, his 
consideration of their proposal caused a political furore in the province.  
Mohammed Ayub Khuhro, the leader of the Sind Muslim League, asserted the right 
of Zamindari Associations to have a say in the formulation of new laws regarding 
land and tenancy,18 but Din Mohammad approached the then Prime Minister, 
Khwaja Nazimuddin, for approval to a proposed amendment, which would provide 
that all tenants who were presently in possession of any cultivable land, or were in 
future engaged by a landlord for the purpose of cultivation, be immediately granted 
a permanent right of occupancy.  This proposal had, the Governor claimed, the 
support of “Revenue experts”, who agreed that otherwise no benefits would accrue 
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to tenants from the Bill.19  In doing this, Din Mohammad invited the ire of Sind’s 
landlords and of the Muslim League, which considered his relationship with hari 
leaders, in opposition to the provincial League branch, to have unacceptably 
lowered the League’s prestige.  Following this and other actions, Din Mohammad 
was ousted from power, and the advocates of tenancy reform in Sind lost their most 
powerful supporter.20  While Din Mohammad was a legal heavyweight, former Chief 
Justice of colonial Bahawalpur and Member of the Punjab Boundary Commission in 
1947, his illustrious career did not enable him to override the interests of Sind’s 
powerful zamindars. 
In February 1954, the interim findings of a Government of Sind Agricultural 
Commission were leaked to the press, and it became public knowledge that out of 
Sind's total population of 4.6 million people, 2.6 million were classed as landless 
labourers, often leading a semi-nomadic existence; and that of 11 million cultivated 
acres in the province, 9 million were owned by only 200,000 landlords.21  However, 
the political scene in Sind appeared undisturbed by this revelation, and the only 
apparently significant step towards land reform was taken in March 1955, when the 
Sind Cabinet issued an executive order abolishing all jagirs in the province, finally 
taking action on a matter that had intermittently arisen since 1947.  The order was 
to affect approximately one million acres of land, of which half was expected 
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eventually to be parcelled out among landless Sindhi cultivators.  The jagirdars, 
however, put the province’s legal system to work, and obtained a stay from the Sind 
courts on the basis that the Government of Sind’s action had been illegal.  The 
matter remained pending until after the dissolution of the old provincial boundaries, 
but the Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan High Court found that the executive 
order was invalid and that all jagirs in Sind stood.22   
Under a provincial legislature and administration dominated by landed 
interests, and one that had remained reasonably politically stable in spite of a grave 
economic situation, it is perhaps hardly surprising that land reform initiatives stalled.  
"From all evidence available", concluded a gloomy American report, "it would be 
safe to assume that little new is being done in Sind to better the lot of the tenants 
and landless labor [sic+ or to carry out the provisions of the provincial tenancy act.”23  
Ineffective as they were, however, these challenges to landlord dominance within 
Sind kept the issues of land and tenancy in the public eye. 
Challenges to landlord dominance from the centre failed equally miserably.  
As suggested by Qureshi’s letter to Liaqat Ali Khan, politicians at the centre had 
ambitions to alter the structure of agrarian society in Sind.  Regardless of the 
inherent problems in actually re-ordering Sindhi society, however, they were 
prevented from taking effective steps in this direction by the division of powers 
between centre and province under the 1935 Government of India Act, upon which 
Pakistan’s governance was based, and which apportioned control over agricultural 
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matters to provincial governments.  Retrospective measures were introduced at the 
centre to make the existing legislation more effective: for example, on 14 April 1951 
the national Constituent Assembly had passed a bill amending the 1935 Act so that 
provincial land reform legislation could be more effective.24  But this had little 
discernable effect on the equitability of land-holding patterns or the status of 
labourers.  In 1953, the Government of Pakistan invited a German specialist, Dr. Otto 
Schiller, to study agricultural co-operatives in the Punjab.  Schiller’s report 
emphasized the rights of the cultivator at the landowner's expense (contrary to the 
'traditional' approach to co-operative farming in the Punjab).  He admitted privately 
to the American Vice-Consul that his proposals were revolutionary, but claimed that 
if they were not implemented, Pakistani politics would swing violently to the far left 
within ten years, in the absence of improvements to the agricultural economy.25  
Schiller’s warnings, however, did not produce a greater impetus towards reform.   
This failure to alter rural socio-economic conditions in favour of labourers 
was common across Pakistan.26   Politicians and officials often overlapped with 
powerful and well-entrenched landlords, meaning that their will to change was 
equivocal at best.  Another reason why effective land reform was not undertaken 
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might have been a lack of external pressure on the Pakistani administrations.27   The 
United States, then one of Pakistan’s major benefactors in dollar aid, with 
consequent influence in Pakistani affairs, never pushed for significant land reform.  
Indeed, the Deputy Director of the United States Foreign Operations Administration 
Mission to Pakistan wrote to the Chief Agriculturalist at the International Co-
operation Administration, one of the U.S. Government bodies responsible for 
development work, that: 
Land tenure is one of the most serious problems of the country, but it is so 
complicated a problem in both wings [...] that to introduce land reform at this 
time would only insure the complete breakdown of any “impact program” we 
might attempt.28   
While the U.S. broadly supported reforms in Pakistan, it was more concerned to 
maintain overall political stability and the goodwill of the Government of Pakistan, 
so that the latter would remain useful as an ally against America’s regional enemies, 
the U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China. 
In this complicated picture, the land irrigated by the Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage was potentially important in any attempts to alter the balance of power in 
the countryside, as advocates of reform, such as I.H. Qureshi, had implied.  Sindhi 
zamindars, however, retained a definite influence on land policy through their 
membership of the Legislative Assembly, as well as their social power in their own 
localities.  When the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage was opened in 1955, the 
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relationship between government, landlords and tenants still remained a source of 
tension and dispute.  The recent truce between the centre and the Sind legislature, 
which Khuhro again headed by now, could not overcome the importance of the 
tropes of the ‘common man’ and ‘the refugee’ as the ultimate subjects of national 
progress.  At the barrage’s ceremonial opening in March the new Governor-General, 
Ghulam Mohammad, began his speech by declaring that "nothing gives me greater 
pleasure than to watch the completion of a project which directly benefits the 
common man, and is destined to produce more food for Pakistan's millions whose 
welfare is very dear to my heart."29 The Governor-General went on to emphasize the 
improvements in food supply that the barrage would deliver, and to place the 
barrage in the context of his government's wider economic and development 
policies.  All of these statements emphasized the role of the central government in 
promoting economic and industrial progress in general, and agricultural 
development in particular.  He weighed into the debate on land allocation by 
declaring that  
in distributing land care should be taken that we do not give such land to big 
landlords and thus add to our difficulties.  *…+  In the past, I am afraid, there 
has been some lack of fair play in this regard, and I do hope and believe that 
the government of Sind shall strain every nerve to mend the conditions and 
improve the distribution in the best interest of the common man*.+ *…+  The 
common man, whether a refugee or a local, is the core of our nation and all 
our schemes and projects must aim at ameliorating the hardships of his day to 
day life.30  
This implied criticism of the Sind government suggested a deep breach 
between the centre’s vision for the project, and the province’s.   Appeals to the 
‘common man’ were perhaps particularly important at that moment because 
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Ghulam Mohammad, having made plain his attitude towards democracy by 
dismissing Nazimuddin from the premiership in 1953, had also dismissed the first 
Constituent Assembly in October 1954, in response to its attempts to curb some of 
his powers.31  By emphasising the state's relationship with everyday citizens, Ghulam 
Mohammad sought to demonstrate a direct identification with the people outside 
the political classes, and so claim a populist legitimacy for his administration.  In 
effect, Ghulam Mohammad implied that the modernist and progressive military and 
civil bureaucracy ought to rule a people who were incapable of managing barrage 
lands ‘fairly’.  This certainly echoed the common British official opinion that Sindhi 
zamindars were not capable of managing their own affairs under barrage conditions, 
and similar accusations made by the anti-separation lobby during the separation of 
Sind debates in the 1930s, as well as I.H. Qureshi’s views.  In fact, it re-articulated 
contemporary arguments in support of land reform that had not been supported by 
significant action on the part of either provincial or central governments.   
Sections of the press seemed to take such rhetoric at face value, and 
supported it enthusiastically.  The Karachi-based weekly Commerce, for instance, 
sought (rather imaginatively) to frame Ghulam Muhammad’s speech in a wider 
context of socio-economic change in the countryside: 
The Governor General did not say this in so many words but we have no 
doubt that he felt it as keenly as many people do that in resisting agrarian 
reforms in the country the feudal lords were precipitating conditions which 
would in the end spell a disaster for them.32  
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Here, the use of the word ‘feudal’ suggested an open conflict between the old and 
the new: the image was not of a class struggle between big landlords and their 
worker-haris, but of an endangered reactionary group fighting a rearguard action 
against the natural – and national – march of progress.  Conversely, the state's 
representative, the Governor-General, was associated with that progress.  But in 
reality very little provision had been made for protecting agricultural labour or 
tenants in the barrage area, and in fact the Sind government had not even 
formulated plans for settling haris onto the 100,000 acres which had been allotted 
to them in 1951.  Commerce’s declaration against ‘feudals’ was a reaction to the vast 
strength of landlords in rural Sind, rather than indicative of a serious challenge to 
that power. 
Land under the One Unit administration 
In October 1955, the establishment of One Unit brought Sind barrage projects under 
the purview of the new Government of West Pakistan, which had the potential to 
ease the deadlock between different rural interests, and between the central and 
provincial governments.  Now, representatives from outside Sind could ask 
questions in the new Provincial Assembly about barrage land, and the budget for 
development, agriculture, and related provincial matters was to be voted on by an 
elective body in which individuals representing Sind constituencies were a minority.  
Sindhi zamindars would no longer dominate the main political forum for the drafting 
of provincial policy, and lost their legislative veto over proposals that they felt would 
harm their interests, such as the allocation of barrage land to haris or non-Sindhis.  A 
group of Sindhi politicians,  comprising three central ministers including Khuhro 
(who, ironically, had been crucial in pushing One Unit through the Sind Assembly in 
1955), as well as several provincial ministers, attempted to dismantle the scheme by 
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nominating candidates for election to the Central and Provincial Assemblies on the 
ticket of breaking up One Unit.  In practical terms It had no effect since Martial Law 
was imposed, and the Assemblies dissolved, shortly afterwards, but did express the 
dissatisfaction of Sindhi politicians with the new arrangements.33  On the other 
hand, Sindhi haris did not necessarily fare any better under the new dispensation.   
One Unit was opposed by G.M. Syed’s hardline Sind Awami Mahaz, as well as the 
Sind Hari Committee and the Awami League.34   After several years of One Unit 
administration, the Sindhi Hari Movement leader and leftist politician Hyder Bux 
Jatoi asserted that "One Unit operation is the most outstanding expression of anti-
democracy in Pakistan. [...]  It is not a mere administrative measure but it conceals 
and reveals forms of local imperialism”, and that the best and largest blocs of new 
land in Sind were being granted to non-Sindhi officers, merchants, capitalists, and 
landlords.35   
However, despite opposition from politically-aware Sindhis, the change in 
how Sind was governed had little effect on the former province’s agricultural areas 
during the mid-late 1950s.  It would not be until Ayub Khan came to power in 1958 
that the true administrative potential of One Unit – its ability to flatten the 
opposition of minority groups such as Sindhis – was fulfilled in combination with 
dictatorial powers at the centre.  Yet lands commanded by the Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage and even the Sukkur Barrage remained unallocated despite One Unit’s 
promise of integrated development.  Instead, continued exhortations from 
Pakistan’s political leaders to speed up allocation and colonization only masked their 
deference to fellow landlords and failure to formulate a clear allocation policy.  Even 
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had a clear policy been available to the officers responsible for settlement, they 
lacked the necessary manpower and resources to do the work of distributing 
roughly 600,000 acres of idle Sind lands.  Rather than relieving officers of local 
zamindars’ influence, the bottleneck caused by red tape and poor inter-
departmental co-ordination was worsened by the need to consult with provincial 
headquarters in Lahore to resolve relatively minor matters, where decision-making 
was slowed by the Government of West Pakistan’s responsibility for such a large 
area.36   
The centre had long viewed this with little sympathy.  At the foundation-
stone-laying ceremony for the Gudu Barrage in 1957, President Mirza had 
complained that colonization work on the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage was lagging 
and causing a “colossal waste of available land and water which we can ill-afford in 
our present state of acute want”, and exhorted the provincial government to do 
better on the Gudu Barrage, with special consideration for poor and middle-class 
people.37  Such pressure from the centre had no discernable effect and by June 
1958, despite almost three years of One Unit administration, colonization  work on 
Sind barrage lands remained cripplingly slow and piecemeal: only 216,000 of 
2,500,000 acres of government-owned land was ready for cultivation.  “Disposal of 
these lands,” reported the U.S. Embassy, 
touches directly upon the sensitive issue of the land tenure system and 
involves conflicting interest group seeking to gain the major share of the new 
lands. The result of this clash between Sindhi landlords, Punjabi landlords, 
refugee claimants, the military, and the landless peasants has been no policy. 
Despite all the statements made by political leaders about speeding up the 
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distribution and rapid cultivation of new lands, the government's action has 
been just the opposite - to slow down the exploitation of the new areas.38 
At that time, only 100,000 acres had been designated for colonization by Sind haris, 
and 67,500 for Sind landlords.  Moreover, a Board of Revenue member admitted 
that no firm policy for the disposal of Sukkur Barrage land existed.  Nobody seemed 
to know how much land was available.  Barrage officials complained that 
effectiveness of the administration and barrage operations were badly impaired by 
political dithering and by the special privileges that zamindars were able to obtain.39 
Similarly, the wider question of land reform in general fared no better in a 
unified West Pakistan than it had under the previous provincial arrangements.  This 
had been demonstrated during the first two years of One Unit’s existence.  Despite 
the oft-expressed concern of Dr. Khan Sahib, Frontier hero and the West Pakistan 
Chief Minister from 1955 to 1957, for the ‘common man’, the Secretary for Refugees 
and Rehabilitation, M. Masood, had complained in 1956 that there was little hope 
for the working and labouring classes from any political quarter.40  In July of the 
same year, huge protests were staged, with the support of opposition political 
parties, by tenants who had been ejected from land that they had been cultivating in 
the Punjab, by refugee landlords who had been allotted the same land.  The West 
Pakistan Government’s handling of these protests demonstrated the Ministry’s 
                                                          
38
 Karachi despatch 1124, 06.06.1958, Central Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 890D.16/6-658, R.G. 
59, U.S.N.A.  The previous year, the U.S. Consul General had reported an impasse between 
politicians and officials regarding the distribution of Ghulam Muhammad Barrage lands, 
“which the politicians from Sind wish to keep in their control but which Lahore Secretariat 
officials, led by Mr. [Sheikh Ikram-ul-] Haque [a Civil Service of Pakistan official who had 
recently been elevated to the rank of Additional Chief Secretary with direct responsibility 
over the Food and Agriculture Departments, and had the right to demand co-operation from 
the Finance and Irrigation Departments], desire to parcel out immediately to presently-
landless tenants”.  Lahore despatch 186, 29.05.1957, 890D.20/5-2957, Central Decimal Files, 
1955-1959, R.G. 59, U.S.N.A.  However, neither Haque’s appointment, nor the handing over 
of colonization duties to the newly-formed West Pakistan Agricultural Development 
Corporation, made a significant short-term impact on colonization work. 
39
 Karachi despatch 1124, 06.06.1958. 
40
 Lahore despatch 238, 25.04.1956, 890D.16/4-2556, Central Decimal Files, 1955-1959, R.G. 
59, U.S.N.A. 
 230 
 
refusal to countenance radical reforms in land tenure, which matched that of the 
earlier provincial governments.  Dr. Khan Sahib offered to have the ejected tenants 
resettled on state land, but rejected most of their demands to give ejected tenants 
greater rights in future, including that all state lands should be reserved for ejected 
tenants rather than publicly auctioned.  The majority of the ejected tenants who had 
come to Lahore to agitate accepted this and returned to their villages, but the 
remainder attempted a march on the Secretariat, and were promptly arrested and 
jailed.41  By offering the agitators individual resettlement but not putting in place 
measures for the future, Khan Sahib demonstrated that his Ministry was concerned 
chiefly with maintaining law and order in the short-term, and not with long-term 
reform.  The deal that he struck with the agitators, together with the arrest of some 
of their number, removed the problem from the surface, but had no effect on the 
structural factors that kept rural labourers insecure and at the mercy of landlords.  
Pakistan’s leaders remained, in the words of a U.K. trade organisation report, inept 
stewards of “the most valuable portion of the country's inheritance: its agricultural 
resources.”42 
The central importance of land was certainly not disputed by Pakistanis, but 
Sindhi zamindars remained bullish about the prospect of reform.  At a Government 
of West Pakistan conference in August 1956, recurring shortages of rice and wheat – 
and pressures brought on the Government of Pakistan by the U.S. International Co-
operation Administration – had reached such an acute point that forced the Prime 
Minister to change the agenda of a provincial conference on the Five-Year Plan to a 
planning session for increasing food output.  Demonstrating the volatility of the 
subject, Abdus Sattar Pirzada, the West Pakistan Minster of Agriculture and a 
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prominent Sindhi zamindar, threatened to withdraw if the subject of land tenure 
reform were broached.  The issue threatened to split West Pakistan politically from 
top to bottom, following the Planning Board’s recommendations that the ceiling for 
landholdings should be only 150 irrigated acres – proposals resented by the 
powerful landowning classes, headed by Firoz Khan Noon in the Punjab and by 
Pirzada in Sind.43   
The appointment of Ahsan ud-Din as Secretary of Agriculture at the 
beginning of 1957 held out some hope for more effective agricultural 
development,44 but there was still no senior officer appointed to oversee exclusively 
the colonization of irrigated but underdeveloped areas, such as those in Hyderabad 
and Khairpur Divisions, irrigated from the Ghulam Muhammad and Sukkur 
Barrages.45  U.S. diplomats continued to encourage the West Pakistan administration 
to impose scientific agriculture on a large scale,46 but skirted around the issue of 
land reform.  In May, the Lahore Secretariat announced that a West Pakistan 
Agricultural Development corporation would be created mainly to see to the 
colonizing of Ghulam Muhammad Barrage lands, despite the opposition of 
politicians based in Sind, who wished to keep control of the project.47  This more 
bellicose tendency on the part of the bureaucracy was confirmed in December 
when, at a conference on agrarian questions in Karachi, the Assistant Chief (Land 
Reforms) of the Planning Board argued for “a bold and realistic approach” which 
eschewed half-hearted measures, noting that the only significant land reform in 
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West Pakistan since independence had been the abolition of jagirs, and some 
legislation to ameliorate the lot of the peasant.48  Even these measures had 
predated One Unit, however, showing that West Pakistan Province had been no 
more successful in resolving land questions than had its predecessor provinces.  
Rather than allowing voices to be heard that were more representative of the West 
Pakistani population as a whole, One Unit seemed merely to have forced landlords 
across the new province to join forces to maintain the status quo. 
Despite landlords’ evident power, however, the state continued to be 
identified with control over valuable agricultural land.  At a Lahore meeting in March 
1958 the Kisan Conference, a peasant organization, demanded land reforms and 
that state lands should be allocated to tenants and landless labourers, rather than 
auctioned off to the highest bidder, echoing the demands of the ejected tenants 
who had marched on Lahore in 1956.  The Conference argued that Ghulam 
Muhammad Barrage lands in particular should be distributed to local haris, and on 
no account to big landlords.  The meeting also passed a resolution in favour of the 
One Unit scheme, on the basis that it would help unite the labouring and working 
classes throughout West Pakistan, and give them the strength to demand change.49  
The unification of West Pakistan presented the Kisan Conference with a structure 
which, although created by the state and not by popular forces, could be used as a 
platform for political mobilization.  The Ghulam Muhammad Barrage, by dint of the 
large area of new land that it irrigated, became a focal point of this mobilization. 
Ghulam Muhammad Barrage land continued to be a topic of peasant and 
tenant protest.  Shortly after the Kisan Conference had concluded its meeting, a 
body of at least 1,000 peasants marched on Karachi to protest against eviction from 
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evacuee lands that they had previously been allotted. These lands had now been re-
assigned to refugee claimants, and the haris turned off the land.  The protest’s 
leaders, headed by National Awami Party General Secretary M.H. Usmani and 
supported by Sindhi nationalist G.M. Syed, met President Mirza to request that the 
peasants be given the opportunity to buy the lands which they had been cultivating.  
Refugee claimants, they said, should be compensated with cash from the resulting 
proceeds of sale, or settled on barrage land which had been reserved for haris but 
that were currently empty.50  That another movement of the lower rural social 
orders asked the state to dispose of barrage lands in a particular way (even if they 
suggested allocating them to refugees rather than indigenous haris) showed that the 
lands were viewed as a resource, which the state could allocate freely.  This 
interpretation of barrage lands’ status was radically different to that of Sindhi 
zamindars, who continued to dig their heels in and demand the lands for 
themselves.   
Such protests were rare, and had little effect on everyday life even within 
Sind, let alone on a national scale.  Although ‘the common man’ was a convenient 
figure for politicians and others to call on, real-life haris had virtually no influence on 
the formulation of either land allocation or land reform policy.  Concessions to them 
were framed as boons granted by the government as a benevolent power, just as 
had been the case under the British colonial administration.  However, Syed’s 
proposal was important in identifying the state as the arbiter between different 
interest groups such as refugees and haris; and it emphasized the fact that the 
demands made by these groups on the state could continue to be articulated in 
terms of land.  This apportioned a level of influence to the government which was 
not, perhaps, borne out by the realities of local politics in rural areas.  On the other 
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hand, the very fact of resistance to the uneasy alliance between bureaucrats and 
zamindar-politicians by which they maintained power over subaltern groups served 
as a reminder that people could not be manipulated quite as easily as the earth and 
concrete that had made the barrages possible.  
Colonization and land reforms under Martial Law  
The ‘democratic’ dispensation of the 1950s, then, had failed either to resolve 
tensions between agrarian groups, or to make a success of the barrage projects in 
Sind.  Towards the end of the decade, the political arena changed markedly with 
President Mirza’s declaration of Martial Law.    Soon afterwards, on 27 October, 
Mirza himself was removed from power and exiled by General Mohammed Ayub 
Khan, the commander in chief of the armed forces.  Ayub promised a new beginning 
for Pakistan: to sweep away the corruption of the old order, and to re-start the 
stalled nation-building process.  The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on 
the administration’s attempts to locate its legitimacy in effectively promoting 
programmes related to land distribution and reform.  Its ineffectuality in getting 
barrage land distributed and colonized very starkly demonstrated, however, the 
difficulties involved in translating this rhetoric into reality, even with the 
authoritarian impetus of a military government. Ironically, the irrigation system, 
which the government so celebrated, proved a powerful rallying point around which 
the 'old forces' of corrupt, unco-operative bureaucrats and landlord-dominated rural 
politics continued to assert themselves against reforming drives from the centre.  At 
the same time, the personal identification of Ayub with ‘development’ helped to 
over-inflate the administration’s sense of its own ability to make concrete 
achievements.51   
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In the immediate aftermath of the 1958 coup, however, it seemed that 
progress would be made in both colonizing barrage land and re-distributing that 
which was already colonized.  The concentration of executive authority in Ayub’s 
hands and the dissolution of the landlord-dominated provincial assemblies, it was 
assumed, would potentially make it easier for the executive to push through the 
distribution of land to cultivators.52  One of Ayub's first acts was to re-issue an order 
given by President Mirza that all barrage lands to which water could be brought 
should be colonized within three months.  On 19 November 1958, after Mirza had 
been exiled, a directive was issued to the Governor of West Pakistan on behalf of 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator and new President, Ayub Khan.  It reiterated 
that all irrigable land on the Thal, Ghulam Muhammad Barrage, Sukkur Barrage, 
Nara Canal, and Abbasia Canal projects, and those lying in riverine areas, should be 
distributed within three months. Six special colonization officers were to be 
appointed to speed up the process. The Governor was also ordered “to increase 
agricultural production, particularly of food crops”, and to ensure that the provincial 
government carried out any orders of the Central Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
relating to agricultural production.53   
Martial Law, then, initially seemed to promise a beneficial effect on 
agriculture.  This was particularly the case in Sind, where zamindars had previously 
retained especially great influence over the working of the local bureaucracy.54  
Within a month of the coup, a U.S. consular officer reflected the image of energy 
and efficiency that the administration wished to project by reporting that, although 
action was still limited by a lack of proper co-ordination at the local level, Martial 
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Law had instilled a more determined approach to developing the Ghulam 
Muhammad Barrage.55  This impetus was maintained well into the following year, 
when the establishment of the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage Land Utilization Board, 
a government body with responsibility for barrage development and operative at 
both national and local levels, marked progress for the project.56  A smoother 
administrative process, which removed the need to refer allocation work back to 
Lahore for approval, was expected to speed up work.57  The engineers in charge of 
the Sukkur Barrage also reported that their system’s operational efficiency had been 
greatly increased following the removal of the “interference of zamindar-politicians” 
under Martial Law, although at Sukkur the administration itself did not seem to be 
rejuvenated as much as that in charge of the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage.58   
On 15 October 1958, the same day on which Ayub publicly promised speedy 
barrage-land cultivation to the press in Rawalpindi, a plan was made public in 
Hyderabad for the disposal of 41,000 acres of new land in the Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage command.  This included 25,000 acres for auction, and 16,000 acres for 
long-term leasing, comprising about a quarter of the new lands expected to be 
released for cultivation that revenue year.  The land would be split into parcels of 
various sizes – 32, 64, 128, 192 and 240 acres – which were auctioned.  The 
successful bidder would have to deposit 25% of the price in advance, with the 
remainder paid in instalments; new owners would be given two years' grace before 
the first instalment was due.59   The relatively large blocs available and the high price 
                                                          
55
 Karachi despatch 420, 05.11.1958, ‘500 C.E.R.P. October-December 1958’, General Records 
1949-61, Karachi Embassy 1956-1958, R.G. 84, U.S.N.A. 
56
 Karachi despatch 902, 07.04.1959, 890D.16/4-759, Mission to Pakistan, Executive Office 
Subject Files 1955-1957, R.G. 59, U.S.N.A. 
57
 Karachi despatch 1083, 27.05.1959, 890D.16/5-2759, Mission to Pakistan, Executive Office 
Subject Files 1955-1957, R.G. 59, U.S.N.A.  
58
 Karachi despatch 902, 07.04.1959, 890D.16/4-759. 
59
 Karachi despatch 373, 20.10.1958, 500 CERP October-December 1958, General Records 
1949-61, Karachi Embassy 1956-1958, R.G. 84, U.S.N.A. 
 237 
 
of the land, roughly twice that charged for lands allocated directly by the 
Government, suggested that the buyers were expected to be 'serious' farmers, able 
to call on capital to buy the land and begin working it, and the manpower to farm 
large areas.  However, the government’s oft-professed concern for the ‘common 
man’60 also found expression in the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage Land Utilization 
Committee’s meeting at Hyderabad in late October, which decided that 35,000 acres 
should be reserved for 2,000 landless cultivator refugee families currently residing in 
the Karachi Administration area.61  In December, the Committee announced the 
reservation of 65,000 acres for haris, 5,000 for tribesmen, 4,000 for ex-servicemen 
and existing military personnel, and 20,000 for local landowners.  Other reservations 
included 24,000 acres to be disposed of by auction.62   
The huge proportion of land reserved for haris suggested a potential break 
with the tradition of shoring up local landlords’ power.  In early 1959, the 
reservation announced for haris was even more generous at over 300,000 acres.63  
Remarkably, much of this land seems actually to have been distributed to its 
intended recipients: the U.S. embassy reported in February 1959 that most Ghulam 
Muhammad Barrage land was being distributed to haris who lived near to the 
newly-irrigated lands.64  Similarly, by May the same year, 1,100 refugee families 
were shifted from Karachi to the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage area, all of whom 
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were previously farmers or unskilled labourers.  This was reportedly the first time 
that Karachi refugees had been settled in interior Sind.65   
However, the government’s pro-hari policy for Ghulam Muhammad Barrage 
land soon proved to be a chimera, and by the autumn of 1959 the tenor of proposed 
land allocations had undergone a startling volte-face.  The reservation for ex-
servicemen had been raised to 100,000 acres, and a new category of grants for ex-
civil servants had been created, standing at 180,000 acres.  With special allocations 
for other outside groups – refugees, Bengalis and Pathan tribesmen – the share for 
local haris and zamindars was much reduced.66  The allocations for ex-civil servants 
drew criticism from the Star, a Karachi-based newspaper that tended to reflect 
views of affluent refugee commercial groups, on the basis that civil servants should 
not be given agricultural land when the country was in the throes of a food crisis.67  
More generally, Dawn criticized the lack of support given to Ghulam Muhammad 
Barrage colonists, arguing that the poor condition of allocated land and the 
prohibitive rate of hiring government-owned tractors to do the work was causing 
great hardship to less-wealthy allottees.68 
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The lack of support given to settlers on barrage land was exemplified by a 
sequence of events that began in 1960.  In January of that year, 81 Bengali peasant 
families, the first of approximately 350, arrived in Karachi by ship from East Pakistan.  
Most were refugees who had either been landless before Partition or who had not 
been given land in East Pakistan after migrating there.  They had volunteered to be 
resettled in West Pakistan, and were collectively to be given 10,000 acres in the 
Ghulam Muhammad Barrage command.  While the scheme dealt with a relatively 
small number of families and quantity of land, its importance to the Government of 
Pakistan as a social experiment, and a way to publicize harmonious east-west wing 
relations, was indicated by the presence of the central Ministers for Refugees and 
Rehabilitation, Food and Agriculture, and Industries at a grand reception for the 
settlers at Karachi’s Keamari docks.  General Azam Khan, the Rehabilitation Minister, 
told the settlers that their arrival in West Pakistan proved beyond doubt that 
Pakistan was “one nation”.  A message from the Governor of West Pakistan, the 
Nawab of Kalabagh, was read out, stating that the allocation of West Pakistan lands 
to East Pakistan people was an “index of the unity of Pakistan”.  Positive responses 
to the arrival in the West Pakistani press, apparently engineered by the press 
department, confirmed the public relations value of the exercise.69   
By March, this rosy glow had already faded as the scheme foundered.  A 
Dawn article criticized a perceived lack of sympathy for the settlers on the part of 
local officials, a lack of planning for the settlements, which forced the settlers to live 
in rude huts with poor facilities, and the allocation of non-perennial land, which was 
often saline and of poor quality.  The article carried the taluka revenue officer’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
the sale of barrage land to relatively wealthy ex-military and civil service officers would 
increase the land’s value and therefore boost government revenues.  Karachi despatch 191, 
26.08.1959, 890D.16/8-2659, Mission to Pakistan, Executive Office Subject Files 1955-1957, 
R.G. 59, U.S.N.A. 
69
 Karachi despatch 577, 07.01.1960, ‘570.1 People, Race Problems, Refugees 1959-61’, 
General Records, 1949-1961, Karachi Embassy 1959-1961, R.G. 84, U.S.N.A. 
 240 
 
retort that the settlers’ representatives had taken soil samples and approved the 
site beforehand, and that hard work would render the lands productive.70  The 
correspondent privately told American officials, however, that the West Pakistani 
officers had shown open contempt for the settlers.71  The settlers’ complaints 
proved a thorn in the side for local officials, and the families were moved to 
different lands, which Dawn subsequently reported were the best in the Ghulam 
Muhammad Barrage zone.72  By 1963, frustration with the ongoing problems 
presented by the scheme led the Governor of West Pakistan to complain privately 
that the settlers themselves were to blame for the failure.73  
Blaming the settlers for their own predicament became standard in 
government circles over the following years, and in a 1967 cabinet meeting it was 
stated that while the scheme "was started with lofty ideas [...]  Unfortunately the 
cultivators from East Pakistan were a poor lot.  Most of them were urban 
adventurers without any agricultural background.”  116 families at that point 
remained on their allocated lands, and had established themselves; of the 
remainder, some had returned to East Pakistan, and the rest had migrated to 
Karachi, where they were “creating difficulties”.  In doing so, the settlers had joined 
forces with approximately 1,400 East Pakistani families who had settled in Karachi, 
but had lost their homes during a severe flooding of the Lyari River; together, the 
East Pakistanis occupied parts of Nazimabad and agitated against the District 
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Commissioner’s attempts to resettle them in Korangi township.74  In combination 
with extremely negative reports of the settlers’ difficulties in the East Pakistani 
press, the whole settlement scheme had become a political disaster.  A.H.M. Sham-
ud Doha, a Bengali politician, went so far as to state in the National Assembly in June 
1967 that the families who had deserted the lands were not agriculturalists but 
“exploiters”.  Those who had wanted to settle down, he said, had done so 
successfully.75   
These events highlighted the important role that the Sind barrages had in 
creating a space in which dramas of nationhood could be played out, demonstrating 
the importance of irrigated land in underpinning the state’s capacity to impose its 
will on social and political groups.  Successful or not, this scheme was rendered 
possible only by the changes wrought on the Sindhi physical environment by the 
technologies of barrage-fed perennial irrigation.  Thus the facilities provided by the 
barrage could be invested with very specific political meaning: an ideal of nationalist 
unity, which fell apart in the execution.  The settlement of Bengalis can be seen as 
primarily a political project and, as a scheme involving a relatively small amount of 
land, its importance resided in its symbolic value.  It would be false to treat the 
scheme’s failure as analogous to the inter-wing tensions which led to the breakup of 
Pakistan in 1971: the settlements foundered on a specific combination of official 
hostility towards the settlers, the latters’ dissatisfaction with their lot, and the 
condition of Ghulam Muhammad Barrage land, which was not by any means a site 
conducive to making an easy living.  The contemptuous attitude towards the 
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Bengalis shown by lower officials in Sind was, however, reflected in inter-wing 
relations at higher levels.76   
The importation of East Pakistani settlers into Sind demonstrated the 
difficulties of treating land as a resource in a nation-making project, but on a 
relatively small scale.  A much larger endeavour had, soon after the coup in 1958, 
been encapsulated in one of the Ayub administration’s key programmes: West 
Pakistan’s first supposedly comprehensive land reform package.  A Commission was 
set up in late October to investigate the question of land ownership and tenancy,77 
and reported as early as January 1959.   While playing on the idea of the common 
man, the resulting policy was, as Jalal has argued, really intended to create a rural 
middle-class that would owe its position and its allegiance to the centralized state.78  
Talbot, too, has highlighted the conservative nature of the reforms, and their failure 
to break the power of the landlord class.79 However, the symbolic value of land 
reforms should not be underestimated: this was an important way in which Ayub’s 
administration sought legitimacy in the face of his abrogation of the constitution, 
and it won the support of important social groups.  The picture gleaned from foreign 
consular sources was of a public and press hungry for land reforms, pitted against 
big landowners who would fight reforms tooth and nail.  The Land Reforms 
Commission’s tricky balancing act was to satisfy the former without unduly upsetting 
the latter.   
To this end, the administration made use of its power over the press to 
inflate the reforms’ expected importance.  As a U.S. report noted, the  
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regime controls media of communications and propaganda and will be able to 
present its program as fulfilment [of its] land reform pledge and as proof it [is] 
serious about its intentions [to] break up [the] estates [of] those large 
landowners who associated with past governments and who wielded [a] 
disproportionate amount of political power. 
Consequently, a Planning Board source expected a “whitewash job”.80   Successive 
delays in reporting suggested that the Commission was finding the large number of 
technical problems difficult to resolve, especially compensation for lands that the 
government was to acquire, and methods for preventing illegal transfers of land 
from a large landowner to family members, which were still taking place in West 
Pakistan despite the government’s threats of retribution.81   
The Commission was also hampered by well-placed landlords, who made 
cases for conservative attitudes towards reform.  Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Ayub’s 
Commerce Minister and the only landlord in the Cabinet, argued that too-stringent 
land reforms would destroy zamindari as an institution capable of maintaining order 
in the countryside and encourage supposedly Communist elements.  As a Sindhi 
himself, with large holdings near Larkana, Bhutto had a significant personal stake in 
limiting the effects of land reforms.  His estimation of the problems likely to arise 
from a weakening of landlord power, if sincerely meant, was perhaps influenced by 
the relatively greater role that big zamindars had traditionally played in Sind.  G.S. 
Kehar, a member of the Commission, agreed that too-radical reforms would disrupt 
the agrarian social structure, and advanced the economic argument that 
fragmentation and a consequent fall in production might ensue.   Less-well-educated 
landlords throughout the province failed to appreciate that the idea of land reform 
had taken root in the popular imagination, and that the public expected to see a 
significant trimming of their holdings, but most Sindhi zamindars accepted that 
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some reduction of their holdings was inevitable.  Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, one of 
three brothers who led the Mazari tribe in Jacobabad District and parts of Punjab 
and Bahawalpur, had moderated his previous staunch insistence on the status quo 
and admitted the need for some redistribution, but argued that reform had to be 
systematic and that landowners should be properly compensated.82  Indeed, 
newspapers such as Dawn had consistently opposed landlord power throughout the 
1950s, and sentiments such as the following cannot be attributed solely to the 
administration’s controls: 
owners of big land holdings are 'flooding' the Land Reforms Commission with 
representations aimed at perpetuation of the unnatural rights and privileges 
which, by unscrupulous use of their enormous wealth and influence, they 
have been enjoying during the previous regimes, to the detriment of the 
economic health, social stability and political progress of the country.83  
When it came, the Commission’s report encapsulated the tensions and 
contradictions inherent in a programme that aimed at a partial rationalization of the 
country’s economic resources, here represented by productive agricultural land, 
within the limits of politically desirable action.  In the name of “ensuring better 
production and social justice”,84 as the Commission’s rubric phrased it, the 
Commissioners announced their intention to lay the foundation for a strong rural 
middle class whose members would operate their own farms.85  Few 
contemporaries could have missed the fact that this would have an especially great 
effect on the areas with the largest estates, namely Sind and southern parts of the 
Punjab, and re-model these ‘backward’ areas in the social image of the canal 
colonies, which remained the west wing’s agricultural heartland.  These regional 
variations in cause and effect were masked by the language of efficiency and the 
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idea of rational resource usage, which allowed one ‘scientific’ standard to be applied 
to significantly different cases.  To justify the resumption of land in excess of the 
ceilings that would be laid down by the government, the Commission deployed a 
moral argument, stating that, since land lying in large estates often went under-
utilized, “No responsible society can allow this basic source of wealth to be used 
inefficiently or indifferently.”86   
The Commission’s report, like the international agency reports discussed in 
the previous chapter, was an example of rationalism par excellence.  In basing their 
recommendations on a calculation of how much land would form an ‘economic 
holding’, and the desired minimum income for an individual farm family,87 the 
Commissioners took an economized view of the phenomenon of land ownership and 
cultivation.  This was deliberately opposed to the cultural value of landownership 
that often lay behind the vast size of estates in Sind and southern Punjab.88  
Consequently, the Commission made a number of recommendations.  These 
included the imposition of limits on the amount of land that individuals could own; 
the resumption of the excess land by the state for redistribution to landless tenants 
and owner-cultivators who could not make a living from their plots; increased 
security of tenure for tenant-farmers; and the abolition of jagirs and other interests 
that came between the state and the cultivator.  These measures were intended to 
encourage both owners and tenants to feel that they had an increased stake in the 
land, and to consequently put more work and capital (if they possessed the latter) 
into making the land more productive.  Further recommendations that the 
fragmentation of holdings should be banned and that fragmented holdings should 
be consolidated into ‘economic units’ spoke to the same ideal of efficient farming 
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that had underpinned the theory, although perhaps not the practice, of 
development work in the barrage commands.   
These recommendations were predicated on an idealized model of scientific 
owner-cultivated farming, which was accorded a greater economic and moral value 
than the system of land ownership and tenure that prevailed in Sind.  The idea of the 
‘lazy Sindhi zamindar’, formulated in colonial times, remained just below the surface 
of this debate.  Yet, like the colonial government’s approach to the management of 
land and landowners, the Commission’s recommendations necessarily entailed 
compromise between conflicting viewpoints and imperatives.  "Unfortunately”, the 
Commissioners wrote, “the requirements of social justice and the interests of 
economic development are not always identical and to achieve both ends will need 
a delicate balancing of measures with social and economic implications".89  The 
proposed solution to the maintenance of this balance - a bolstered rural middle class 
- was conveniently also a key element in Ayub’s bid to win long-term political control 
over West Pakistan.   
On 24 January 1959, Ayub announced the Cabinet’s decisions on land 
reform, based on the Commission’s report.  As expected, the reforms cut down the 
sizes of estates, but only hit the largest landlords particularly hard.  The ceiling for 
individual holdings was fixed at a generous 500 acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of 
non-irrigated land, plus up to 150 acres for orchards.  Moreover, provisions relating 
to grants to heirs and female dependents allowed grants to exceed specified 
ceilings, providing an easy way for heads of close-knit family groups to parcel off 
land to relatives.  Excess land was to be taken over by the government; existing 
tenants would have first refusal, or the lands would be sold to other ‘deserving 
people’.  Owners would be fully compensated, though over the course of 25 years.  
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All jagirs, on the other hand, were to be abolished without compensation.  
Regarding conditions on the estates, cultivators who remained tenants would have 
full security of tenure, and a court finding would be necessary for eject a tenant.  
The consolidation of holdings would be made compulsory, and the fragmentation of 
holdings below a prescribed minimum would be forbidden, with the joint 
management of uneconomically small holdings facilitated by law.  In addition, the 
new programme would provide for adequate credit facilities, seed, fertilizers, and 
implements for new owners.90 
As a public relations exercise, the land reforms appeared to perform 
admirably.  The appetite for land reform in Sind, especially among members of the 
middle classes such as lower-level civil servants, teachers and students, was strong.  
The land reform programme was considered a major test of the administration’s 
bona fides by many politically-conscious Pakistanis,91 and support for Ayub’s 
administration among these groups was often framed in terms of opposition to the 
old powerbrokers, although some agricultural officers were rightly sceptical of the 
ability of land reforms to alter much in terms of agricultural production.92  The 
administration had enhanced its position by acting on a measure long given symbolic 
importance, and was able to claim in publicity material that Ayub’s government had 
taken “the longest and firmest stride *...+ in its drive for the uplift of the ‘small 
man’”.93  It had, however, done so without demolishing middling-landlords, who 
were potential allies of the administration.   
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As well as using the reforms to support its claims to legitimacy, Ayub’s 
government also used them to manage the balance of power in the countryside.  
The reforms sought to reduce the wealth and status, and therefore political power, 
of the big landlords while increasing that of the middling landlords; and at the same 
time to concede enough to peasants and tenants to forestall later demands for more 
radical redistribution, but without allowing rural power to shift significantly in their 
favour.  The reforms did represent a dramatic break from the inaction of previous 
Pakistani governments, but were moderate compared with reforms in other 
decolonized Asian countries.94  Neither magnates after the wadero style, nor a 
multitude of peasant-owners, but a middle-class of well-to-do gentlemen farmers 
were the main intended beneficiaries, as the Foreign Minister stated at a press 
conference on 9 February 1959.95  This was the kind of conservative constituency 
that Ayub’s administration needed to cultivate in order to garner support and make 
a bid for legitimacy without going to the polls.  Ayub made sure to curb the influence 
of the notorious ‘zamindar-politician’ before re-introducing a limited democracy 
under the Basic Democracies system.96  But the new maximum holdings were by no 
means trivial tracts of land, and the combination of high ceilings and ‘escape clauses’ 
meant that the position of the administration’s natural constituency in the 
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countryside – military officers, ex-civil servants, and urban middle classes who had 
invested in land – would not be threatened.97    
Preserving elements of the social order in rural areas was, indeed, an 
important part of the administration’s strategy for maintaining political stability.  
The decision to give existing tenants the first opportunity to buy the land that they 
had been cultivating benefited the administration by maintaining the existing social 
structure in rural areas.  The reforms aimed to minimize the disruption caused to 
already-cultivated land.  The majority of the total 2,155,000 acres resumed between 
1958-1959 had been worked under lease, so relatively few owner-cultivators were 
displaced.  Only 46,000 acres had been cultivated personally by their owners prior to 
resumption.98  More than a third of tenants, i.e. 55,000, who received land were 
allotted that which they had already been cultivating; this fixed the tenants to 
particular plots.  But while it made them owners of property with an increased stake 
in social and political orderliness, the effect on rural society was curtailed by the 
relatively tiny amount of land which former tenants received: only 7.5% of West 
Pakistan’s tenant farmers, 146,000, became landowners under the programme.  On 
a social level, the reforms maintained the private ownership and working of land as 
the norm.  They did not promote co-operative societies or the collectivization of 
agriculture, which were important contemporary ideas.   
The land reforms programme affected some areas more than others, and so 
its implications for the dynamics of rural power were regionally differentiated.  The 
clause abolishing jagirs had little impact in Punjab, where jagirdari was rare, while in 
Sind it threatened to break the economic power of powerful families such as Sind’s 
pre-British rulers, the Talpurs.  Baluchistan, too, was to be heavily affected by land 
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reforms, where the inextricability of land holdings from the tribal structure meant 
that resumptions would severely undermine the existing social order.  Leaders from 
these two provinces consequently attacked the programme in provincial terms, 
claiming that a Punjabi-dominated government was discriminating against them.99  
Moreover, Sindhis accused the Punjab of using the One Unit scheme as a cover for 
taking water from the upstream rivers, which they claimed rightfully belonged to 
Sind, and of manipulating their control of the Government of West Pakistan and the 
Agricultural Development Corporation to ensure that development schemes within 
Sind benefited Punjabis instead of Sindhis.100   
Big landlords strongly criticized the Chief Land Commissioner, I.U. Khan, a 
refugee who had a reputation for hostility towards the old landed interests,101 but 
landlords did not organise collectively to agitate against the reforms, even in Sind, 
which had by far the highest levels of resumptions.102  As late as February 1967, M.A. 
Khuhro told a British diplomat that there had never been any effective opposition to 
Ayub’s government in Sind because the big landlords, who held the political power, 
had a vested interest in co-operating with the government.103  Khuhro himself, 
despite professing sympathies with the opposition, announced later that month that 
he was joining Ayub’s Pakistan Muslim League, effectively throwing his lot in with 
the government.  Throughout the 1960s, educated and politically-aware Sindhis 
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increasingly felt marginalized by Ayub’s government;104 but, without a cohesive 
political platform from which to launch an effective protest, these leaders had little 
choice but to accept the land reforms. 
Zamindars’ failure to organize collectively was not, however, the only factor 
that allowed the land reforms some success.  The Martial Law administration did, for 
a time, wield real power, and the programme benefited from a determined 
administrative effort.105  The administration’s many concessions to big landlords also 
meant that the latter were more willing to accept the reforms, especially as the 
programme’s implementation was lenient.  In Hyderabad District, by mid-1960 only 
60% of land marked for resumption and re-allocation had actually been resumed; 
the remainder consisted mostly of waste land.  The Deputy Commissioner of 
Nawabshah District reported that the clause allowing zamindars to choose which 
lands should be resumed had resulted in the resumption of small, scattered patches 
throughout their holdings, rather than of large contiguous blocks that could form an 
‘economic holding’.  In Sukkur District, moreover, the land of only 11 zamindars had 
actually been resumed, amounting to 23,031 acres; a further 190,331 acres of jagir 
land had been resumed.  While officials in Sukkur itself were convinced that 
zamindars were finished as political powers in the area, lower-ranking officials 
outside the city disagreed sharply, arguing that in most cases zamindars had been 
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able to retain control over much of their lands, especially by transferring them to 
family members.106   
The administration’s success in handling the balance of power in the 
countryside across West Pakistan appeared to have been significant in the short to 
medium terms.  By the mid-1960s, Sindhi landlords were typically more interested in 
maintaining their links with the establishment than with advancing the cause of 
Sindhi autonomy.107  The division between urban and rural areas remained strong, 
and militated against effective organisation on the basis of a separate Sindhi 
identity.  Indeed, a United States Information Service tour of northern Sind in 
January 1959 found that, under the Martial Law government, opposition to 
outsiders coming into Sind had begun to dissipate among middle-class groups such 
as students, local government officials, schoolteachers, and townsmen.  The same 
was true of peasants.  Accompanying this ostensible change of heart was an 
increased recognition that Pakistan’s development should be national and not 
regional.  Locals who were interviewed blamed (perhaps not surprisingly) former 
provincial politicians for agitations against Punjabis and for asserting a Sindhi over a 
Pakistani identity.  On the other hand, however, actual development in the local 
area remained slow: efforts by government departments to bring more land in the 
region of Sukkur and Jacobabad under cultivation appeared unsuccessful, and 
indeed they would remain so until the new Gudu Barrage could increase the water 
supply.108 
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Colonizing the Gudu Barrage    
While the land reforms programme was underway in late 1950s-early 1960s, the 
administration’s supposed commitment to the ‘common man’ was again tested 
when the Gudu Barrage was completed in 1962, and the land that it irrigated had to 
be allotted.  Construction did not begin on the Gudu Barrage in earnest until 1957, 
because the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage, which brought water to the beleaguered 
new metropolis of Karachi as well as to agriculture, had emerged as the firm priority 
for successive governments in Sind.  Consequently, decisions concerning the 
disposal of the land that the Gudu Barrage was to irrigate were not taken until the 
early 1960s.  It was, therefore, the first major irrigation-extension project for which 
Ayub’s administration had the chance to determine the intended political effects.   
The One Unit administration and Martial Law’s silencing of effective political 
opposition had gone some way towards making the land opened by the Gudu 
scheme a ‘blank canvas’ on which a centrally-defined ‘national interest’ could be 
projected.  This was visible in the relatively high proportion of land that was 
reserved for groups with no prior interest in Sindhi agricultural land.  When the 
Gudu Barrage opened, the grant policy for the project’s 111,000 acres of state lands 
stood at 70% for locals, current government servants, and other people from 
outside the barrage command zone; and 20% for the settlement of persons 
displaced by the Mangla and Tarbela dam projects, and the Islamabad city-
construction project, along with retired government servants.  Dawn made a plea 
for the remaining 10% to be apportioned to residents of Lower Sind who, historically 
dependent on the Indus downstream of Kotri, had been left with severely reduced 
water supplies after the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage diverted the river water away 
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to fill its canals; and for the East Pakistanis in the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage 
command who faced ongoing problems with their land.109   
The allocation of land to people affected by other development schemes 
suggested that Sind barrage land was perceived as a resource that could be used to 
absorb the ill-effects of state activity elsewhere within its territory.  The Islamabad 
scheme was designed to provide the country with a federal capital outside the 
crowded environs of Karachi, and so the link between the project and the nation 
was clear.  The city was to be a capital for the whole nation, even though it since has 
been suggested that its location in Punjab was partly motivated by the desire of the 
Ayub cabinet and its Punjabi allies to shift the seat of federal power away from 
refugee-dominated Karachi and into home territory.110  The Mangla and Tarbela 
projects were both dam-irrigation schemes – similar to the Sind barrages in that 
large artificial structures impeded and regulated the river’s flow in order to control 
the level of water in the river and in canals drawing water from it.  Unlike the Sind 
barrages, however, these schemes required the number of people formerly resident 
in the basin areas to abandon their homes and disperse throughout the country, 
losing their livelihoods and often their sense of community.111  Both schemes, 
moreover, had the backing of international donors, especially after the formation of 
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the Aid To Pakistan Consortium by the World Bank in October 1960, which was 
tasked with funding works planned during the Indus waters dispute with India.  
Indeed, during the early 1960s Pakistan’s political and financial attention turned very 
much towards these two projects, away from Sind: the Gudu Barrage represented 
the last major scheme to open up new lands for cultivation in the lower Indus 
region.   
Gudu Barrage land was, therefore, perceived as a resource that the state 
could use to facilitate other ‘development’ projects.  This staked out the Gudu 
project as a West Pakistani, rather than Sindhi, scheme.  Further information on the 
land allocation policies for this barrage has not been found during research for this 
thesis, but it seems that the concerns underpinning Gudu colonization remained 
similar to those for the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage.  Yet this is not to say that the 
colonization of every irrigation project in Sind was the same phenomenon.  The 
groups to whom land was allocated on the Ghulam Muhammad and Gudu Barrages 
were more diverse than those who colonized the Sukkur Barrage or the Jamrao 
Canal, reflecting the wide range of claimants on the state’s patronage in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  If a trend can be deduced, it seems that colonization policies for the 
Independence-era projects were less coherent than those of the colonial period.  
The very diversity of groups to whom small proportions of barrage land were 
allocated, from East Pakistani settlers to refugees from India, suggested that land 
was allocated in order to make a show of how the state was ‘looking after’ various 
sections of society.  This was similar to Ayub’s land reform programme, which made 
grand claims to have changed conditions for millions of cultivators, but in fact did 
relatively little to alter life on the ground.   
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Conclusion 
Successive administrations’ failure to distribute Sind barrage land after 
Independence was caused by an array of problems: the dominance of landlords over 
rural politics, distaste in ruling circles for radical change, and bureaucratic inertia.  
Despite changes in government at the higher levels, these problems remained 
substantially the same throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  Similarly, no variation on 
the form of government was able or willing to make radical changes to the existing 
systems of land ownership and tenure in the decades following Independence.  
There were, however, important differences in the ways that successive 
administrations during this period approached land.  The ‘democratic’ governments 
of the 1950s proved almost wholly ineffectual in either changing the situation on the 
ground, or co-ordinating their activities to ensure the longevity of that system of 
government.  Ayub Khan, on the other hand, identified his administration with 
intervention into agrarian society in a way that other administrations had not, by 
making land reform a key programme.  His centralized and autocratic style of 
government allowed for a more coherent set of policies that translated into more 
effective action.  The Martial Law administration government was able to have the 
barrage lands colonized more effectively than its predecessors in Pakistan, even if 
the actual process still fell short of the ideal.  It also pushed through land reforms 
which, though limited in scope and imperfectly executed, had a palpable effect in 
rural areas and furthered the consolidation of Ayub’s government’s rule.   In this it 
was aided by the pre-existing One Unit structure of provincial government in West 
Pakistan, which allowed the implementation of a programme that claimed to affect 
the whole province indiscriminately, but in practice had a much greater effect on 
certain areas.  In the case of land reforms, these areas were Sind and Baluchistan.  
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Consequently, Ayub’s administration reinforced the trend that privileged the model 
of middling landlords and peasant proprietorship common in the Punjab’s canal 
colonies, as had been the case for the Jamrao Canal and Sukkur Barrage under the 
colonial dispensation.  The land reforms programme was primarily designed, 
however, as a vehicle for the administration’s claim to legitimacy, and to reinforce 
its control over rural areas.  It should be remembered that these land reforms made 
more reference to the demands of the administration than the welfare of peasants: 
declarations of fidelity to the interests of the ‘common man’, which emanated from 
politicians and bureaucrats with increasing vigour throughout the 1950s and into the 
Ayub period, were usually cosmetic.   
Land politics in Pakistani Sind demonstrated, therefore, the limits of state 
power.  The rhetoric accompanying the construction of the barrage projects, which 
loudly proclaimed the mastery of the nation’s engineers over the natural 
environment, could not be translated directly into the colonization of barrage lands.  
On the other hand, the engineers’ capacity to move earth and water was not 
matched by an equivalent administrative or political capacity to re-work the social 
environment.  By the time Ayub Khan fell from power in March 1969, Sind’s 
irrigation system and agricultural landscape had changed more than the interests of 
the people who inhabited it.
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Conclusion 
[H]istorical scholarship is primarily about locating, drawing upon and 
integrating different types and sources of material – much of it 
fragmentary (in quality and scope), textual and scattered across 
different domains – in order to discern coherently the specific processes 
and mechanisms by which one historical moment influences another. 
-Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao (2009)1 
 
This thesis has examined the relationship between successive administrations in 
Sind and the development of the irrigation system, particularly the Jamrao Canal, 
Sukkur Barrage, Ghulam Muhammad Barrage, and Gudu Barrage projects.  These 
schemes were important not only because they were complex to execute and 
carried out on a large scale, but also because they expressed the capacity of 
governments to assert their legitimacy by seeking to control the environmental base 
that underpinned politics, society and the economy.  Professing all the while their 
concern for the advancement of a poor and ‘backward’ region, successive 
administrations used the prestige attached to large-scale, technology-intensive 
infrastructure works to demonstrate that they, as the vessels of scientific 'progress', 
had a right to govern Sind.  This was most crucially expressed in terms of human 
dominance over the environment, where the humans in question were agents of the 
state.  At the same time, administrations attempted, with varying degrees of 
coherence and success, to use land allocation policy in order to manage the social 
and political impacts that these projects would have in Sind.   
In the 1890s and early 1900s, the Jamrao Canal marked the beginning of 
increasing intervention into Sindhi agrarian life on the part of the colonial 
administration in Sind, which aimed at closer bureaucratic control over both the 
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physical environment and human cultivators.  This control was asserted by, 
respectively, government engineers’ ability to direct the flow of water from the 
River Indus to fields, and the rules and regulations – stricter than those ordinarily 
enforced in the Bombay Presidency – that governed the practice of agriculture on 
the Jamrao tract.  Officials furthered their aim with the mass importation of 
cultivators from the Punjab, where the canal colonies were considered to have 
refined the ‘naturally’ productive and efficient instincts of Jat agriculturalists.  
Punjabis were expected to bring their more ‘advanced’ cultivation methods to 
‘backward’ Sind, and help improve agricultural productivity across the province.  This 
attempt to modernize simultaneously Sind’s irrigational infrastructure and agrarian 
society was garbed in a language that asserted the duty of the British in India to lie 
in advancing the material progress of native Indians.  While these aspects of the 
Jamrao project were emphasized by official discussions of the project’s meaning, the 
colonial administration chose to bolster its political authority by conceding large 
grants of land to interest groups, such as the Talpur Mirs, within Sind.    
The trends that the construction and colonization of the Jamrao Canal had 
set were extended and intensified by the planning, construction, and colonization of 
the Sukkur Barrage.  Like the Jamrao Canal, the Sukkur Barrage was expected to 
increase agricultural productivity, help consolidate British political control over the 
province, and fulfil the colonizer’s obligation to advance India’s moral and material 
condition. Increases in official control over cultivation and cultivators, tested on the 
Jamrao Canal tract, came to be enacted across much of Sind, as land was 
compulsorily squared in anticipation of new cultivation conditions to be set by the 
renovated irrigation system.   Even more significantly for the dynamics of imperial 
power, the Sukkur Barrage demonstrated British technical and logistical expertise, 
and so became a symbol of British might.  Ceremonies connected with the barrage 
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reflected British officers’ perception of themselves as a force for ‘progress’ in Sind 
and India.  The place of grand public works in asserting the superiority of a 
rationalist view of nature, in which nature could be subjected to human dominance, 
also emphasized a hierarchy  in which ‘lazy’ and ‘irrational’ Sindhis were subjected 
by the British-led state.  The state proclaimed its power to re-make Sind’s people as 
well as its environment, and to this end Punjabis were again imported to work much 
of the newly-opened land, with the vague assumption that Sindhis would learn 
modern agricultural techniques from them.  Yet, in a repetition of officials’ 
experience of colonizing the Jamrao Canal, social and political stability in Sind 
demanded that Sindhi zamindars and haris also be allocated land, meaning that 
officials had to temper their enthusiasm for ‘scientifically’-minded Punjabi 
cultivators, who would also pay a high price for barrage land and produce high-value 
crops.  Despite officials’ scepticism about Sindhis and their ability to cultivate the 
new lands effectively, therefore, the Sukkur Barrage project had to take their 
position in the province into account.   
The barrage might have augured well for the extension of state authority in 
Sind, but in practice it complicated the relationship between officials and Sindhi 
rural magnates, becoming as it did the focus of fierce political debates.  At the same 
time, the barrage was effective in helping to instil the logic of material progress in 
the Sindhi public sphere, as arguments in favour of Sind’s separation from the 
Bombay Presidency in the 1920s-early 1930s referred to the expectation of a 
wealthier, more productive province to come.  Thus were laid the seeds of political 
support for ‘development’ activities after Independence.  Arguments made by 
Sindhis who opposed separation, meanwhile, had raised doubts about Sind’s ability 
to meet the debts incurred in constructing the barrage and new canals.  The senior 
bureaucracy came to share those reservations after separation was granted, when 
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controversy erupted between 1937-1939 over the administration’s desire to 
increase the rates of land revenue to be gathered on barrage lands.  This did not 
prove a disaster for the British in Sind, however, and successive Ministries were 
persuaded by Sir Lancelot Graham, the Governor, to defend the increase.  Attention 
was deflected from the Governor’s retention of the final say in matters connected 
with the barrage, and onto those Sindhi politicians who found themselves 
advocating the Government’s actions, proving the worth to the state of co-opting 
local elites rather than coming into outright conflict with them.   
Soon after the connection between state authority in Sind and the barrage 
had been tested and confirmed, the colonial discourse of material progress was 
challenged by the outbreak of the Second World War.  As the war created 
considerable uncertainty about the future of the British administration in India, the 
Government of Sind produced plans for post-war development, which represented 
part of the colonizers’ last-ditch attempt to retain control over the province by 
promising further development in the future.  Despite their relatively short-term 
political intentions, these plans did form the basis for post-Independence 
development schemes.    After Pakistani Independence, which followed closely upon 
the war’s end, the idea of ‘material progress’ that the Sukkur Barrage and the post-
war schemes had embodied was taken up enthusiastically by the new government, 
and re-cast in a nationalist framework as ‘nation-building’.  The need that officials, 
politicians, and the public felt for material progress was made even more pressing 
by the upheavals that the province, and Pakistan generally, experienced as a result 
of the transfer of power – demographic, social, and political.  During these first years 
of volatility, the post-colonial state consolidated the interventionist tendencies that 
the colonial state had maintained, and latterly justified with the language of 
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‘progress’, and took upon itself more functions of guiding and regulating social and 
economic behaviour in Sind. 
During Sind’s early days as a part of Pakistan, the two barrages that had 
been mooted in the post-war development plans were perceived by officials as the 
solution to the problem of raising agricultural productivity in Sind in the face of 
recurring food crises during the 1950s and early 1960s.  Indian claims on the waters 
of the Indus also brought home the vulnerability of Pakistan’s water position and 
highlighted the need for irrigation development in Sind and elsewhere.  Yet the 
location of the barrages at the heart of the new administration’s search for 
legitimacy revealed that they also had symbolic value.  The construction and 
opening ceremonies for the new Ghulam Muhammad and Gudu Barrages revealed a 
similarity with discourses connected with the Sukkur Barrage: the same obsession 
with engineering prevailed, albeit reconfigured as a marker of Pakistan’s national 
progress rather than of imperial superiority.  The celebration of technical rationalism 
that this embodied also found an avenue in the administrative-political innovation of 
the One Unit scheme.  While the scheme’s primary aims were political, the removal 
of the provincial frameworks in which development activities had previously been 
undertaken was seized upon as a fillip to a more ‘rational’ approach to the usage of 
Pakistan’s natural resources, such as the waters of the Indus, which prioritized 
technical notions of efficiency over political considerations.   
However, these grand notions were subverted when it came to the 
development of the barrage areas themselves, by preparing the land for cultivation 
and ensuring high crop yields.  The government’s policies for doing so were half-
hearted during the 1950s, and only had a large impact during the 1960s.  Moreover, 
the severe problems caused by the waterlogging of lands in Sind, especially in the 
barrage zones in the 1960s, undermined the technicist discourses that privileged 
 263 
 
engineering expertise.  While the government instituted another round of 
infrastructure projects to combat the drainage problem, reinforcing its reliance on 
engineers, the close of the 1960s marked the end of what Briscoe and Usman have 
called the “heroic age” of water engineering in Pakistan.2  Irrigation-extension 
projects on the scale of the barrages have not since been undertaken in Sind. 
The allocation and colonization of land on the Ghulam Muhammad and 
Gudu Barrages showed a different, and much more contested, side to irrigation 
development after Independence.  The slow pace of colonization on Ghulam 
Muhammad Barrage-watered tracts during the ‘democratic’ 1950s demonstrated 
the continuing power of landlords in Sind.  Big zamindars, who dominated the 
provincial legislature, were able to block moves towards a colonization policy that 
would not grant them the majority of new lands.  This was frustrating to the central 
government, members of which saw barrage lands as a resource that could be used 
to tackle Pakistan’s economic and demographic problems.  Meanwhile, the centre 
was powerful enough to prevent Sindhi zamindars from unilaterally dominating the 
development of the barrage projects.  Caught between two opposing forces, 
colonization virtually froze, with some settlement being achieved only in small 
blocks, serving special interests such as refugee resettlement.  In parallel 
developments, big zamindars’ power was also visible in the lack of effective reform 
carried through in Sind during the ‘democratic’ 1950s; while the frequent recurrence 
and repression of haris’ demands for greater protection from the government 
suggested that, despite Sind’s continued reputation for feudalistic ‘backwardness’, 
hari politics also remained an important force during this period.  Even after the 
amalgamation of Sind into West Pakistan in 1955, however, the relationship 
between Sind’s big landlords and other agrarian interest groups changed little.   
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The declaration of Martial Law in 1958 breathed new life into questions of 
land colonization and ownership, in Sind as across West Pakistan.  Ayub Khan’s land 
reforms in 1958-1959 shored up the general’s power by strengthening the position 
of the middle classes who supported him.  By attempting to impose the model of 
middling-sized landholdings and owner-cultivation, derived from the Punjab’s canal 
colonies, on the ‘backward’ areas of Pakistan that Sind epitomized, he also re-used 
the strategies of colonial administrations.  The limited success of these reforms 
highlighted the continuing strength of landlords in the countryside.  Similarly, while 
Ayub’s administration initially proclaimed an allegiance to the 'common man' and 
promised to allocate barrage lands to tenants and smallholders, it quickly changed 
tack.  Both Ghulam Muhammad and Gudu Barrage land was reserved for 'outsiders' 
such as refugees, civil servants, and military personnel.  Gudu Barrage land was later 
used, when it became available from 1962, to resettle people displaced by 
development projects in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, 
suggesting the needs of the nation's other development programmes took priority 
over the distribution of land to groups who already lived in Sind.  Throughout 
Pakistan’s first two decades, the failure of successive administrations to have 
barrage land effectively colonized, and the parallel failure to reform land usage and 
ownership in Sind, undermined claims that irrigation development would lead, 
through material progress, to a better future for the ‘common man’.  
 In this story of barrages and canals in Sind, then, can be read that of 
officials’ attempts to strengthen state authority through the simultaneous 
manipulation of natural and social forces.  Taking a long view, it is evident that 
understanding the colonial state is essential to a meaningful analysis of Pakistani 
history after Independence, while conversely events after 1947 highlighted those 
aspects of the relationship between the state and people that were deeply enough 
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ingrained to survive Independence.  Between 1898 and 1969 the relationship 
between the state, the people, and the environment in Sind remained remarkably 
constant in nature.  After Independence, the institutions put in place by the colonial 
administration in Sind continued to build barrages and canals, and the irrigation 
system continued to be a focal point for interactions between the state and the 
people.  By pursuing irrigational and agricultural development, administrations 
before and after Independence acted in an arena that often seemed divorced from 
elite national politics and the great political questions of the day – whether the 
communal balance in India’s constitutional future in the 1930s-1940s, or the 
increasingly strained relationship between the eastern and western wings of 
Pakistan in the 1950s-1960s.  The condition of the irrigation system, and the ways in 
which the state used irrigation development to manage agrarian society, continued 
throughout the early- to mid-twentieth century to shape provincial life.  River 
politics, and the politics of land irrigated by river-water, played a major part in Sind’s 
experience of the twentieth century, helping to determine the dynamics of power 
and authority within the province, and between the province and the wider region.  
This reflected the structural continuities in the state and agrarian society, as well as 
the fact that Pakistani administrators inherited those colonial attitudes towards 
irrigational and agricultural development that were loosely collected in the 
discourse of material progress. 
The overall trend of irrigation development was to strengthen the state in 
relation to society.  In the 1890s, the construction of new projects such as the 
Jamrao Canal heralded increasingly intensive agriculture.  State-owned, newly-
irrigated land was a resource that successive administrations could allocate to 
reward their collaborators and encourage the creation of new agrarian groupings, 
whose members in turn were expected to support the state politically and 
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economically, through their loyalty and land revenue payments.  At the same time, 
by imposing stricter conditions on cultivation methods, the state asserted and 
enhanced its ability to intervene in rural life.  This marked an important point in the 
process through which Sind became a more regular and regulated province, moving 
away from the province’s roots as a frontier, which remained visible in matters such 
as the application of tribal law in the Upper Sind Frontier.   
 Such developments reflected a similar pattern to that found in the Punjab, 
where the expansion of canal colonies from the mid-1880s extended close 
bureaucratic control in the formerly ‘wild’ districts in the west of the province.  
Analyzing these developments, Gilmartin, Ali and Islam have shown how far our 
understanding of the state in the Indus Basin benefits from considering its links with 
irrigated agriculture.  Since irrigation and colonization policy in Sind had many 
similarities to that in the Punjab, many of their conclusions are valid outside the 
Punjabi context.  Attempts by officials to transplant to Sind many characteristics 
associated with Punjabi canal colonies showed that the administration there 
followed the Punjab’s example of deploying ‘scientific’ knowledge of the natural 
environment and of the people whom it governed, in order to dominate both.  Sind, 
like its northern neighbour, was drawn into a regional framework of governance and 
public works policy, reflecting the imperial desire to fulfil the ‘civilizing mission’ by 
increasing material wealth.     
 On the other hand, Sind presented a rather messier prospect for irrigation 
development than did the western Punjab.  Sind’s numerous and powerful 
zamindars already claimed rights to much of Sind’s barren land, meaning that a large 
proportion of the thousands of acres serviced by any new canal would be privately-
owned, rather than state property.  Because of their pre-existing rights to land, and 
their political significance as mediators between the colonial state and the rural 
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population, zamindars were able to demand a significant proportion of the land 
opened up by irrigation projects.  This allowed them to consolidate their position in 
agrarian society and dominate the legislatures of British and, later, Pakistani Sind.  
Moreover, whereas canal development in the Punjab favoured peasant owner-
cultivators, officials were sceptical of the possibility that Sind could foster an 
equivalent native class, and consequently arranged for the importation of large 
numbers of ‘superior’ Punjabi cultivators to buy and work the land irrigated by the 
Jamrao Canal and Sukkur Barrage.  That these Punjabis seem to have had relatively 
little effect on provincial politics suggests that Sind’s elite, drawing on local 
zamindari families, was not seriously threatened by the administration’s attempts to 
establish links with their northern neighbours.  This in turn suggests that British 
colonization policy was only partially successful, at best, in altering the balance of 
power in the province, and using new land to promote agrarian change.  Even within 
the Indus Basin, local differences in the social and political context of irrigation 
development meant that, whatever officials might have desired, the way that 
political and social power developed idiosyncratically.   
When the Jamrao Canal was constructed and colonized, an interventionist 
state seemed a natural corollary of paternalistic imperialism, which had ebbed and 
flowed in colonial politics since the early nineteenth century.  By the time 
construction began on the Sukkur Barrage in the 1920s, however, paternalistic 
imperialism had begun to contradict broader political developments in India, where 
the rise of nationalist politics, and the concession to this that the British made in the 
form of more direct Indian involvement in governance, might have suggested that 
the state would become more responsive to pressures from social forces.  Instead, 
the state’s activities in the important arena of irrigation and agriculture remained 
distinctly authoritarian.  If, as Tomlinson argued, the 1935 Government of India Act 
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involved the relinquishing of day-to-day imperial control to the provinces,3 the 
Governor of Sind’s retention of special responsibility for the Sukkur Barrage showed 
that the British were far from ready to concede the whole of provincial governance 
in India.  Indeed it would have been odd if, having recently attempted meticulously 
to balance financial and political considerations in constructing and colonizing new 
canals, the administration had handed over such an integral part of state authority 
to Indian political control.  During the Second World War, while the Cripps Mission 
marked an important attempt to settle the future balance of power among Indian 
political parties and the imperial state, the Rau Commission on the sharing of Indus 
waters and the draft agreement drawn up by the engineers of Sind and the Punjab 
confirmed the place of the state’s technocrats in determining the agricultural 
conditions under which the people of the Indus Basin would live.   
The strength of the colonial state provided solid bureaucratic roots for what 
succeeded it after Pakistani Independence.  This was a matter of ideas as well as 
institutions, and the colonial discourse of ‘progress’ that had been attached to the 
Jamrao Canal and Sukkur Barrage translated easily, during the transition period of 
the 1940s and early 1950s, into a nationalist framework as one of ‘nation-building’.  
This process was not unique to Sind or India, but paralleled the evolution of the 
concept of ‘development’ in late-colonial Africa into a prime field of endeavour for 
the new nations there after decolonization.4  This, perhaps, was a common feature 
of the relationship between colonial states and their successors.  In the case of 
irrigation development in Sind, what was really being built was the infrastructure on 
which state authority depended.  This marked a continuity between the colonial and 
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post-colonial periods, allowing the developmentalist logic of large-scale 
infrastructure works to retain its grip on state activity.  The ‘democratic’ 1950s might 
have been a period of crisis for Pakistan, riven by the political chaos that led to Ayub 
Khan’s military coup in 1958, but in terms of irrigation development Sind forged 
ahead, notwithstanding accusations from the central government that the provincial 
administration was dragging its heels in constructing and colonizing the Ghulam 
Muhammad and Gudu Barrages.  While politics at the national level was dominated 
by the struggle for supremacy between combinations of Punjabi, Pashtun, refugee 
and Bengali factions during the 1950s and 1960s, as authors such Talbot have made 
clear,5 the state in Sind continued to prioritize material development over political 
autonomy and the making of engaged citizens.  Thus, authoritarianism in Pakistan 
was not only rooted in the military-bureaucratic heritage of the four provinces of 
West Pakistan, as Jalal and Alavi have influentially suggested,6 but also in the state’s 
claim to the right to ‘develop’ the country’s natural – and human – resources as it 
saw fit.  The lack of effective opposition to administrators’ assertion of this right 
suggests that the principle of progress through development activities was accepted 
in politically-influential circles.  In lieu of effective public movements to challenge 
the state over development works, such as the much later campaign against big 
dams in India in the 1990s,7 ownership of the meaning of material progress was 
reserved to the bureaucratic and political elites who determined how the state’s 
resources should be deployed. 
                                                          
5
 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A modern history (London: Hurst and Company, 2005), pp.138-143, 
161-164. 
6
 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan's political economy of 
defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.32; Hamza Alavi, 'The State in 
Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma 
(ed.s), Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (London; New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1973), pp.145-146. 
7
 See Arundhati Roy, The Cost of Living (London: Flamingo, 1999), pp.9-12. 
 270 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the contours of state 
power and authority remained entirely unaltered after Independence.  Differences 
in how the state was able to organize its relationship with the people were 
demonstrated by the fact that, during the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistani 
administrations did not produce coherent land allocation policies for the new 
barrages in Sind, as the British had done.  Lacking an organizing intentionality that 
was long-term, central, and programmatic, the political implications of barrage land 
allocation after Independence were more haphazard than they had been before it.  
Various iterations of colonization schemes might well have been as self-conscious 
about promoting the interests of certain groups as British schemes had been, but it 
is less likely that these were carried through effectively.   While comprehensive 
records, detailing how colonization actually progressed, are not available, the 
political manoeuvrings that determined who received barrage land seem to have 
been conducted in a more diffuse way than before Independence, involving 
numerous officers with relevant responsibilities rather than a Colonization Officer in 
collaboration with the Commissioner-in-Sind. 
Water and land remained crucial considerations in politics.  Politics in Sind, 
and other parts of the country (such as Baluchistan and the southern Punjab) that 
featured powerful big landlords remained wedded to an agrarian socio-economic 
structure that had survived the potentially destabilizing effects of supposedly 
‘revolutionary’ barrage irrigation.  Like the colonial administration before it, the 
state in Pakistan’s western wing found itself with little choice but to accommodate 
existing land-ownership patterns, and the contours of political power rooted in 
them, however much the rhetoric of ‘nation-building’ claimed that the state’s 
developmental responsibility lay in promoting the interests of refugees and the 
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‘common man’.  The greater success of land reforms in India,8 an area that shared 
the same broad colonial heritage as that of West Pakistan, emphasized the fact that 
landlord power in the latter was deeply entrenched in local society.  It could not be 
undone at a stroke.  At the same time, however, the tenacity of demands by haris 
and other low-status agricultural groups for greater state protection suggests that 
the dominance of landlords in politics was subject to challenge, and not as complete 
as a less detailed reading of the failure of successive administrations to instigate 
effective land reforms might suggest.   
One of the pillars of the colonial state in Sind – its management of the 
irrigation system, and its consequent interdependency with powerful rural interests 
– remained in place throughout the period under study, regardless of political 
upheaveals such as Pakistani Independence.  The role that the state played in 
Pakistani Sind vis à vis agrarian society continued to be determined, to a great 
extent, by its control of the supply of water and irrigated land.  Work done by 
successive administrations to improve water provision, and to bring more land 
under cultivation, did little to alter the basis of this relationship, despite the rhetoric 
of ‘progress’ during the British period, and that of ‘nation-building’ after 
Independence.  While successive administrations were able to strengthen 
bureaucratic influence over irrigation and cultivation practices, their political 
dependence on magnates in the countryside meant that changes in Sind’s irrigation 
system could not be used to foster socio-economic revolution, whereas the 
government in the Punjab had succeeded to a greater degree in adjusting the 
balance of power between different elements within agrarian society.  The 
paradoxical nature of irrigation development in Sind, especially during the intensive 
phase between the 1920s-1960s, was that the furious pace of technological and 
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infrastructural advancement was offset by the relative stasis in Sind’s political 
development.  The responsiveness of Sind’s political classes to changing conditions 
remained limited, but they were able to weather the passing storms of the Second 
World War, Pakistani Independence, One Unit, the declaration of Martial Law, and 
finally Ayub Khan’s land reforms, with remarkable success.  When Ayub’s 
government fell in 1969, and Pakistan collapsed into civil war in 1971, Sind’s 
zamindars remained prominent in their province, and were ready to emerge, 
relatively unfazed and unscathed, into the new ‘democratic’ era of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto’s ascendency.   
The Jamrao Canal and the Sind barrages, however, cannot be understood 
only in terms of their political ramifications and their effect on the dynamics of 
power in the province and the region.  The ideas that prompted successive 
administrations to seek solutions to everyday problems in river projects, and the 
type of 'development' that this represented, connected Sind, India and then Pakistan 
to wider discourses of progress and processes of modernity.  At their most 
fundamental level, these projects were intended to adjust the relationship between 
those who built irrigation systems and those who used them, and between humans 
and the environment.  Because this relationship characterized authoritarian 
government activity around the world, as Scott has shown,9 it has important 
implications for how we understand colonial and post-colonial states more 
generally.  A powerful narrative of human versus nature promoted a techno-centric 
state as the driving force behind of economic and demographic growth in the 
province, allowing those humans who were responsible for the projects (engineers, 
higher-ranking bureaucrats, and politicians) to represent progress and modernity.  
By implication these people were forward-thinking, scientifically-minded, and able 
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to deploy a vast amount of technical and logistical knowledge and ability.  
Furthermore, they took upon themselves the responsibility for the well-being and 
development of the general population.  In short, the modern, civilized human who 
conquered nature was analogous to the government; thus, according to the logic of 
this narrative, the state’s special status as the representative of civilization gave it a 
right to rule. 
Whether the narrative was bent to the purposes of aggrandizing the British 
Empire or, later, the Pakistani nation-state, one of its chief implications was the 
division between those who possessed technical expertise, and those who did not.  
All three barrage projects and the Jamrao Canal relied on a kind of knowledge that 
was the preserve of the state and very small sections of the public.  Sindhi zamindars 
and haris, by contrast, appeared to be the antithesis of this kind of knowledge.  By 
declaring their aim to 'transform' Sind through the application of technical 
knowledge and skill, officials made a virtue of technology-led modernization, in 
which social change was expected to follow infrastructural development.  This 
attitude was reflected by politicians, initially in their subservient role as members of 
the provincial Assembly in British Sind, and later as wielders of greater power in the 
provincial and central governments after Independence.  Taking its cue from colonial 
developments, the Pakistani state maintained its interest in large-scale projects such 
as the Ghulam Muhammad and Gudu Barrages, and in doing so continued to view 
infrastructural development as a precursor to social change.   
The teleology of ‘material progress’, and the distinction between the 
rational expert and the irrational farmer, played a crucial part in determining the 
political value of ‘expertise’.  Moreover, this knowledge was associated with an ideal 
of post-Enlightenment (Euro-American) rationalism, and its deployment in the 
service of the Empire and the nation emphasized that same distinction.  From the 
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late nineteenth century to the present day, experts in fields of the natural and social 
sciences have helped determine government policy in places and contexts as diverse 
as the early Soviet Union, Egypt in the 1940s, United States in the 1970s, and Latin 
America in the 1990s.10  South Asia was no exception, and the development of Sind’s 
irrigation system was a notable attempt to bring aspects of the province’s people 
and natural environment simultaneously under closer management by those 
‘experts’ who staffed the civil service.  After Independence, the Pakistani 
government’s seeking of experts from Europe, North America, and the white 
Dominions highlighted the links between such expertise and these regions’ 
application of technology and ‘modern’ social organization.  Indeed, exporting 
expertise was one of mid-twentieth century America’s ways of promoting its 
political agenda across the developing world.11   
We should be cautious, however, about viewing the importation of ‘foreign’ 
ideas and practices into developing countries as the defining elements of 
modernization processes in the developing world.  As this study has shown, 
Pakistani elites did not allow new ideas, particularly those promoted by Pakistan’s 
American benefactors, about how their country should be modernized to displace 
fully the lessons that they had drawn from the later decades of colonial rule.  Indeed 
the ‘modernization theory’ propounded by American scholars such as Talcott 
Parsons and W.W. Rostow in the 1950s-1960s, which dominated much of American 
thinking when it came to international development, laid more emphasis on the 
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attitudes of people in ‘traditional’ societies in the developing world than on 
technology transfer per se.12  Pakistan’s attempts to develop itself through large-
scale, technology-intensive construction projects – not only in Sind but also with the 
Thal Project in the Punjab and the Mangla, Taunsa, and Tarbela river schemes – 
demonstrated that it would continue to emphasize infrastructure rather than 
people.  Developing countries such as Pakistan did not, therefore, seek wholly to 
emulate the U.S.A. and other Western patrons when they set out on the path of 
post-independence modernization.   
Finally, Sind’s experience of barrage and canal projects underlined that 
irrigational and agricultural development did not necessarily follow a pattern set by 
a coherent or complete vision of technicist modernity.  Beyond the rhetoric of 
barrage-connected ceremonies, neither the colonial nor the postcolonial 
administrations used irrigation projects as the starting-point for the systematic 
development of the land.  The British in India sought to promote commercialized 
farming, and in Sind they made some effort to encourage what they regarded as 
scientific cultivation of land on the Jamrao Canal and Sukkur Barrage tracts, but 
Sind’s transport infrastructure remained unmodernized.  Nor were social aspects of 
modernization, such as extending education, meaningfully pursued.  After 
Independence, the administrations of the 1950s and 1960s were hesitant to 
promote and facilitate the introduction of synthetic fertilizers and mechanical 
cultivation into the barrage commands, even though these two resources could be 
associated with precisely the kind of scientific agriculture that the barrages were 
supposed to encourage, particularly against the backdrop of the Green Revolution 
that was sweeping through particular parts of the developing world.  Officials 
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questioned the wisdom of introducing mechanical cultivation where local conditions 
were not optimal for its use.  Foreign (particularly American) models of commercial 
agriculture were not in fact being imported wholesale, despite the precedent of 
shifts towards producing for a commercial market that had occurred during the 
British period.  Even Pakistan’s Five Year Plans, which were proclaimed to be 
comprehensive schedules for the rational development of the whole nation, proved 
ineffectual.  While, in Escobar’s words, “As the application of scientific and technical 
knowledge to the public domain, planning lent legitimacy to, and fuelled hopes 
about, the development enterprise,” across the ‘Third World’,13 in reality the 
supposed modernization of Pakistan underpinned the state’s claim to legitimacy 
without appearing to have a great effect on the country itself.  Neither the concrete 
evidence of development presented in the barrages, nor the bureaucratic, 
rationalizing drive of agricultural planning, were sufficient to make Sind ‘modern’.  
For the purpose of asserting the state in Sind’s power over nature and thus its right 
to rule, the fact of having built and begun to operate the barrages and canals – the 
same fact that was celebrated by the pomp and grand rhetoric of the foundation 
stone and opening ceremonies – seemed to suffice. 
Epilogue 
Today, the irrigation system in Sindh (as it is now spelled) remains the backbone of 
the agrarian economy.  Since the 1970s international donors, such as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development 
Bank, have played a greater role in financing and planning water development 
projects in the province.  These have tended to focus on drainage and water 
management, such as the Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects of the 1970s-
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1980s; there have been no new major river-diversion schemes since the Gudu 
Barrage.  The question of how much water each riparian partner on the Indus could 
take, which originated in a disagreement between the colonial Governments of 
Bombay and the Punjab, was supposedly settled within Pakistan by an 
interprovincial water accord in 1991, but downstream voices still argue that Sindh 
needs more water.14  Riparian tension exists within Sindh too, where much of the 
Indus Delta region lies devastated: by concentrating on diverting water into the 
barrage-fed canal system, the authorities leave only a tiny amount to trickle down to 
the sea.  This has led to environmental and economic deterioration in the delta, 
from the death of the coastal mangrove swamps (which relied on fresh water 
flowing out from the river, and formed an important breeding ground for fish) to the 
spoiling of agricultural land as sea-water leaches inland.15 
In the wake the floods that devastated many parts of Pakistan, especially the 
North-West Frontier Province and Sindh, in August 2010, the irrigation system has 
gained a new prominence in the public consciousness.  The government’s response 
to these floods, and by extension the relationship between the state and the 
environment, has been keenly watched.16  Amid the human suffering that the 2010 
floods caused, the crucial importance of the river in Sindh and Pakistan was clear.  
The claims of the builders of canals and barrages to have tamed the Indus and 
conquered the environment were starkly revealed to have been prematurely made.   
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